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Abstract 
This study warns that Scottish education is in danger of losing a valuable and venerable 
element of the school curriculum: the Classics. In order to demonstrate what Scottish 
education stands to lose, this study defends one particular element of the Classics, rhetoric, 
understood as the practice of effective speaking and effective writing for the purpose of 
persuasion. Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence (CfE), first conceived in 2002 and 
implemented in 2010, is still a fledgling curricular initiative and schools are currently in an 
adjustment phase while existing syllabus content and pedagogical approaches are reviewed 
in order to better reflect the aims and purposes of the new curriculum. With increased 
focus on teacher autonomy, flexibility, personalisation and choice (Scottish Government 
2008), now is an ideal time, I claim, to reveal and defend the contribution of rhetoric to this 
curriculum. This study promotes the learning and teaching of rhetoric in Scottish 
secondary schools, citing its potential to enrich not just the Classics but many areas of the 
curriculum, and makes particular claims for its contribution to cultivating critical and 
responsible citizens.  
Set against a broader backdrop of political and philosophical influences on curriculum 
reform and educational policy, this research examines the origins, aims and purposes of 
CfE and suggests that, although clearly influenced by supranational expectations regarding 
employability, economic growth and adequately equipping the future workforce, the 
curriculum appears to uphold the value of the Arts and Humanities and places education 
for citizenship at its core. These moves imply progress, at least in Scotland, towards 
ameliorating the ‘crisis in the Humanities’ and making room for increased focus on cross-
curricular skills and abilities which are considered important for responsible citizenship: 
literacy, speaking and listening, argumentation and debate. The retention of Classical 
languages in Scotland’s new curriculum offers renewed hope, at least at the policy level, 
for the revitalisation of Classics teaching in Scottish schools. Yet despite their inclusion in 
the curriculum, they have received no promotion and there are no teacher training places 
available in Classical languages in Scotland so, at a practical level, the future of the 
subjects remains in crisis. By focussing on the educational merit of just one feature of the 
Classics, this study aims to highlight the value of rhetoric in CfE and in so doing raise the 
profile and improve the image of Classical language education. 
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I argue that the Classical rhetorical framework, developed as a method for citizens to 
represent themselves effectively in public, has much to offer the development of literacy, 
critical literacy and critical thinking. These skills are shown to be linked to citizenship 
education and particular attention is paid to what is meant by ‘responsible citizenship’ in 
CfE. The argument is made that popular interpretations of the policy imply personally 
responsible or participatory conceptions of citizenship, but I promote a maximal 
interpretation in the form of ‘justice-oriented’ citizenship (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 
242). I defend that it is this conception of citizenship which is optimal for Scottish 
democracy both to appeal to the Scottish democratic intellect (Davie 1961) and to advance 
the values of wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity, the values inscribed on the mace 
in the Scottish Parliament (Gillies 2006). Despite ambiguity in CfE regarding the form of 
democracy envisaged for the 21st century, I argue that the study of rhetoric cultivates 
knowledge and skills which are particularly pertinent and beneficial to deliberative 
democracy and that in such a conception of democracy, rhetoric complements critical 
argumentation as a method of deliberation between citizens. I claim that it does so by 
facilitating narrative imagination, engaging the emotions and by providing a 
communicative bridge between diversely positioned deliberators.  
After highlighting and defending the value of rhetoric in CfE, the study concludes with the 
consideration of how rhetoric might best be positioned in the curriculum and advances a 
number of possible pedagogical models for its delivery, the most practical of which is 
offered by a cross-curricular approach but the most desirable of which is conferred by 
Classical languages. 
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Glossary of Classical rhetorical devices 
Alliteration: Repetition of the same sound beginning several words in sequence. ‘Let us 
go forth to lead the land we love’. J. F. Kennedy 
Anaphora: The repetition of a word or phrase at the beginning of successive phrases, 
clauses or lines. ‘It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of 
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of 
incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of 
hope, it was the winter of despair’. Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities 
Anticlimax: A rhetorical term for an abrupt shift from a serious or noble tone to a less 
exalted one--often for comic effect. ‘In moments of crisis I size up the situation in a flash, 
set my teeth, contract my muscles, take a firm grip on myself and, without a tremor, always 
do the wrong thing’. George Bernard Shaw 
Antithesis: The placing of a sentence or one of its parts against another to which it is 
opposed to form a balanced contrast of ideas, as in ‘Man proposes, God disposes’. 
Apostrophe: When a writer (or speaker) uses words to speak directly to a person or an 
opponent, or to an imaginary person, location, deity, abstract quality or idea, not actually 
present. ‘O black night, nurse of the golden eyes!’ Euripides  
Asyndeton: Deliberate omission of conjunctions between a series of words, phrases, or 
clauses.  The effects of this device are to emphasize each clause and to produce a 
punctuated rhythm in the sentence. ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’. Julius Caesar 
Chiasmus: The reversal of the order of words in the second of two parallel phrases. ‘He 
came in triumph and in defeat departs’. 
Ellipsis: Deliberate omission of a word or of words that are readily implied by the context 
and must be supplied by the reader or listener. ‘And he to England shall along with you’. 
Shakespeare, Hamlet Act III 
Hendiadys: A figure of speech in which an idea is expressed by two nouns connected by a 
conjunction instead of a noun and modifier, as in ‘to look with eyes and envy’ instead of 
‘to look with envious eyes’. 
Homoioteleuton: A figure of speech in the endings of words/phrases have similar sounds. 
‘She was sweeping while the baby was wailing’. 
Hyperbaton: A figure of speech using deviation from normal or logical word order to 
produce a rhetorical or distinctive effect. ‘Some rise by sin, and some by virtue fall’. 
Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act II 
Hyperbole: The use of exaggerated terms for the purpose of emphasis or heightened 
effect. ‘We walked along a road in Cumberland and stooped, because the sky hung so low’.  
Thomas Wolfe, Look Homeward, Angel 
Litotes: Deliberate understatement, especially when expressing a thought by denying its 
opposite. ‘It isn't very serious. I have this tiny little tumour on the brain’. J.D. Salinger, 
The Catcher in the Rye 
Metaphor: Implied comparison achieved through a figurative use of words; the word is 
used not in its literal sense, but in one analogous to it. ‘From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste 
in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent’. Winston Churchill  
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Onomatopoeia: The use of words that imitate the sounds associated with the objects or 
actions to which they refer. ‘Chug, chug, chug. Puff, puff, puff. Ding-dong, ding-dong. The 
little train rumbled over the tracks’. Arnold Munk, The Little Engine That Could 
Paradox: An apparently contradictory statement that nevertheless contains a measure of 
truth. ‘Art is a form of lying in order to tell the truth’. Pablo Picasso 
Personification: Investing abstractions or inanimate objects with human qualities. ‘Once 
again, the heart of America is heavy. The spirit of America weeps for a tragedy that denies 
the very meaning of our land’. Lyndon Baines Johnson 
Polyptoton: Repetition of words derived from the same root. ‘With eager feeding food 
doth choke the feeder’. Shakespeare, Richard II Act 2 
Praeteritio: Allusion to something by denying that it will be mentioned. ‘It would be 
unseemly for me to dwell on Senator Kennedy's drinking problem, and too many have 
already sensationalized his womanizing...’ 
Prolepsis: A technique by which an orator foresees and forestalls objections to an 
argument; the anticipation of possible objections to a speech. This allows the orator to 
provide answers to the objections before anyone else has the opportunity to raise them. 
Pun: The pun, also called paronomasia, is a form of word play that suggests two or more 
meanings, by exploiting multiple meanings of words, or of similar-sounding words, for an 
intended humorous or rhetorical effect. ‘Now is the winter of our discontent made glorious 
summer by this son of York’. Shakespeare, Richard III Act I 
Rhetorical question: Asking a question, not for the purpose of eliciting an answer but to 
assert or deny an answer implicitly. ‘Can anyone look at our reduced standing in the world 
today and say, “Let's have four more years of this”?’ Ronald Reagan 
Simile: An explicit comparison between two things using 'like' or 'as'. ‘My love is as a 
fever, longing still’. Shakespeare, Sonnet 147 
Synecdoche: A figure of speech in which a part stands for the whole. ‘I have nothing to 
offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat’. Winston Churchill 
Transferred epithet: The reversal of the syntactic relation of two words. ‘Fitting the 
clumsy helmets just in time’. Wilfred Owen, Dulce et Decorum est 
Tricolon: A series of three parallel words, phrases or clauses. ‘Tell me and I forget. Teach 
me and I remember. Involve me and I learn’. Benjamin Franklin 
Zeugma: Use of a word to govern two or more words though appropriate to only one, as in 
‘I lost my keys and my temper’.  
 
Adapted and excerpted from Corbett and Connors (1998) 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The motivation behind this study is three-fold: a personal commitment to the teaching of 
Classical languages, civilisations and literatures; a crisis in Classics education and the 
introduction of a new curriculum in Scotland which permits the reconsideration of, and 
exposes renewed potential for, certain elements of Greek and Latin teaching. In this 
introductory chapter, I show how each of these motivations has influenced the selection of 
this research study. I reveal its aims, justify its methodology and trace its evolution from 
my professional context.  
According to Michael Russell, the Cabinet Secretary for Education and Lifelong Learning, 
‘Curriculum for Excellence [CfE] is the big idea in Scottish education’ (Humes 2013: 23) 
so it is appropriate that I should situate my defence of rhetoric within CfE policy, to 
maximise the relevance of the research for contemporary policy and practice in Scotland. It 
is necessary to provide some background to the inception, creation and development of 
Scotland’s new curriculum in order to suggest that its introduction represents the dawn of a 
new educational age in Scotland, and in particular, one which is receptive to a resurgence 
of Classical language education. To achieve this, a distinction is drawn between the 
Scottish curricular reform and global trends in education which advantage learning in 
Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) and tend to disregard the Arts 
and Humanities. It is from an acute awareness of the worrying impact these trends have 
had on Classics teaching that the study is partially motivated. In this regard, a broad and 
overarching theoretical question underpins the research study at both macro and micro 
levels: ‘What is education for?’. This question needs to be reconsidered urgently, I 
propose, and the answers (there are many) undergird and fuse the complex nexus of policy 
analysis, philosophy of education and political theory on which my recommendations 
regarding Classical language education, curriculum theory, citizenship education and 
democratic deliberation are based. The time is right, I contend, for a reappraisal of 
Classical education which highlights the potential loss to democracy, citizenship and 
education in Scotland if Classical languages, and rhetoric in particular, are allowed to 
perish.  
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First, I provide some autobiographical background including my educational experiences 
to date in order to adequately orient the personal and professional axes which frame the 
dissertation. Thereafter, I illustrate the importance and relevance of the research by 
outlining the current crisis in Classics education.  
Professional Autobiography 
At school, I loved Latin. I started learning the language of the Romans when I was 11 
years old and very quickly demonstrated some aptitude. The meticulous attention to detail 
required for the translation of a highly inflected language appealed to the more precise 
faculties of my juvenile mind but the need to piece together the disparate clues and make 
sense of the archaeological remains of daily life in Ancient Rome called on imagination 
and creativity. It was this combination of linguistic focus and historical ‘detective work’ 
which got, and has kept, me hooked. Reading the poetry of Virgil, Ovid and Catullus and 
the prose of Seneca, Pliny and Cicero was just reward for the industry and application 
required to learn seemingly incessant grammar rules. The grammar rules required for 
Latin, though, pale into insignificance compared to those required for Classical Greek, as I 
found aged 16. By that time, I had decided that I would study Classics at university and to 
do so at a Classics department of good repute, I realised that I would have to learn Greek. 
With Greek verbs being almost interminably irregular, I questioned the sense of such an 
endeavour on a daily basis but as soon as the rich and timeless literature of Homer, 
Euripides and Herodotus became accessible to me, all trauma was forgotten. At university, 
I expanded my Classical horizons by studying a variety of courses including Greek and 
Latin literature, History, Archaeology and Philosophy, all the time fascinated by the value 
and enduring relevance of the ideas and events of the Ancient civilisations under study. My 
interest in the Latin and Greek languages and civilisations blossomed throughout 
undergraduate and postgraduate study and, thereafter, I felt compelled to share my passion 
with others. It was during teacher training that I came to understand the important part I 
could play in spreading enthusiasm for Classical subjects to the next generation of learners. 
Since 2006, then, I have been a teacher of Classics (Latin, Greek, Classical Civilisation and 
Ancient History). I have taught in three secondary schools; an independent day school for 
girls and boys in Scotland (2006-2010), an independent day school for girls in England 
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(2010-2012) and most recently in an English State-funded co-educational Sixth Form 
College for International students, where I teach Classical Greek and Roman Studies on the 
International Baccalaureate diploma programme. When I commenced the Doctorate in 
Education (Ed.D.) I was teaching in Scotland. I now have professional experience in both 
Scotland and England but have chosen to situate my defence of rhetoric in the Scottish 
curriculum for two reasons: firstly, the number of students studying Classics at school in 
England is rising but it is falling in Scotland (Cambridge Schools Classics Project [CSCP] 
2007) which makes analysis of its curricular contribution more urgent in Scotland and, 
secondly, my own involvement with aspects of the Scottish curricular reform process.  
As lead teacher in the department in my first school, I was recruited by the Scottish 
Qualifications Authority (SQA) to join the Qualification Design Team (QDT) for Latin, a 
group established to consider how the aims and purposes of Scotland’s CfE could be best 
reflected in Latin qualifications at all levels. As a member of this team, I executed the 
overhaul and redesign of Latin syllabi content and assessment in the secondary phase of 
Scottish education. In performing this role since 2010, I have been tasked with thinking 
creatively in collaboration with colleagues from higher education as well as teachers of 
Classics from independent and State schools
1
 about the future of Classical language 
teaching in Scotland. It is important to note that my involvement has been limited to the 
implementation of the policy and the redesign of qualifications: I did not play any role in 
the writing of the CfE policy documents, only SQA assessment guidance documents. In 
such a way, I do not consider my research to be conducted as a policy ‘insider’ (Brannick 
and Coghlan 2007) since the main focus for the study is a suite of documentation written 
by the Curriculum Review Group, a board of which I was not a member. Obviously, that I 
have contributed to the publication of SQA policy documentation (assessment criteria, 
exemplification and associated evidence of attainment), redesigned in order to better reflect 
the assessment needs of CfE, has encouraged me to keep abreast of wider policy 
development. An interest in the evolving nature, discourse and ramifications of the policy, 
rather than in assessment itself, has proved of particular academic intrigue. Aside from 
contributing to the development of innovative assessment more compatible with the aims 
of CfE, I am first and foremost a practitioner and this research study is firmly rooted in and 
                                                 
1
 Because our subjects are taught in the merest paucity of State schools in Scotland (in 2011-2012 of the 44 
centres presenting candidates, 12 were in the State sector), my own experience, like that of most Classics 
teachers, is based predominantly in the independent sector. However, my understanding of the learning and 
teaching of Classics across the sectors has been informed by real and current experience through extensive 
collaboration with colleagues from State schools on the QDT. 
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supported by classroom teaching experience and membership of a profession in the throes 
of curricular reform.  
Why the defence of Classical rhetoric?  
Aware that it would be impossible, within the confines of an Ed.D. dissertation, to provide 
an adequately argued defence of Classical language education in its entirety, I have opted 
instead to focus on the value of just one element of Latin and Greek which I consider has 
particular benefit to contemporary education: rhetoric. I was first introduced to rhetoric 
(for examples of Ancient and modern rhetorical passages see Appendix A) by my Classics 
teacher, at high school, when I studied Standard Grade and Higher Latin. The rhetorical 
devices employed by Cicero, Rome’s foremost orator, captured my imagination and 
inspired me to learn more about the art of persuasion. I remember being particularly struck, 
as a teenager, by the enduring relevance of Classical rhetoric and its recurrent use in the 
‘modern’ communication of politicians, journalists and advertisers. I felt that the ability to 
identify the use of specific rhetorical devices and analyse their effect allowed me to 
distinguish quickly style from substance while appreciating the literary benefits of eloquent 
communication. During my undergraduate study of Literae Humaniores, I contrived to 
choose as many rhetorical options as possible and now, privileged to cascade my 
knowledge of Classical rhetorical theory to young people, I find its relevance is reinforced 
on a daily basis. When teaching elements of rhetoric through Latin literature, I never fail to 
be amazed by the students’ wonder when an orator’s linguistic tricks are demystified 
through knowledge of the rhetorical framework as though a magician has waved a magic 
wand and an opaque veil of communicative stupefaction has been removed, restoring 
penetrating linguistic clarity. Intrigued by the powerful effect the learning and teaching of 
rhetoric can have on students, it seemed an obvious choice for me to pursue this ongoing 
fascination with Classical rhetoric at the core of my Doctoral dissertation as I identify 
myself as both a Classicist and an educator. In the section which follows, I explain what is 
meant by Classics and provide some background to the teaching and learning of Classical 
languages and their treatment in educational policy. This context is necessary for the 
exploration of what is meant by rhetoric in the next chapter.  
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The crisis in Classics 
Classics is an umbrella term for the languages, literatures and civilisations of the Greeks 
and Romans. Latin and Greek are the Classical languages which give fullest and richest 
access to the poetry, philosophy, plays, letters, history and rhetoric of these civilisations 
although they can, of course, be studied in translation and in Scotland there exists an 
English-medium course of this type called Classical Studies. Classical Studies is 
considered a Social Subject in CfE, like Geography, History, Business Studies and Modern 
Studies and, as such, has no linguistic focus. It is primarily concerned with the social 
aspects of the Ancient world. Classical rhetoric is not studied as part of Classical Studies 
but forms a significant part of Latin and Greek syllabi in Scotland and so my defence of 
rhetoric is only concerned with the linguistic aspects of Classics education, about which 
more will be said in Chapters Two, Three and Six.  
It ought to be noted at the outset that the learning and teaching of Classical subjects in 
school classrooms has not been the subject of many
2
 research studies or publications over 
the last century and the majority of those which do exist is based in an English curricular 
context. Owing to the very limited (Williams 2003) number of published works on the role 
of Classical subjects in Scottish education little is known about how, when and why they 
came to disappear from most mainstream schools. In order to outline the current crisis in 
Classics education, I will refer to the national picture, informed by English research studies 
which are illuminative of general trends in curriculum reform. Knowledge of the Scottish 
context has been informed by curriculum policy documentation and discussion with 
colleagues who have enjoyed longer careers in education than I.   
In the late 19
th
 and early to mid 20
th
 centuries, secondary school education was 
synonymous with training in the Classics, or more accurately a training in the Latin and 
Greek languages. The Victorian and Edwardian attitude to the learning of Classics at 
school was that the linguistic aspects should take precedence over history, archaeology and 
philosophy. Sullivan (1965: 4) comments, rather facetiously, on the centrality of the 
languages: ‘[t]o be against accuracy and a sound knowledge of Latin and Greek is rather 
                                                 
2
 Bolgar 1963, Sullivan 1965, Sharwood-Smith 1977, Stray 1998, Morwood 2003, Hart 2006, Lister 2007. 
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like being against God, country and motherhood’. The mental aerobics required for 
translation and critical linguistic analysis were thought to be instrumentally valuable in the 
training of the mind. Indeed, Bolgar (1963: 8) asserts that the study of Classics facilitates 
‘a clear grasp of the nature of grammar and syntax, the acquiring of a sound basis for an 
understanding of philology and mastery of the art of writing’.  
Developments in recent history have prompted the marginalisation or dismissal of Classics 
from this pivotal position in the school curriculum and have precipitated a concomitant 
decline in the number of students studying Classical subjects in schools. Technological and 
industrial advancements in the last century and the demand for scientists fuelled by wars 
and international tension, such as the Cold War, meant that the centrality of Classics in 
education came to be questioned since the study of literature and history did not appear to 
contribute directly to national advancement. Previously exalted as the ‘best key to a proper 
understanding of life’ (Bolgar 1963: 11), Classical languages were succeeded by Science 
and Mathematics as the focus of promotion in educational policy (Baker 1989, Stray 1998, 
Teaching and Learning Research Programme 2006, Taylor 2008, Wynarczyk and Hale 
2009).  
In 1960, as a result of this shift away from Classics on the school curriculum, the 
withdrawal of the requirement for all Oxbridge entrants to have Latin caused Classics to go 
into a deeper downward spiral. This was exacerbated by the Education Reform Act (United 
Kingdom Parliament 1988) and the associated introduction of the National Curriculum in 
England which stated there would be three ‘core’ subjects (Maths, Science and English) 
and a further list of seven foundation subjects (History, Geography, a Modern Foreign 
Language, Technology, Music, Art and Physical Education) and thus Classical subjects 
were excluded from that point onwards in many State schools. With the launch of 
comprehensive education, Classics attracted a reputation for being an ‘instrument of 
selection for an intellectual elite’ (Sharwood Smith 1977: 2) and was considered 
incompatible with the progressive educational agenda of the 1970s and 1980s (Baker 1989, 
Moore 1989, Williams 2003, Gillard 2011) since the rote learning required in Classics 
appeared to hark back to the post-war days of strict discipline and knowledge transmission, 
both of which were deemed undesirable at that time. With an urgent need for scientists and 
mathematicians, Classical subjects, perceived as being useless, irrelevant and remote, 
became unfavoured. The mystique which surrounded the ‘classically educated man, able, 
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by virtue of his training, to master any problem in the sphere of life, so long as it was 
amenable to intellectual analysis’ (Sharwood Smith 1977: 1) began to fade and Classics 
was thus dethroned from the dominant position it had long held in the curriculum. 
Predictably, in consequence, the numbers with access to Classical subjects declined. In 
Scotland, Latin and Greek remained in the curriculum as optional subjects but they 
dwindled in popularity as schools chose to place emphasis on subjects which offered 
knowledge and skills which improved potential for, and could be directly applied to, 
employment. As Classics teachers were due to retire, departments were closed and so over 
the last half century, Classical language education has disappeared entirely from most 
Scottish schools, remaining in the merest paucity
3
. With more teachers now leaving 
Classics classrooms nationally, than are entering (Beckett 2012, Hunt 2012a, b, c, 2013), 
the subject is precariously poised between survival and extinction. Presentations for SQA 
exams have declined to such a degree
4
 that Standard Grade Greek qualifications were 
withdrawn in 2011, as a result of SQA’s ‘low uptake policy’ (SQA 2010) and the decision 
was taken in the same year that no new qualifications would be developed for Classical 
Greek in Scotland
5
. Effectively, the subject was axed from CfE. The fear among Classicists 
is now that the ‘low-uptake policy’, like the sword of Damocles, hangs ominously over the 
future of Latin at all levels. Thus the situation is now urgent and I fear that, unless a strong 
case is made for the retention of the Classics, Scottish education stands to be intellectually 
and culturally impoverished as a result of their removal from the curriculum. 
The hazards facing the future of Classics education in Scotland and elsewhere are in part 
the result of shifting global trends in education policy and curricular reform. At the crux of 
the matter is the question which underlies all curriculum decisions, ‘What is education 
for?’. The answers to this question are being increasingly motivated by political and 
                                                 
3
 In exam diet 2011-2012, 44 schools out of 550 secondary schools and colleges in Scotland presented 
candidates for Latin qualifications. 24 presented candidates for Standard Grade (total presentation: 411), 1 
presented candidates for Intermediate 1 (total presentation: 5), 12 presented candidates for Intermediate 2 
(total presentation: 139), 35 presented candidates for Higher (total presentation: 243), 14 presented 
candidates for Advanced Higher (total presentation: 26). Given that the average total number of candidates 
per year is 50,000 (SQA 2011), those sitting Latin qualifications amount to 0.5 per cent.  
4
 In exam diet 2011-2012, 3 centres presented candidates for Classical Greek qualifications. Total 
presentation at Intermediate 2 was 15 and at Higher was 8. Given that the average total number of candidates 
per year is 50,000 (SQA 2011), those sitting Greek qualifications amount to 0.04 per cent.  
5
 After 2013, pupils wishing to gain accreditation for Classical Greek will have to be presented for an 
alternative qualification; General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), Advanced Subsidiary (AS) 
and Advanced Level (A Level) qualifications are offered by the English Oxford, Cambridge and RSA (OCR) 
examination board. 
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economic factors as nations aim to increase their gross domestic product (GDP) and 
become more economically and technologically competitive (Becker 1964, Kernan et al. 
1997, Hartley 2003, Dale 2005, Menand 2010, Ferrall 2011, Fettner 2011). As shall be 
shown later in this chapter, there is evidence that these considerations have, in part, 
influenced the development and discourse of CfE. ‘The profit motive’ (Nussbaum 2010: 7) 
is prioritised by leaders and policy makers as being the key to the future health of nations, 
with a number of concomitant consequences. Most worrying among these is a ‘crisis in the 
Humanities’6 which threatens the study of Humanities subjects in schools and universities 
across the globe. As a result of this focus on economic growth, parents are becoming 
increasingly impatient with schools which seek to cultivate ‘allegedly superfluous skills’ 
(Nussbaum 2010: 4) like the ability to think critically and imagine sympathetically the 
predicament of another person. They dismiss other abilities considered vital for democratic 
citizenship and campaign instead for ‘getting their children filled with testable skills that 
seem likely to produce financial success’ (Nussbaum 2010: 4). With employment and 
national economic growth playing new roles in reframing theories concerning the purpose 
of education, one theory in particular appears to have had a negative impact on the learning 
and teaching of Humanities subjects like Classics: Human Capital Theory (HCT). 
Research conducted in Chicago in the 1960s produced a theory which recognised that 
education was ‘the single most important determinant’ of economic growth (Becker 1964: 
45). Education and training were therefore considered to be an investment (not only for the 
individual, but also for their community, country and government) since, according to the 
theory, enlarged human capital impacts directly on skill creation, productivity and income. 
The prioritisation of human capital as a conduit through which education could be directly 
converted to economic output resulted in the HCT dividing the curriculum into the 
appreciative (subjects concerned with intrinsic value like Art, Philosophy and Classics) and 
the instrumental (subjects which are of value beyond themselves like Science, Mathematics 
and Modern Foreign Languages). Because the HCT considers that people act for economic 
reasons alone and are driven by return on investment, it  
                                                 
6
 The threat of this educational calamity has been the focus of many embittered research studies. A selection 
includes:  Plumb 1964, Kernan et al. 1997, Weisbuch 1999, Paulson 2001, Donoghue 2008, Collini 2009, 
Franke 2009, Levine 2009, Meyer Spacks and Berlowitz 2009, Woodward 2009, Gay 2010, Menand 2010, 
Bate 2011, Ferrall 2011, Fettner 2011, Motion 2011, Wolin 2011.  
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cannot explain the behaviour of someone who wants to spend her time studying 
something without any prospect of economic returns from this education… 
such as learning to read and understand poems, or studying some ancient 
culture (Robeyns 2006: 72-73).  
As a result of this theoretical perspective influencing educational stakeholders at all levels 
(teachers, schools, local education authorities and government education departments 
among others), I have heard from colleagues in local and national networks that teachers 
who failed to adequately justify the impact of Classics for entrepreneurship, enterprise and 
employability initiatives, found themselves squeezed out of the curriculum, left teaching 
Classics outside the school day or not at all. There may, of course, be other factors at work 
but the brutal division of learning into ‘directly applicable’ and ‘useless’, which the HCT 
promotes, has damaged the esteem of Humanities subjects like Classics. This 
simplification of the curriculum is ill-informed and short-sighted, in my view, since 
learners leave school and become members of a multi-faceted community (both local and 
global) where they must exercise critical judgement informed by their study of the 
diversity of human life: they are not simply robots working in industry or financial 
markets. Grave dangers lie in store for us, I believe, if we allow the HCT to suppress the 
study of the Humanities. I support the stance taken by Wolin (2011: 15) who defends the 
Humanities by identifying that in studying the events of the past, we are more able to 
create a future free of injustice. Furthermore, he advises that studying Philosophy equips us 
with the reasoning skills and moral judgement necessary for discerning justice from 
injustice and ‘the substantive from the superficial’. Literature, he suggests, exercises the 
imagination and expands our conception of what is possible and rhetoric, he says, 
‘furnishes us with the capacities of linguistic self-expression in order that we might 
persuade our fellow citizens about the worth of our most cherished beliefs and 
convictions’(Wolin 2011: 15). I concur that the Humanities offer a host of educative 
benefits which cannot be supplanted by instrumental subjects. 
Despite the HCT excising the appreciative disciplines of the sort described here, it is 
acknowledged by many (see previous footnote) that a narrow focus on instrumental 
learning (exemplified by STEM subjects) is insufficient preparation for democratic 
citizenship. Indeed, to keep ‘democracies alive and wide awake’ (Nussbaum 2010: 10), the 
curriculum needs to offer more than instrumental knowledge: it must cultivate capacities 
for critical thinking, reflection and effective self-expression; all of which I consider are 
10 
 
offered abundantly by the study of Classics. Dewey (1966: 249) urges against a division 
between learning for intrinsic and extrinsic purposes, promoting instead the realisation of 
the value of each subject in itself, before measuring its capacity as a resource for other 
ends. This appears to have been the guiding principle of curriculum design in the late 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries, when Classics enjoyed prominence on the school curriculum but 
greater emphasis is now placed on those subjects, like Science, which ‘will help build a 
vibrant and sustainable economy’ (Scottish Executive 2006a: 29), because it is 
believed that tomorrow’s scientists and engineers will contribute directly to the growth 
of Scotland’s national wealth.  
Another global trend which has contributed to the promotion of STEM subjects and has 
damaged the role of Classics in schools and society is the ‘skills agenda’ which prioritises 
the cultivation of skills over the isolated transmission and absorption of knowledge. CfE 
states that ‘the development of skills is essential to learning and education to help young 
people to become successful learners, confident individuals, responsible citizens and 
effective contributors’ (Scottish Government 2009b: 2). This policy move is part of ‘a 
worldwide trend
7
 for new curricular models to downgrade knowledge’ (Priestley and 
Minty 2012a: 2). In a shift away from the detailed specification of content to be covered 
CfE propounds a more ‘skills based’ approach. 
Providing individuals with skills helps each individual to fulfil their social and 
intellectual potential and benefits the wider Scottish economy... [CfE] 
recognises the pivotal role of schools and their partners in equipping young 
people with opportunities to build, develop, present and demonstrate a wide 
variety of skills (Scottish Government 2009b: 4). 
This shift from a knowledge based curriculum to a skills based one has, traditionally, been 
damaging to Classics teaching since the learning of Latin and Greek is so commonly 
associated with learning by rote, memorisation and mastering the rules of linguistic 
accidence, with very little focus on which transferable skills are being developed in the 
process. This does not mean, however, that skills are not being developed: quite the 
contrary. I will show, in Chapter Three, that Classical languages, and rhetoric in particular, 
can help learners develop literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking skills and in 
                                                 
7
 Young 2008, Yates and Collins 2010, Priestley 2011, Wheelahan 2011. 
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Chapter Four, skills conducive to responsible citizenship. Nevertheless, proponents of the 
‘skills agenda’ justify the downgrade of knowledge by citing future needs: ‘workers and 
citizens will need the skills to quickly acquire new knowledge, as existing knowledge 
forms become rapidly obsolete’ (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 3). It is this view that the HCT 
adopts; it judges knowledge of the Classical world to be obsolete, thus it cannot explain the 
choice of any student to prefer learning Classics over Science. Yet it is surely too 
simplistic to state that all those who study Science will contribute to national economic 
growth and yet none of those who study Classics
8
 can aspire to do so. Baroness Susan 
Greenfield, herself a Professor of Biomedical Science but a former student of Classics, 
suggests a more inclusive approach is required to answer the question, ‘What is education 
for?’. She suggests that Classics can usefully enrich and extend the education of young 
people as part of a curriculum which values the contribution of both Sciences and Arts and 
Humanities:   
in the future our young people will need knowledge, not information - the 
learning of isolated facts: they will need a way of linking and understanding 
the vagaries of human nature, rather than a simple formula, a single date, or a 
sound bite. Science gives the tools, but Classics the questions and conceptual 
framework (Greenfield 2004: 13). 
The role of Classics in providing a conceptual framework for linking and understanding 
diverse activities in private and public life will be explored in greater detail in the analysis 
of the critical faculties in Chapter Three. When preparing students for careers which may 
exist in the future, I acknowledge that it is becoming increasingly important to equip them 
with skills which help to break down artificial barriers in their learning and which promote 
links between different fields of knowledge. I contend that Classics can contribute 
positively to the cultivation of life skills which young people need to operate successfully 
as individuals and citizens, despite the contempt with which it is held by proponents of the 
HCT. At present, it is sufficient to conclude that the influence of the HCT on Humanities 
                                                 
8
 Evidence suggests that those who pursue the study of Classics at university find themselves the most 
employable of Arts graduates. Cambridge University Classics Faculty accounts for why: ‘Few degrees offer 
the same opportunities for acquiring advanced skills in languages, analytical thinking, essay-writing, visual 
analysis, critical sensitivity, spotting a biased source at a hundred paces, and so on. Our students have gone 
on to law, journalism, film and television, banking, consultancy, marketing, museum and gallery work, 
teaching and academia’ (University of Cambridge Classics Faculty 2007a). The fact that the study of Greek 
and Roman literature and civilisation is not directly applicable to accountancy or management consultancy is 
clearly not the problem which it is made out to be by Human Capital theorists; the skills developed as a result 
of studying Classics are valuable, transferable and sought-after by employers in a variety of sectors. 
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education has been largely detrimental, and I hold that it has contributed in no small 
measure to the current crisis in Classics. 
In contrast, I propose that the benefits of education ought not to be judged proportionately 
to the economic pay-offs but rather on their capacity to expand human capabilities 
(Woßmann 2002: 207). By that I mean, contrary to the HCT, economic growth ought not 
to be considered an end in itself but could more usefully be judged as a means to 
expanding the freedoms which people enjoy, for example the abilities to read, 
communicate, and argue, to choose a more informed way, and to be taken more seriously 
by others (Sen 1999, Somekh and Schwandt 2007). Encouragingly, there is evidence that 
these human capabilities are valorised in CfE since the four capacities (effective 
contributor, successful learner, confident individual and responsible citizen [Scottish 
Government 2008: 25, see Appendix B]) are placed at the heart of the curriculum and are 
described as ‘purposes of the curriculum’ (Scottish Executive Education Department 
[SEED] 2004a: 12). There is also no evidence in CfE of the downgrade of Humanities 
subjects: Languages, Arts and Social Studies are given equal prominence in the curriculum 
areas and appear alongside Science, Mathematics and Technologies. CfE upholds the 
distinctiveness
9
 of the Scottish curriculum (Bryce and Humes 2003: 111) in advocating a 
broad general education (Education Scotland 2012) but the policy documents do also 
demonstrate concern for employability and economic growth. Contrary to the HCT, 
however, these references exhibit attendant concern for narrowing the social gap and 
improving the accessibility of the curriculum to all learners. CfE, then, seems to be a 
curriculum which cherishes the Humanities and human capacities but is one which is also 
designed to boost economic growth and increase employment opportunities. In order to 
understand the urgency of my argument for Classics, is it necessary to locate this 
dissertation in the context of CfE in Scotland. In the next section, I explore the 
supranational influences on CfE which have motivated these manifold curricular aims 
before analysing, in detail, the policy’s origin, development and early reception. 
                                                 
9
 Scottish education has resisted the worst of capitalist influences on education and is committed to 
developing the democratic intellect of children through a broad general education. Particular differences 
between Scotland and England and Wales, for example, are its autonomous legislative framework, resistance 
to national testing and the existence of one national examination body. The distinctiveness of Scottish 
education will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Four. 
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Supranational influences on CfE 
CfE calls for the promotion of an inclusive, tolerant and respectful Scotland, in which the 
positive potential of each young person is realised, and ‘all are equally valued as citizens 
regardless of accidents of nature or nurture’ (Carr et al. 2006: 13). Alongside this social 
aspiration, the policy also highlights the need for the curriculum to ‘enable young people to 
understand the world they are living in, reach the highest possible levels of achievement 
and equip them for work and learning throughout their lives’ (SEED 2004a: 10). These 
aims were influenced in part, I believe, by supranational forces which drove an agenda of 
higher attainment, inclusive citizenship and increased focus on employability. ‘[T]he EU’s 
Lisbon declaration (European Parliament 2000) called for Europe to become the most 
dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, with more and 
better jobs for greater social cohesion’ (Dale 2005: 135). Early CfE policy documents 
show that social factors were high on the agenda of educational change together with 
the need to address economic performance alongside reducing poverty. 
Like other countries, we face new influences, which mean that we must look 
differently at the curriculum. These include global, social, political and 
economic changes, and the particular challenges facing Scotland: the need to 
increase the economic performance of the nation; reflect its growing diversity; 
improve health; and reduce poverty (SEED 2004a: 10). 
During the initial planning and design phase of CfE, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) conducted an investigation into the quality and equity 
of schooling in Scotland and in its report (2007) it identified that there was 
a very large gap [in motivation, opportunity and achievement] between young 
people in the bottom fourth band of socio-economic status and the top fourth 
band, with Scotland lagging considerably behind some of its comparator 
nations – the Netherlands, Korea, Canada and Finland…these findings suggest 
that young people from poorer backgrounds face significant barriers in 
accessing a system of high performing schools (Teese 2007: 140). 
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The OECD review group
10
 argued that a highly centralised control over both the 
curriculum and organisational structures during the 1990s ‘had been achieved at the cost of 
responsiveness and relevance to the educational needs of a significant proportion of the 
population’ (Reeves 2008: 6). Therefore they suggested that schools, education authorities 
and communities should be given greater autonomy and independence, at local level, to 
make decisions about how best to engage their students more fruitfully in the educational 
process (Reeves 2008: 6-7). The policy documents (Scottish Government 2008, 2009a, 
2009b) released after the publication of the OECD report in 2007 reassert the importance 
of making the curriculum accessible to all learners. However, unlike in England, the 
Scottish Government did not launch any intervention schemes specifically aimed at 
improving academic engagement and performance of children from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds. The ‘pupil premium’11 which is paid by the United Kingdom (UK) 
Government to English schools to raise standards in less affluent areas has no equivalent in 
Scotland (Scottish Parliament 2011). Instead, the new curriculum was designed to be 
distinctive in explicitly moving away from central prescription, ‘towards a model that 
relies upon professional capacity to adapt curriculum guidance to meet the needs of local 
school communities’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 346). Policy authors were giving teachers 
the task of designing a curriculum which suited their own unique subset of learners, 
appropriately differentiated and personalised. As such, CfE attempts to take account of 
current and anticipated needs deriving from economic and social changes and aims to 
provide a curriculum which is flexible enough to not only meet the immediate needs of 
Scotland’s diverse learner body but also to make progress in improving educational 
attainment and narrowing the gap in social cohesion. These, together with increasing the 
economic performance of Scotland and creating new and better employment opportunities, 
are the highly ambitious goals of the policy authors. It will now be illuminative to analyse 
how these diverse influences from supranational, national and local levels were filtered 
into the policy through the process of curriculum review. 
                                                 
10
 This was a group set up to review the report and make suggestions for improvement in the priorities 
identified. 
11
 The UK government considers that the pupil premium, which is additional to main school funding, is the 
best way to address the current underlying inequalities between children eligible for free school meals (FSM) 
and their peers by ensuring that funding to tackle disadvantage reaches the pupils who need it most. The 
pupil premium was introduced in April 2011 and is allocated to schools to work with pupils who have been 
registered for free school meals at any point in the last six years (known as ‘Ever 6 FSM’) (Department for 
Education 2013a). 
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The genealogy of CfE 
While this research study does not set out to provide a comprehensive review of Scottish 
curricular history, a brief summary of the genealogy of CfE is provided to elucidate this 
curricular reform process, contextualise subsequent analysis of the policy and facilitate 
engagement with the critical literature. Following the Education and Training (Scotland) 
Act (Scottish Parliament 2000), which states that, 'every child matters, regardless of 
his or her family background... and should have the best possible start in life’, the 
Scottish Parliament, soon after devolution in 1999, launched its largest ever public 
consultation exercise with the aim of improving Scotland’s educational system  for 
future generations. By encouraging all potential stakeholders to participate in the process 
of reform, I consider that the Scottish Parliament initiated a program of foresight 
planning
12
, commissioned by a government keenly aware of shifting global processes and 
the need to plan a curriculum for the years ahead. 
The Minister for Education and Young People launched the National Debate on Schools in 
the 21st century in the Scottish Parliament in March 2002. Key elements of the agenda for 
change were greater flexibility and choice in the school curriculum and the need for well-
built and well-resourced schools (SEED 2004b). A wide 'policy community' (Richardson 
and Jordan 1979, McPherson and Rabb 1988) of pupils, teachers, parents and others were 
invited to form discussion groups and to submit their conclusions. There existed no 
specific policy proposal. Rather, open questions were asked about what schools in the 
future should be like and what their pupils should learn. Respondents were asked to 
consider how pupils could learn more effectively, as well as highlighting the best and 
worst parts of the current system. Suggestions for improvement in curriculum design and 
content were sought, as well as how motivation for learning could be developed. The 
debate elicited over 1500 responses and it is estimated that 20,000 people took part (Munn 
et al. 2004: 433).  
                                                 
12
 Foresight planning can be described as ‘a future oriented public discussion... neither a form of prediction or 
planning but rather an analysis of global trends, how they will affect us and how (given our resources) we 
might take advantage of them’ (Peters 2003: 8). 
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Alongside the markedly consultative process of the National Debate, the Education, 
Culture, and Sport Committee of the Scottish Parliament conducted its own inquiry into the 
purposes of Scottish education. The Committee wanted to 'build on that [debate] by 
provoking debate in more depth about the key issues about the future of education’ 
(Education, Culture and Sport Committee Discussion Paper 2002: 1). The members of this 
Parliamentary review group were educators who had significant knowledge of the Scottish 
education system and were experienced practitioners and advisors on policy matters. This 
Parliamentary inquiry, then, might be seen as representative of more traditional styles of 
consultation but the responses from all stakeholders were collated and formed the starting 
point for the design of the new curriculum. 
I now provide some background to the authorship of the policy and introduce the 
publications which constitute the suite of policy documents since reference to both is 
recurrent throughout the dissertation. The Scottish Executive established a Curriculum 
Review Group in November 2004 to build on the outcomes of the National Debate and the 
Parliamentary enquiry, charged with the analysing the responses and leading the process of 
curriculum reform. The members of this group were invited to participate and acted as 
representatives for all sectors of Scottish education (primary, secondary, further 
education, higher education and SQA). There was widespread concern among teaching 
colleagues, at the time, that these ‘hand-picked’ individuals did not provide a true 
representation of educators at each level and that the documents and policies they produced 
could not thus adequately communicate the diverse and variously-invested views of 
stakeholders in Scottish education. There was no public consultation on the formation of 
this group nor has the selection process been described in a transparent way
13
. In 2004 the 
group produced ‘A Curriculum for Excellence’ (SEED 2004a), a document outlining 
‘our vision for children and young people’ (SEED 2004a: 3) and in that publication the 
members of the group were named (SEED 2004a: 18). In the same year, ‘Curriculum for 
Excellence - a ministerial response’ (2004b) was published which provided 
governmental justification for the Review Group’s priorities. In  2006, an update was 
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 Unfortunately, the lack of transparency in justifying the selection of the policy authors repeats the much-
maligned earlier selection of a similar group, the Consultative Committee on the Curriculum (CCC) 
established in 1985. In response to the establishment of this group, Humes (1986: 8) comments that the 
membership of advisory committees constitutes a ‘leadership class’ in Scottish education, which has ‘an 
array of exclusionary devices with which it screens aspiring entrants’. The Educational Institute of Scotland 
(EIS) expressed concern that the representatives on this committee were unaware of staff opinions and 
attitudes to key issues and concepts. ‘Until these doubts are resolved it would seem unlikely that advice 
emanating from the CCC would have any standing with professional teachers’ (EIS 1988: 1). There was the 
concern among my colleagues in school that history appeared to be repeating itself with CfE. 
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published, ‘A Curriculum for Excellence: progress and proposals’ (Scottish Executive 
2006a). This document served to provide further information about the design and 
structure of Scotland’s new curriculum together with ‘Building the Curriculum 1: the 
contribution of curriculum areas’ (Scottish Executive 2006b) which provided the draft 
outcomes for each curricular area, so that young people could see how their learning 
was linked together and could develop from the early level (nursery) to level four (end 
of S2) in a unified, coherent curriculum. These were formalised in ‘Curriculum for 
Excellence: Experiences and Outcomes’ (Scottish Government 2009a) but publications 
in the Building the Curriculum series continued, providing greater clarity on the shape 
of CfE: Building the Curriculum 2: ‘Active learning in the Early Years’ (Scottish 
Government 2007); 3: ‘A framework for learning and teaching’ (Scottish Government 
2008); 4: ‘Skills for learning, life and work’ (Scottish Government 2009b) and 5: ‘A 
framework for assessment’ (Scottish Government 2011a). Now in the implementation 
stage, further details about the ongoing development of the policy are included in 
‘Curriculum for Excellence Action Plan’ (Scottish Government 2011b) and ‘Curriculum 
for Excellence Implementation – Questions and Answers’ (Scottish Government 2011c). 
Alongside documents published by the Scottish Government which are informed by the 
findings of the Curriculum Review Group, the non-departmental public body Learning and 
Teaching Scotland (LTS) (called Education Scotland after 2011) has published guidance 
documents to help schools and teachers plan for implementation. Two of these are of 
particular relevance to this dissertation: ‘Participation and Learning’ (LTS 2007) which 
provides examples of good practice for active learning and active citizenship and 
‘Developing global citizens within Curriculum for Excellence’ (LTS 2011a), a 
guidance document which provides a framework for the teaching and learning of three 
cross-curricular themes; sustainable development, international education and 
citizenship. 
In the section which follows, I refer to these publications as I interrogate the implicit 
assumptions of the policy with regard to what sort of education is envisaged by the policy 
authors for learners in Scotland. I support my own critical examination of what CfE sets 
out to achieve with the critical responses of professional and academic policy stakeholders 
since these not only inform the policy analysis throughout this study but also contextualise 
my own critical engagement with the content of the policy as a teacher of Classics. In 
conducting a preliminary survey of the policy’s intentions and the reactions they have 
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provoked, the identification of pitfalls and possibilities will open up an enlarged discursive 
space for a deep consideration of the role of Classical languages in the curriculum and will 
provide a suitably situated starting point for my defence of rhetoric. 
The conception of education implied by the aims of CfE: a critical 
commentary 
The aims of CfE are aspirational and laudable; this is uncontested by a significant number 
of critics
14
 of the policy. 
A Curriculum for Excellence... will provide an important impetus to achieving 
our vision for children and young people, that all children and young people 
should be valued by being safe, nurtured, achieving, healthy, active, included, 
respected and responsible (SEED 2004a: 3). 
With these admirable objectives of the curriculum it is difficult to take issue. Indeed, for 
many years there were very few expressions of critical reaction to the policy simply 
because its flexibility and ‘high-minded tone’ (Carr et al. 2006: 13) prevented any real 
interrogation of its substance. Since 2008, though, diversely positioned critics (both 
academics and teachers) have expressed a variety of concerns about the shape, content and 
direction of the policy (Reeves 2008, Bloomer 2009, Buie 2011, Ford 2011, MacKinnon 
2011, Hepburn 2012, Johnson 2012). The reaction of teachers to the policy will be 
sketched later in this chapter: its mixed reception in schools serves to underscore the value 
of the pedagogical model I propose in this dissertation. For the moment, I intend to 
examine two criticisms of CfE which have emerged from the critical literature, both of 
which create opportunities for Classics, I suggest, and have implications which are 
integral to the subsequent development of my argument. They are: the absence of a 
clearly defined theoretical base for the curriculum (sometimes referred to as its ‘mixed 
curricular structure’) and the repeated use of undefined terms throughout policy 
documentation.  
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 Carr et al. 2006, Biesta 2008, Maclellan and Soden 2008, Priestley 2010, Priestley and Humes 2010, 
Priestley and Minty 2012a, b, Reid 2012. 
19 
 
Many critics have raised concern that the policy documents are littered with the repeated 
use of generalised, undefined terms. Terms which have been isolated for particular 
criticism are ‘active learning’ (Priestley 2010, Priestley and Humes 2010, Reid 2012), 
‘skills for learning, skills for life and skills for work’, ‘literacy and numeracy and health 
and well-being’, ‘enterprise, citizenship, sustainable development, international education 
and creativity’ (Priestley and Humes 2010), ‘critical literacy’ (Reid 2012), ‘critical 
thinking’ (Maclellan and Soden 2008) and ‘freedom and creativity’ (Oberski 2009). 
Nowhere are these explained, systematically unpacked or is their inclusion in the policy 
justified. Consequently there exist wide variations in the way in which these terms are 
understood and enacted in practice (for example Priestley comments on how diversely 
‘active learning’ has been interpreted [2010: 30]). Just as certain key terms are used 
without detailed explanation of how they should be understood, there is a concomitant 
absence of instruction in how they ought to be cultivated through practical 
implementation of the curriculum. Instead of seeing the lack of specified pedagogic 
instruction as a failure of CfE as others do (Carr et al. 2006, Maclellan and Soden 2008, 
Oberski 2009, Priestley 2010, Priestley and Minty 2012a, Reid 2012), I think that 
Fairclough (2000: 25) is right in observing that ‘there is an advantage in vagueness – in 
ways of representing processes that are unspecific... the more unspecific they are, the more 
open to various interpretations by differently positioned readerships’. If CfE is ‘regarded as 
a broad framework document, designed to form the basis of subsequent policy 
development, rather than an extended rationale’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 351), its use 
of nebulous terms becomes less reprehensible and its flexibility becomes its unique selling 
point.  
Furthermore, the absence of prescribed pedagogic prescription offers two key benefits: the 
potential for restoration of influence to minority subjects like Classics and the validation of 
teaching as a researching profession in Scotland. Since all curriculum areas are now 
invited to have input into the fulfilment of the experiences and outcomes in health and 
well-being, literacy and numeracy, teachers of Classics are the recipients of a rare 
opportunity to raise the profile and potential contribution of their subjects. This is true, 
too, with respect to the attributes exemplified in the four capacities: it is the very fact 
that terms like critical thinking and responsible citizenship are not clearly defined 
which provides scope, I defend later in this dissertation, for the deeper interrogation 
and reconsideration of rhetoric. Contribution of this sort was not possible in CfE’s 
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predecessor, ‘Curriculum and assessment in Scotland: 5-14 National Guidelines’ 
(Scottish Education Department 1987), where delineation of subject discipline was 
absolute. Therefore, as well as offering an increased sphere of influence for teachers 
of minority subjects like Classics, it also offers all teachers the opportunity to become 
active and engaged researchers, as the General Teaching Council for Scotland (GTCS) 
desires (GTCS 2012: 8), encouraging teachers to use their knowledge, experience and 
research skills to critically assess what they consider these terms to mean and how these 
interpretations impact on professional practice. In inviting practitioners to engage with 
policy development locally and to use their creativity to design specific
15
 learning activities 
which can successfully deliver the experiences and outcomes of the curriculum, CfE 
promises not only the restoration of autonomy to teachers but also the revalidation of the 
profession as one committed to innovation and improvement through the requirement of its 
members to be researchers. The scope for these professional benefits would be more 
limited, I claim, if terms and pedagogy were strictly defined. 
The second common criticism is linked to the first: not only is terminology used and its 
meaning not adequately articulated, the theoretical basis of the curriculum itself is nowhere 
clarified. The absence of any reference to what Priestley and Humes (2010: 346) call the 
‘rich vein of literature in the field of curriculum development (Dewey 1938, Taba 1962, 
Stenhouse 1975, Kelly 1986, 1999)’ suggests that the curriculum was developed without 
due regard to ‘the insights of research into the curriculum, whether from a philosophical, 
sociological or psychological standpoint’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 346). With no 
rigorous justification of the theoretical model underpinning the curriculum, its structure is 
open to criticism for being ‘problematic’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 346), ill-founded and 
precarious. In Kelly’s (1999) view, acknowledgement and justification of a particular 
planning model ‘is necessary to ensure coherence and conceptual clarity about the 
purposes of education’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 346). 
On initial viewing, the curriculum looked to be based on the process model (Kelly 1999), 
in which the four capacities represented the intrinsic principles of the curriculum; creating 
an aspirational vision of what young people could do and become if their potential were 
recognised and nurtured. In the pre-2006 policy documentation the lack of prescribed 
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content looked to represent a bold departure from the status quo and provided cause for 
celebration: it appeared to eschew the prescription which defined previous curricular 
structures (for example, Standard Grade, 5-14, Higher Still) in favour of a more flexible 
approach which promised to restore autonomy and creativity to teachers. The excited 
anticipation was, however, short lived as ‘Building the Curriculum 1’ (Scottish Executive 
2006b) and later policy documents dashed hopes of flexibility and autonomy, advocating 
some very prescriptive elements and giving answers to those (like Carr et al. 2006: 13) 
who had questioned what form the joined up curriculum would take. The sequential levels 
which separate learning into stages linked by increasingly complex learning objectives 
seem to suggest that CfE is rather a mastery curriculum (in which content i s specified 
as objectives and data is used to measure performance of individuals and schools 
[Kelly 1999]), the same, in this respect, as the 5-14 curriculum it replaces. 
Additionally, the organisation of knowledge into discrete curriculum areas (Scottish 
Government 2006b) and the selection of precise content as experiences and outcomes 
within these (Scottish Government 2009a) not only appears oppositional to the 
founding principles of flexibility, breadth and choice but seems ‘inimical to the 
underlying purposes of the curriculum as expressed in the four capacities’ (Priestley and 
Humes 2010: 358).  
The schism between process and mastery curricular models, triggered by the lack of 
conceptual clarity, risks marginalising the potential benefits of freedom, creativity and 
personalisation promised by CfE. Priestley and Humes (2010: 359) claim that because 
teachers are to deliver
16
 very detailed and specific outcomes, opportunities for 
professional autonomy and innovative teaching are reduced, ‘rendering classrooms 
predictable, limited and uncreative’. With this assessment of CfE’s impact, I do not 
entirely agree. The organisation of the curriculum into discrete areas, together with the 
introduction of sequential levels, does not reduce the possibilities presented by the 
more process-driven elements of the curriculum. What remains flexible and open to 
creative interpretation is the delivery of the cross-curricular themes and the four 
capacities which are the responsibility of all practitioners. It is in these areas, rather 
than as a discrete subject area, I explain in Chapters Three and Four, that rhetoric has 
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 Tension surrounds the language of ‘delivery’ in CfE. Priestley (2013b) contends that ‘good education is 
something that is experienced by young people; it is not delivered. Delivery implies that education is a 
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legacy of the highly prescriptive 5-14 curriculum (discussed above). 
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a vital role to play. Admittedly, the prescription of outcomes and experiences for each 
curricular area returns to a mastery model which confines learning within subject 
disciplines and this does, perhaps, limit the autonomy of the practitioner to some 
extent since the content for a certain proportion of each curriculum area is prescribed 
but this does not necessitate that the learning therein is predictable, limited or 
uncreative. Rather, the onus is on teachers, as professionals, to review their existing 
practice and develop pedagogical methods which facilitate fulfilment of the 
experiences and outcomes while furthering the aims of CfE. As was noted above, th is 
ought not to be seen as an unreasonable expectation for a ‘researching’ profession nor 
should the curriculum be unduly criticised for its seemingly ‘hybrid’ model. I consider 
that its aims for education in Scotland are compatible with the shape and structure of 
the curriculum revealed in the suite of policy documents published to date although 
much is reliant on the willingness of the teaching profession to adapt their practice in 
pursuit of CfE’s new vision. The reaction of teachers, then, warrants exam ination as it 
reveals an important dimension of the relationship between policy and practice; further 
explanation of my own professional context and experience elucidates the origin of the 
present study.  
Reaction of teachers in Scotland to the development and 
implementation of CfE 
A relatively small number of formal research studies
17
 have been done in the area of 
teacher reaction to CfE. The data collected from these research projects revealed that 
most teachers (whether in favour of CfE or not) used the term ‘floundering in the dark’ to 
describe their situation at the time of the interviews (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 11). This 
follows comments in the popular press that ‘people are running about doing what seems 
best to them without any degree of co-ordination’ (MacLeod 2008) and one respondent 
to an EIS survey is reported to have said, “I believe that no one has any real grasp of 
what it is about. The more reassurances SQA and partners try to give, the more concerned 
and confused I have become” (Priestley 2013a). I think Priestley’s metaphor of school 
staff attempting to ‘negotiate the curricular minefield’ (2010: 30) is apt. As a member 
of teaching staff in a Scottish secondary school, in the early days of the introduction of 
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 Priestley (2008), Priestley et al. (2009), Easton and Priestley (2010), Farquhar (2010), Minty and Priestley 
(2012), Priestley and Minty (2012a, b).  
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the policy, despite the curriculum espousing freedom and flexibility, I myself felt that 
it occupied a ‘danger zone’ which I had to map without exposing myself to any latent 
explosive devices. This was mostly due to the fact that decisions about the shape and 
content of the curriculum could be taken locally; inevitably schools began to 
restructure their curriculum. In this regard, a broader war metaphor might be in order; 
I observed teachers become soldiers, even crusaders, fighting for the continuation of 
their discrete subject on the timetable and in option blocks. Teaching and learning 
strategies were planned with military precision and became weapons as battle lines 
were drawn between adversarial teachers, keen to bring students over to their side to 
consolidate their position of importance within the review process. The metaphor 
could even be extended to describe the dynamic of staff interaction, where the 
curriculum leader and other members of senior management became the enemy, set on 
imposing their new educational agenda on the teaching staff, in an effort to bring 
changed practices which were deemed important, but not sufficiently justified, by 
those in charge. This scenario is probably a standard response to all major educational 
reform initiatives; it just so happens that CfE was the first I encountered in my 
professional career and so it was particularly keenly felt by me.  
Aside from my somewhat embattled personal experience, teacher reaction to CfE, 
predictably, falls into three categories, those in favour, those against and those who 
remain unsure. Firstly, those in favour praise the opportunities presented by CfE to be 
‘creative and innovative’ (Oberski 2009: 21) and welcome increased collaborative and 
collegial working practices (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 8). Mostly based in the primary 
sector, these teachers enjoy experimenting and see themselves as agents of change and 
professional developers of the curriculum. Frequently they embrace cross-curricular 
learning opportunities and prioritise making bridges between subjects, ‘whereas before 
the bridges were there but nobody really paid attention to them’ (Priestley and Minty 
2012a: 13). Secondly, those who feel bitter towards the curricular reform perceive the 
innovation to be entirely unnecessary, simply change for change’s sake and/or 
politically-driven and question why it was necessary to move away from the 5-14 
guidelines as the basis for pedagogical practice. As well as describing the curriculum 
as having shifted from ‘extreme prescription to extreme woolliness’  (Priestley and 
Minty 2012a: 11), these teachers, mostly situated in the secondary sector, are the first 
to criticise the assessment redesign process. They express reservations about the 
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compatibility of a flexible and personalised curriculum and the maintenance of rigorous 
and valid assessment standards, claiming that the development of assessment materials 
came as an ‘afterthought’ (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 16) to CfE yet should have been 
at the core of the curriculum design process from the outset. Having been involved in 
the creation of assessment materials for Classical languages, I would retort to these 
teachers that CfE aims to move away from the stressful and unfulfilling race to 
assessment which necessitates ‘teaching to the test’ and that delaying the development 
of assessment until after the policy has been adequately developed is an entirely 
justifiable, defensible and, indeed, sensible course of action, albeit understandably 
frustrating. Obviously, it is important for practitioners to understand how learning will 
be assessed and what absolute standards are required for the granting of qualifications 
but these ought not, I think, to drive the initial implementation of the new curriculum. 
Thirdly, those teachers whose reactions fall between these two extremes often admit to 
anxiety about the ‘radical revision of curriculum content’ (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 8) 
but say that they are becoming more open to experimentation, either by moving away 
from the use of textbooks by planning more active and collaborative lessons, or by 
increasingly handing control and choice over to pupils as to what and how they learn.  
The chasm between policy intention and classroom practice has contributed to an 
‘implementation gap’ (Supovitz and Weinbaum 2008) which is widened by teachers who 
risk ‘using yesterday’s answers to today’s problems and resorting to existing notions 
of “best practice”, preventing meaningful engagement with innovation’ (Priestley 
2010: 34). The advent of CfE has stimulated a feeling among teachers, I think, that 
new approaches to teaching are encouraged by the policy authors. It is my hope, then, 
that the defence of rhetoric argued in this dissertation may be considered more 
willingly by teachers and school leaders during the present adjustment phase than it 
may have been under the highly prescriptive 5-14 curriculum. The first and third 
groups of teachers described here are likely, I suspect, to be open to suggestions 
regarding alternative pedagogical models and this has the potential, I contend, to 
herald a reconsideration of rhetoric (and more broadly the Classics). Among the second 
group, the very fact that someone else has considered the policy’s intentions and created a 
potential pedagogical solution, may mean that it receives a warm reception. The 
introduction of CfE has provided a new forum for the suggestion of alternative approaches 
to the curriculum and, given the widespread perplexity which abounds among teachers 
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(Bloomer 2009, Farquhar 2010, Ford 2011, Johnson 2012, Priestley and Minty 2012a, Reid 
2012, Priestley 2013a), it is my feeling that there has never been a better time to relaunch 
the Classics. A targeted, thoroughly-considered and innovative approach which can 
demonstrate its fulfilment of the aims of the policy authors and engages teachers but does 
not place unreasonable expectations on them is a possible modus operandi. The perplexity 
of teachers, I hope, opens up new possibilities for rhetoric. 
Aims and methodology 
The goal of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the specific benefits and 
broader implications of reintroducing rhetoric into the contemporary Scottish curriculum. I 
claim that rhetoric offers a possible pedagogical model for the delivery of skills identified 
as important in CfE: responsible citizenship, critical thinking, literacy and critical literacy. 
It is not within the scope of this dissertation, however, to conduct a comprehensive survey 
of historic curriculum reform in Scotland nor does the study seek to imply that rhetoric is 
the panacea of the curriculum but rather I urge that rhetoric’s contribution be reconsidered 
in light of new possibilities presented by the inclusion of Classical languages as a subject 
area in CfE. As well as seeking to understand CfE as a policy innovation, the professional 
dimension of the Ed.D. behoves critical examination and employment of this enhanced 
understanding to offer prescriptive recommendations for the future conduct of educational 
policy and professional practice. In this case, my recommendations centre on salvaging 
something of educational value that is in danger of being lost. In this regard, it is hoped 
that this study can contribute positively to the pedagogical development process, generated 
by CfE and currently underway in schools across Scotland. In particular, I would be very 
pleased if curriculum leaders within schools would reconsider rhetoric as a possible vehicle 
through which aspects of literacy and citizenship education could be delivered to learners.  
Not all Scottish schools teach, or indeed have ever taught, Classics, and it is an aim of this 
dissertation to raise the profile of Classical languages, and Classical rhetoric in particular, 
in the contemporary Scottish curriculum and advertise Classics as a possible curriculum 
mainstay both in schools with Classics departments and those currently without. While I do 
not expect that this Doctoral dissertation will profoundly alter the landscape of Classics 
teaching in the UK and beyond, it is my hope that the focus on rhetoric and the ways in 
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which it can be illuminated through the study of Latin and Greek may reach a slightly 
wider audience and may begin to reverse the decline in the perceived value of Classics 
teaching in schools. I have first-hand experience of Classics being seen as an odd, 
antiquated and minority subject in schools both by senior management and by teaching 
staff: I would like this dissertation to, in some way, justify the value of the subject within 
the current curricular initiative and consequently erode this damaging reputation, thereby 
strengthening, at least at some level, the position of Classics teachers in schools. A further, 
though more ambitious aim, is for increased collaboration among teachers of English, 
Religious and Moral Education (RME), Media Studies, Modern Studies and Classics and if 
such an ethos could be cultivated, the argument for rhetoric expounded in this dissertation 
might receive warmer reception and greater engagement. If teachers limit their sphere of 
interest and influence within predefined curricular boundaries, it is unlikely that rhetoric 
will fulfil its potential and make the difference I so genuinely believe it can.  
This dissertation aims to expand the field of scholarship by addressing a number of small 
gaps in educational and philosophical research to date. In particular, Priestley (2010: 24) 
identifies a ‘stark absence of critique of new curricular policy’ in Scotland and given the 
scale of the curriculum reform, a surprisingly limited number of academic articles
18
 have 
been published with analysis of CfE as their focus. This study aims to critically examine 
the policy, using frameworks from curriculum theory and political philosophy, and to set 
the Scottish policy context against a wider backdrop of global trends in secondary 
education. The disparity between the value placed on the Classics at a policy level and its 
conspicuous absence in schools and classrooms across Scotland opens up space for 
dialogue and motivates a defence for current conditions. As was mentioned above, the role 
of Classics in the Scottish curriculum is vastly understudied, both in terms of curriculum 
analysis and pedagogical research: this study aims to redress this deficit. Of the studies 
where England is the focus (Bolgar 1963, Sullivan 1965, Sharwood-Smith 1977, Stray 
1998, Morwood 2003, Hart 2006, Lister 2007) none has included specific examination of 
Classical rhetoric’s role in the curriculum, its value or contemporary relevance in 
secondary education. There has, though, been some research done on the learning and 
teaching of rhetoric in the United States of America (USA), where it can appear on 
undergraduate courses as a composition course or one focussed on academic writing. 
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 Carr et al. 2006, Gillies 2006, Biesta 2008, Maclellan and Soden 2008, Reeves 2008, Oberski 2009, 
Priestley 2010, Priestley and Humes 2010, MacKinnon 2011, Priestley and Minty 2012a, b, Priestley et al. 
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27 
 
While the research conducted into the efficacy and scope of these courses is helpful in 
ascertaining how rhetoric is understood internationally, I outline in Chapter Two that what 
is meant by rhetoric in the USA is very different from Classical rhetoric and, together with 
the learning context being post-school, these studies are not of primary relevance to the 
present study. The aim is certainly not to provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
curricular models which promote rhetoric in the USA
19
 but rather, elements of these 
research studies will be used for comparative purposes within my argument which focusses 
on the Scottish secondary school curriculum and classroom as the learning context. 
Furthermore, Classicists
20
 have conducted a great deal of research on rhetoric’s role in the 
development of Languages, Politics or Arts and Humanities but very little of this 
knowledge has, until now, informed the study of the pitfalls and possibilities of the 
teaching and learning of rhetoric in schools. At this time of curricular reform in Scotland, it 
is right to cascade the benefits of academic research and apply it to the education sector, 
where I consider it might be of maximum value in directing future policy and practice. 
The Scottish Survey of Literacy and Numeracy (Scottish Government 2013) is tasked with 
measuring how well curriculum policy is translated into professional practice in 
classrooms, with particular focus on two priority areas: literacy and numeracy. It identified 
that two elements of literacy education are being taught well in schools: reading and 
writing. Attainment in these areas is high and shows improvement since the previous 
survey. The same is not true, though, for listening and speaking. Rather, in these areas, 
pupils are consistently performing less well and so there exists an attainment gap in 
listening and speaking which this defence of rhetoric seeks to narrow through the 
presentation of an Ancient oral argumentative structure. In Chapter Three, this structure 
will be analysed in detail and its potential value justified for today’s literacy classrooms, 
the curriculum and society. The inextricable link between rhetoric and oracy makes it not 
just relevant for literacy education, but for citizenship education too. The role of rhetoric in 
society has been studied by political philosophers and theorists who tend to dismiss its 
relevance for current political contexts owing to the shifting cultural, political and societal 
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norms over the last 2000 years. This study has twin aims in this regard: it sets out to 
augment the small corpus of research which recognises the value of rhetoric in facilitating 
and optimising democratic deliberation but it goes beyond the extant research to promote a 
partially revised conception of Classical rhetoric which allows for a more robust defence of 
rhetoric’s role in contemporary democratic deliberation.  
Given the aims of this dissertation, its methodology necessarily combines a number of 
strands. Primarily a conceptual study, it is concerned with critically analysing competing 
conceptions of rhetoric, historically located and supported by the analysis of Classical 
texts. This analytical approach to the interrogation of rhetoric, in combination with my 
subject knowledge as a Classics scholar and my professional experience as a Classics 
teacher, induces the articulation of a revised conception of rhetoric through reclamation 
and innovation. Other concepts, like critical literacy and responsible citizenship (which I 
argue are underproblematised or taken for granted by policy authors, actors and 
stakeholders), are subjected to analysis and critique. Discussion of the wide range of 
possible interpretations of these concepts is informed and enriched by both curriculum 
theory and educational policy analysis.   
Analysis of CfE policy is integral to this dissertation’s methodology. I analyse both the 
policy determination (this concerns how policy is made, why, when and by whom) and the 
policy content (this considers how a particular policy developed ‘in relation to other, 
earlier policies and is informed by a theoretical framework which seeks to offer a critique 
of policy’ [Parsons 1995: 55]). The multidimensional nature of educational policy requires 
analysis which is multi-framed and this dissertation seeks to examine the values, 
assumptions and aims of CfE by engaging with curriculum theory. Specifically I claim that 
curriculum theory provides a critical framework for the analysis of the evolution of the 
policy. The critical pedagogical theory propounded by Cohen, Manion and Morrison 
(2007: 32) suggests that the curriculum should be treated as a ‘form of cultural politics’ 
and I share their appeal for students to be adequately equipped to participate in and 
criticise the curriculum, rather than passively receiving the authoritative messages 
promoted therein.  
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Engagement with contemporary political philosophy allows for a broader consideration of 
global educational trends and political theory and in this study I isolate democratic 
deliberation for particular analysis. The theories of leading philosophers and political 
theorists (for example Nussbaum, Young and Benhabib) are analysed in order to uncover 
the areas of contestation which exert influence on the contemporary citizenship education 
landscape. In so doing, I extend and supplement their positions to justify and defend my 
revised interpretation of rhetoric. Through analysis and argumentation, this dissertation 
develops and defends an account of rhetoric which identifies its potential educative and 
civic benefits for contemporary Scottish learners.  
Outline of chapters 
Chapter Two aims to provide a rich account of what is meant by rhetoric and provides an 
analysis of its role in education and society since it was conceived and formalised into a 
system of communication by the Greeks. I chart its evolution during the Roman period and 
assess what role the orator played in Roman education and public life, with particular 
reference to the published works of Cicero, the Roman Republic’s foremost orator and 
author of many texts that I argue are still suitable for study. Early in the dissertation, I 
make clear that ‘rhetoric’ itself is a contested term and that its relationship with philosophy 
and ethics is the subject of historic and contemporary debate. These tensions will be further 
explored elsewhere in the dissertation but most rigorously in Chapter Five. After 
summarising the positions adopted by several key thinkers, I advance a particular 
understanding of rhetoric for inclusion in CfE and suggest that it has much to offer modern 
students by combining elements of political literacy, oracy, citizenship and critical skills.  
In Chapter Three, I advance the claim that rhetoric can contribute positively to the 
cultivation of three cross-curricular skills considered important in CfE: literacy, critical 
thinking and critical literacy. Despite being the responsibility of all practitioners, some 
doubt surrounds what is meant by these terms (MacLellan and Soden 2008, Oberski 2009, 
Priestley and Humes 2010, Priestley 2010, Reid 2012) and how teachers might begin to 
deliver these skills successfully through the curriculum. I claim that these cross-curricular 
skills are inadequately articulated in the policy and that deeper interrogation of what is 
meant is required to clarify and supplement our understanding of the role rhetoric can play 
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in advancing learners’ critical faculties. Specifically, I assert that the rhetorical framework 
offers a useful structure around which students can learn to weave arguments and that the 
process of doing so provides opportunities for the development and application of literacy, 
critical thinking and critical literacy. I offer a defence of rhetoric which centres on its 
capacity to improve learners’ ability to communicate confidently and coherently in society 
through increased familiarity with methods of constructing and deconstructing argument. 
In conducting this investigation, I refer to the critical literature in the field to enhance 
analysis of the policy and reinforce my defence. Building on the argument I introduced in 
Chapter One, that democracy needs citizens capable of reasoned and informed criticism, I 
outline three ways in which I consider the rhetorical framework to address shortcomings of 
the pedagogical tools used currently by teachers in secondary schools: a focus on speaking 
and listening, oral performance skills and social/political distance from the culture under 
study. I extend the link between literacy and citizenship in CfE by connecting the cross-
curricular skills of critical literacy and critical thinking with the key capacity of responsible 
citizenship, something which CfE does not do, and suggest that a citizenry better equipped 
for argumentation may bring rich rewards for Scottish education and democracy. 
Chapter Four presents an exploration of what is meant by the responsible citizen capacity 
but given that the policy describes the responsible citizen only briefly and shies away from 
fuller definition, I propose that we might better understand the intentions of the policy 
authors if we subject the conception of citizenship implied by the capacity to interpretation 
on a continuum from ‘minimal’ to ‘maximal’ conceptions (McLaughlin 1992). I argue that 
the policy authors have been too cautious in their vision for responsible citizenship in CfE; 
they appear to alienate maximal conceptions of citizenship in favour of an approach which 
construes citizenship minimally. Placed at the heart of the curriculum as a key capacity, 
CfE’s conception of the responsible citizen is disappointingly flaccid and requires support 
and scaffolding from deeper analysis of citizenship trends in the philosophy of education to 
make it fit for purpose in the dynamic civic arena of contemporary Scotland. In justifying 
my claims in this chapter, I point to the apparently changing nature of policy priorities and 
to some promising examples of best practice identified in related policy documents which, 
I argue, exhort a new approach to citizenship education and which motivate a maximal 
interpretation. ‘Justice-oriented citizenship’ (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 242) is such a 
conception of citizenship which, although not currently taught extensively in schools 
(Westheimer and Kahne 2004, Biesta 2008, Zipin and Reid 2008, Biesta 2011, Swalwell 
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2013), is the one which I think we ought to support and promote for responsible citizenship 
and democratic education in Scotland. That rhetoric combines skills of self-representation 
with those of critical analysis and active participation makes it worthy of reconsideration, I 
propose, as a pedagogical method for the cultivation of justice-oriented citizenship in 
current conditions. 
Chapter Five aims to defend the reintroduction of rhetoric by considering its potential 
contribution to democratic deliberation. Moving beyond the claims made in previous 
chapters that rhetoric can contribute positively to the development of literacy and critical 
faculties, I aim to show that the learning and teaching of rhetoric in school has the potential 
to inform and facilitate democratic deliberation, a skill which I maintain is conducive to 
responsible citizenship in Scotland. This will involve examining complex philosophical 
issues surrounding the interplay between rhetoric, the emotions, truth and reason and, in 
my analysis, I draw on the work of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Young and Benhabib. In this 
regard, I defend the position that rhetoric offers opportunities for students to learn about 
persuasion, coercion and empathy, and claim that it can help them to build narrative 
imagination through consideration of ‘the other’. In making this argument, I draw on 
Aristotle’s concept of deliberative rhetoric in combination with the speech-making 
framework provided by Classical rhetorical theory and propose that such a conception of 
rhetoric could, following Young, give a voice to the traditionally underrepresented and 
marginalised groups in society thereby improving equality and inclusion within 
deliberative democracy. I do, however, concede that a shift in deliberative culture from the 
‘consent-obsessed’ Ancient world to the ‘discursive’ present day requires a partly revised 
conception of rhetoric, more relevant for current conditions, but in so presenting suggest 
that certain elements of Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric should be retained as they have 
much to offer current understandings of rhetoric and democratic deliberation. 
Chapter Six presents my conclusions regarding the optimal curricular position for rhetoric. 
I maintain that Classical languages offer the most authentic curricular context for the 
learning and teaching of rhetoric for ‘deconstructive purposes’ but note that they offer 
limited scope for rhetorical construction and performance, elements which I concede must 
be delivered by other subjects across the curriculum. This limiting factor is lessened, I 
posit, by the additional learning and cultural benefits which stem from the study of 
Classical languages. I claim that CfE provides renewed optimism and favourable 
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conditions for the reintegration of Classical rhetoric in the curriculum of mainstream 
secondary schools – a renaissance which I believe will enrich a curriculum impoverished 
by its absence. I admit that there are, however, practical challenges to be surmounted and 
deeper theoretical issues to be considered before such a situation can become a reality. In 
the final section of the chapter I highlight some implications for my professional practice 
and identify areas which warrant further investigation as a result of this study. 
In the chapter which follows, then, I lay the foundations for these claims by attempting to 
disentangle what is meant by ‘rhetoric’ from the numerous, sometimes competing, 
conceptions which survive from the Classical world. By demonstrating the role it played in 
Greek and Roman education systems and civic society, I introduce a number of key 
tensions created by Classical rhetorical theory which provide material for deeper 
interrogation later in this dissertation. By introducing the rhetorical framework and the 
speech-making process before embarking wholesale on the defence of rhetoric, I hope to 
prepare the reader adequately for the claims which follow; both culturally by providing 
some historical context for the Classical world and linguistically, by explaining technical 
terms which are central to Classical language education but which are not commonly used 
outside the subject discipline. It is only once the origin and purpose of rhetoric have been 
clarified that I can begin to defend its role in contemporary Scottish education. Chapter 
Two, ‘Rhetoric: multiple interpretations’ aims to provide an appropriate preliminary 
discussion of these issues. 
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Chapter Two 
Rhetoric: multiple interpretations 
 
This chapter sets out to explain the significance and complexity of what is meant by 
‘rhetoric’ by tracing its origins in Classical Greece and examining its role in education and 
society in the Greek and Roman worlds. Almost since its inception, the nature, meaning 
and purpose of rhetoric have been contested. Current definitions of rhetoric include: the 
practice of oratory; the study of strategies for effective oratory; the use of language, written 
or spoken, to inform or persuade; the study of the relation between language and 
knowledge and the capacity to persuade others (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990). I consider all 
these definitions to be related to rhetoric but do not think that it is possible, or desirable, to 
attempt to distil such a complex and contested concept into a single definition. In this 
chapter, I advance the interpretation of rhetoric which I consider to be most relevant for 
contemporary Scottish secondary education and which is optimal for inclusion in CfE. 
Following Cicero (de Oratore 3.2), I hold that rhetoric requires eloquence but that it goes 
beyond the capacity to communicate effectively to encompass the power of persuasion. 
Classical rhetorical theory is a sensitive and complex theory of language which, from its 
inception, sought to demarcate and describe the operation of language in human affairs but 
at no point did it claim to include within its scope ‘virtually all forms of discourse and 
symbolic communication’ (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 2). I do not agree with the view of 
Weaver et al. (1970) that rhetoric is synonymous with communication and deny that 
rhetoric is necessarily present when one person addresses another.  
Of primary importance is the tension which exists between rhetoric as effective discourse 
and rhetoric as persuasive discourse. At the crux of this tension is the intention of the 
orator and the extent to which, in aiming to persuade, self-interest or the public good act as 
motivators. If rhetoric is viewed as a system of effective and articulate self-representation, 
it need not involve ‘the use of empty promises and half-truths’ (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 
1) nor should it be linked to vacuous and malevolent verbal entrapment, ‘excessive 
subtlety, manipulation and deceit’ (Pernot 2005: 44). These slights are indicative of the 
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widespread mistrust of rhetoric which has influenced its public perception from the 
Classical world to this day. I contend in this chapter, and in Chapter Five, that this negative 
view of rhetoric is erroneous: communication itself is neither admirable nor deplorable, 
rather that it is the intention and moral standing of the orator and the willingness of the 
audience to be persuaded which influence such value judgements.  
As I see it, rhetoric is a very particular form of communication which selects, from the vast 
realm of human discourse, occasions for speaking and writing that can be regarded as 
persuasive in intent. My approach in this chapter will be to identify the key areas of 
contestation which influence and inform the claims and argumentation in subsequent 
chapters. In order to illuminate these areas of contestation, I will present the theories of key 
Classical thinkers: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. To adequately introduce their 
positions it is necessary to provide details of their context which will involve sketching 
related areas of rhetorical theory including: the relationship between philosophy and 
rhetoric, genres of rhetoric and parts of speech, the Roman reinterpretation of Greek 
rhetoric, the role of rhetoric in Classical education and the conception of the ideal orator. It 
is on this broad explanatory foundation that the claims and argumentation in later chapters 
will be built. In concluding this chapter, I link the art of rhetoric with the way in which 
knowledge is created by argument and the way in which ideology and power are extended 
through discourse. This leads to discussion in Chapter Three of the relationship between 
rhetoric and critical skills.  
Origins of rhetoric in Classical Greece 
 
Until the fifth century BC, Greece was ruled by tyrants and there was little need for self-
representation. For the ordinary citizen, prestige and reputation were measured in military 
prowess, the currency of success from the heroes of Homer’s epic poems21 to the veterans 
of the Peloponnesian wars. Stories were transmitted orally and speeches were delivered by 
oligarchs and plutocrats without concern for structure or style; their power ensured the 
                                                 
21
 In Homer’s Iliad, for example, young heroes like Achilles are mighty warriors while older ones like Nestor 
are impressive speakers. Physical education was thought vitally important for Greek youths as it was their 
preparation for war. It was felt that the ability to speak well came with age and experience, was of secondary 
importance to martial prowess and therefore had no place in the education of the young. 
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desired outcome so there was no need for persuasion. However, in 476 BC Thrasybulus, 
the tyrant of Syracuse, was overthrown and a democracy was formed. Under this despot, 
the land and property of many common citizens had been seized; for the first time, these 
ordinary people flooded the courts in an attempt to recover their property through oral self-
representation. A certain Corax (about whom very little is known) devised an art of 
rhetoric which comprised simple techniques for effective presentation and argumentation 
in the law courts and permitted ordinary men to make their cases in public (Aristotle, 
Rhetoric 2, 24). His chief contribution was in helping to structure judicial speeches into 
various parts: prose, narration, statement of arguments, refutation of opposing arguments, 
and summary. This structure serves as the basis for all later rhetorical theory.  
Rhetoric thereafter became ‘a major cultural force’ (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 20) in the 
golden age of Pericles (480-404 BC) and was closely tied to the development of new forms 
of government and social organisation (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 20). In democratic 
Athens, generals took their orders from the assembly, which reached decisions after 
listening to the arguments on either side (Thucydides acknowledged the importance of 
oratory by including speeches of this sort in his history of the Peloponnesian war [Book 
2]); thus it was of prime civic importance (and often a matter of war or peace, death or life) 
for men to be able to express their views eloquently and articulately and to persuade their 
peers. Rhetoric quickly became an attractive subject of study and men inspired by the 
rhetorical structure created by Corax began to travel around Greece teaching others how to 
represent their interests in public. These teachers were known as Sophists (wise men) and, 
over time, they devised their own conception of rhetoric which they offered to teach those 
who could afford their fees. The Sophists should not be seen as ‘populist-minded teachers’ 
(Poulakos 1987: 101) wishing to educate the masses and bring succour to the hitherto 
voiceless and marginalised. Rather, their motivation for teaching rhetoric was to impart the 
secrets of effective persuasive argumentation for personal financial gain (Plato, Hippias 
Maior, 282c-d, Tell 2009).  
The Sophistic conception of rhetoric then, aware of the need for their paying customers to 
be successful in persuading others, attended increasingly to devising persuasive techniques 
rather than to constructing logical arguments. Thus the Sophists are accused of reframing 
the rhetorical theory pioneered by Corax, moving it away from a framework in which 
arguments are most articulately phrased to the emotional and psychological manipulation 
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of the audience. This shift from rhetoric being used as an honest and ethical method of 
self-representation to one which facilitated success, regardless of the pursuit of truth, 
attracted early criticism. Gorgias, one of the few Sophists for whom we have literary 
evidence, is vilified by the historian Diodorus (Biblioteca historica 12.135) for abusing 
rhetoric by employing naively exaggerated effects and laboured constructions which 
seemed ridiculous and excessively contrived in order to persuade his audience. Evidence 
survives, too, of Socrates’ dialogue with Gorgias, and it is in this, and other works of Plato, 
that we find a battle line drawn between rhetoric and philosophy. Plato views both the 
Sophists and rhetoric as being dishonest, unethical and unscrupulous and this area of 
contestation warrants further consideration. 
Plato 
Plato recorded two dialogues between his teacher, Socrates
22
, and the Sophists, Gorgias 
and Protagoras. For Plato, rhetoric is the producer of persuasion (Gorgias 453a). He treats 
persuasion as a matter of deception and questions the possibility of communication 
altogether, while in Protagoras, it appears that he viewed rhetoric as ‘making the weaker 
account the stronger’ as a method of improving a person’s or city’s objective condition 
(Schiappa 1999: 54). He identifies two types of rhetoric: common rhetoric and true rhetoric 
(Gorgias 517a). Common rhetoric is the misuse of rhetoric (Gorgias 457a1-2) commonly 
associated with the egotistical and profit-driven Sophists and their clients. True rhetoric 
has little in common with what people normally call rhetoric: it goes beyond ordinary 
rhetoric to the realm of philosophy. It is really a science used in the service of justice 
(Gorgias 527c) and the discourse of the philosopher (Pernot 2005: 51). Plato’s 
philosophical conception of rhetorical theory can be distinguished from Sophistic 
rhetorical theory by its commitment to truth, even when truth conflicts with personal 
success (Schiappa 1999: 10). In exposing this tension between common and true rhetoric, 
Plato makes a clear distinction between the rhetorical life, which consists in looking for 
material success for oneself and for others and the philosophical life, which is directed 
toward the good and consists of taking care of one’s soul and educating one’s fellow 
citizens, whatever the cost to oneself (Hippias Major 304a-b, Theaetetus 172c). This raises 
                                                 
22
 We cannot be sure how accurately Plato recorded the words of Socrates (Bonazzi et al. 2009) nor the 
extent to which the views expressed by Socrates in the dialogues have been influenced by Plato’s own 
philosophical stance. Therefore, to ensure consistency in referencing throughout the dissertation, I conflate 
Socrates’ position with that of Plato. 
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questions concerning responsible citizenship and the extent to which citizens communicate 
as a result of selfish or selfless motivations: deeper analysis of the contested conceptions of 
citizenship are presented in Chapter Four and in Chapter Five an attempt is made to 
reconcile rhetoric with democratic deliberation despite the tensions surrounding self-
representation, self-interest and truth. The relationship between citizens, politics and 
communication is fundamental in this discussion and it must be remembered that the 
Platonic criticism of rhetoric is undoubtedly influenced by his contempt for democracy as a 
political model. For Plato, common rhetoric is the expression of a perverted way of seeing 
politics and as an adversary of the democracy, he can only denounce
23
 the art of oratory 
which was one of the mainsprings of this type of government (Pernot 2005: 46). Plato’s 
damning criticism concludes that rhetoric is not an art, but an imitation of an art, in that it 
does not rest upon a true knowledge of its object (Gorgias 462c). 
Aristotle 
Aristotle, however, claimed that rhetoric was an art but one of a special character (Rhetoric 
1.1), not a science with its own subject matter, but a discipline unconcerned with the truth 
of its own conclusions. Aristotle saw rhetoric not as the art of persuading but rather the 
faculty of ‘finding out in each case the existing means of persuasion’ (Rhetoric 1.1355b25-
26). It is in this distinction that Aristotle’s view differs most from Plato’s. Whereas for 
Plato rhetoric was seen as a powerful force which promised easy victory over victims to be 
subjugated, Aristotle held that rhetoric was useful for bringing the truth to light, since some 
people could not be convinced by facts. If it is right to defend oneself by force, he thought 
it right to be able to do the same by words. His treatise introduces technical categorisation 
of rhetoric including the division of speeches into four parts (the introduction, the 
statement of the issue, the argument and the conclusion [Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.13]) and 
identifies the means for rhetorical discovery by analysing everything conducive to 
persuasion (Pernot 2005: 42). He admits that the power of words can be misused, but 
contends that so can all good things (Rhetoric 1.1.1355b).  
                                                 
23
 However Plato included the study of rhetoric in the curriculum of his Academy because his aim was to 
prepare civic leaders (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 25) and he felt that it was important for potential political 
figures to understand ways in which they could best engage and address their fellow citizens.  
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Whereas Plato favoured dialectic (the method of argumentation used by two or more 
people holding different points of view about a subject, who wish to establish the truth of 
the matter by dialogue with reasoned arguments), Aristotle saw it as a practice fraught with 
difficulty, typically marked by frustration rather than ease of achievement (Topics, Wardy 
1996). Aristotle clarified the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric: whereas dialectic 
is persuasive discourse exclusively based on logos (logical argument), rhetorical 
persuasion also relies on ethos (credibility or character of the speaker) and pathos 
(emotional connection with the audience), irrational elements of communication which 
improve the relationship between the speaker and the audience (Rhetoric 1, 2). I argue in 
Chapters Three and Five, following Aristotle, that rhetoric is a compound discipline in 
which a dialectical component is supplemented by knowledge of how to arouse, or appeal 
to, an audience’s emotions and influence their impressions of a speaker’s character. 
Aristotle’s ideal orator knows the cognitive competencies and pertinent mental associations 
of those listening to him
24
 and is ready to exploit forces already present in the listener. He 
builds on pre-existing ideas and recognised values, and in this way he can effect the 
mystery of persuasion: to induce someone to think something they were not thinking 
before by introducing a new thought into the mind of the listener from known and accepted 
premises. This aspect of Aristotelian rhetorical theory is of central significance to my claim 
that rhetoric can help cultivate narrative imagination and empathy in learners, which will 
be subjected to rigorous philosophical analysis in Chapter Five. There too, I build on 
Aristotle’s conclusion that rhetoric can act as an aid to reaching agreement on questions 
demanding immediate action in everyday life. It is this deliberative function of rhetoric, 
promoted by Aristotle as one of three rhetorical genres
25
 that I claim is the most valuable 
conception of rhetoric for citizenship and democracy in Scotland.  
Roman reinterpretation of rhetoric 
Indeed, the political system at Rome under the Republic was highly conducive to the 
practice of deliberative rhetoric, a system of communication inherited from the Greeks. 
                                                 
24
 Aristotle’s orator is male because only men in Ancient Athens were permitted to participate in public 
affairs. Hereafter I use the masculine pronoun in cases where I refer to the Classical conception (Greek and 
Roman) of the orator. A gender-neutral pronoun will be used later when referring to modern conceptions of 
the orator. 
25
 The other two are forensic (law court speeches) and epideictic (eulogies). Although not central to the 
argument in this study, more will be said about these genres in the discussion of rhetorical exercises in 
Chapter Three. 
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Whereas Aristotle’s conception of deliberation was exercised among wealthy and educated 
Greek citizens, the Roman Republic presented the orator with a number of fora in which to 
utilise rhetoric for deliberative purposes. The Senate, open only to elected representatives 
from Italy’s political and military elite, provided a discursive space in which views on 
political questions could be expressed orally by members of the body of elders and the 
consensus, once agreed, would be acted upon by elected magistrates. Unlike modern 
political assemblies, senators had not necessarily decided in advance which way they 
would vote and so the debates were real: powerful speakers, regardless of their position in 
the hierarchy, had the chance of influencing the outcome (Clarke 1996: x). However, 
orators also had to be able to address a much larger, more diverse crowd in the form of the 
contio, Rome’s public assembly open to all inhabitants regardless of social, political or 
economic status. Understandably, the art of deliberative rhetoric had to develop in order to 
accommodate the diverse needs of these multiple audiences since the content, style and 
tone of the orator’s speech before the Senate and the contio would have to be quite 
different.  
And these ends can be achieved with less apparatus in the Senate, as that is a 
wise deliberative body, and one should leave room for many others to speak, 
besides avoiding any suspicion of a display of talent, whereas a public meeting 
(contio) permits of the full employment of powerful and weighty oratory and 
required variety... But as the orator’s chief stage seems to be the platform at a 
public meeting, it naturally results that we are stimulated to employ the more 
ornate kind of oratory (Cicero, de Oratore 3.333-34, 338). 
This quote, written by the foremost orator of the Roman Republic, indicates that within 
deliberative rhetoric, the Romans developed a scheme which regulated the different levels 
of language which an orator could employ depending on his audience. These included 
embellished style (ornate), fitting style (apte) and modest style (decore). In choosing 
which style to adopt, the orator had to exercise his critical faculties and identify with the 
mood and sympathies of his audience. In a development of the Aristotelian concept of the 
orator’s pathos I argue in the next chapter that the learning and teaching of rhetoric helps 
cultivate critical faculties since, as Cicero held, communicators must make judgements 
about their audience in order to demonstrate awareness of their needs, thereby maximising 
their persuasiveness. Cicero himself is most famed for his use of the Asiatic style (Brutus 
95, 325) in forensic oratory which left juries stunned and captivated by his use of ornate 
and embellished language, delivered with dramatic and emotional flourish. It is this style 
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of communication which has the greatest potential to seduce those unfamiliar with the 
rhetorical theory and it is for this reason that I consider it vital for learners to become 
familiar with rhetoric so that they can deconstruct all the types of communication with 
which they are bombarded in today’s world. Cicero’s publications on rhetoric have 
provided a rich resource for rhetorical theorists for two centuries and the works of 
particular relevance to the argument expounded in this dissertation are: de Inventione (a 
handbook for orators on how to best structure speeches), de Oratore (a fuller statement of 
rhetorical principles in dialogue form), Topics (a rhetorical treatment of common topics) 
and Brutus (a discussion of famous orators). In de Inventione (Book 3), for example, 
Cicero expands on Corax’s and Aristotle’s technical categorisation of rhetoric by 
delineating the parts of a speech
26
 (partes orationis) in order to ensure effective and 
persuasive communication. Cicero’s rhetorical works provide a window into the 
interpretation and reinterpretation of the Aristotelian rules of the genre and demonstrate 
how, for Cicero in the Roman Republic, rhetoric was more than persuasive discourse. It 
had a role to play in defending civic institutions. Setting forth the rules of rhetoric 
amounted to considering the conditions for the healthy functioning of the State (Pernot 
2005: 114) and it is on this conception of rhetoric as a mainstay of civilisation that I build 
in Chapters Four and Five. It was with the belief that rhetoric was a civic virtue that the 
first century AD educator Quintilian placed it at the centre of the liberal arts curriculum in 
his school.  
Quintilian and rhetorical education 
 
Quintilian’s aim was to produce the good man speaking well, one who combined a 
Platonic commitment to virtue and absolute truth with the Ciceronian focus on effective 
public service (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 35). Quintilian’s ideal orator had to marry 
mastery of the art of rhetoric with oratorical competence and embody the moral conviction 
and social quality of someone who was devoted to the traditional institutions and values of 
Rome (Pernot 2005: 96). He was the sort of man the people could trust. According to the 
Roman historian Tacitus, gaining the trust of the nation was vital as it led to success. 
                                                 
26
 These are the exordium or opening, the narratio or statement of facts, the divisio or partitio, the statement 
of the point at issue and exposition of what the orator proposes to prove, the confirmatio or exposition of 
arguments, the refutatio or refutation of the opponent's arguments, and finally the conclusio or peroration. 
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The more able a man was at speaking, the greater the ease with which he 
attained high office and the greater his pre-eminence among his colleagues in 
office; he obtained more influence with the powerful, carried more weight with 
the Senate, possessed a higher reputation with the people (Tacitus, Dialogus 
36.4). 
In gaining the trust of the audience, Quintilian advised that the orator was required to speak 
with careful consideration and to rely on his status (including age, nobility and prestige) to 
guarantee the worth of his words. In an extension of the Aristotelian conception of ethos, 
which held that orators were listened to not for their words in themselves but for their 
position in the city, Quintilian introduced additional essential elements to rhetorical 
discourse including the orator’s weightiness (gravitas) and his personal authority 
(auctoritas). Auctoritas, an ‘elusive but vital mix of personal impressiveness and charisma 
with influence and connections’ (Steel 2001: 13), played a vital role in elevating the 
speaker’s words and persuading his audience, as did his trustworthiness, forcefulness and 
brevity. The effectiveness of the orator, then, did not depend solely on the quality of the 
oratory.  
This introduces another area of contestation: what is more important, true knowledge of the 
subject being discussed or the ability to deliver an effective speech, informed by rhetorical 
theory? For Quintilian, true knowledge of the topic under discussion was a prerequisite for 
the orator to successfully persuade, otherwise he would be a fraud. This view echoes 
Plato’s, that it is most important for the orator to know the subject, to know it accurately 
for what it is, and to tell the truth. Under these circumstances, Plato thought that the plan of 
the oration would follow naturally from the subject itself and the words would take care of 
themselves (Pernot 2005: 50). Aristotle is less concerned with the communication of truth, 
but rather that the orator speaks to make political and social life function on solid legal and 
moral foundations (Pernot 2005: 116). Pernot (2005: 115) summarises this area of 
contestation well: 
The question is one of knowing whether rhetoric is a technique without 
content, a collection of recipes applicable at will to any topic, or if it is a 
complete art – putting into play all a person’s qualities, supposing wisdom and 
knowledge in its expression and exercising its ability to persuade because of its 
inherent value.  
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The extent to which Cicero believed that the orator had to have strong moral conviction is 
unclear. Stroh (1975) and Steel (2001) identify instances where Cicero manipulates facts in 
his forensic speeches to produce a persuasively distorted account of events. Cicero has 
Crassus state (de Oratore 2) that ‘no one can be eloquent about anything of which he is 
ignorant’, but this statement is conjoined with the denial that ‘no one can speak eloquently 
about the very thing he knows, even if his knowledge is perfect, if he is ignorant of how to 
make and polish an oration’ (Wardy 1996: 101). Thus for an orator to be successful Cicero 
held that eloquence, knowledge of the subject and familiarity with rhetorical rules must be 
intertwined. It is with Cicero’s position that I have most sympathy in this area of 
contestation although in Chapter Five I propose a slightly revised conception of rhetoric 
which accommodates the use of rhetoric in deliberative conversation in contrast to Cicero’s 
conception which limits rhetoric to monological performance in public. 
Because rhetoric and oratory were to the fore in public arenas and were instrumental in the 
execution of Roman laws, politics, literature, philosophy and religion, knowledge of the 
rhetorical framework and the ability to apply it became a high priority in post-elementary 
education. Indeed, Benson and Prosser (1972: vii) claim that ‘rhetoric played the central 
role in ancient education’. Once Roman boys had learned arithmetic, reading and writing 
(which included an emphasis on the study of grammar as this was regarded an important 
prerequisite to the acquisition of the elaborate declamatory style [Bizzell and Herzberg 
1990: 34]), they hurried off to rhetorical schools such as the one run by Quintilian, to be 
taught how to speak and to argue. Indeed, Quintilian produced the first codified textbook 
on the theory and practice of rhetoric, the Instituto Oratoria, which is divided into 
theoretical, educational, and practical constructs. A rhetorician, by the end of his training, 
should have been able to tell a story, defend a case, make a display or engage in 
argumentative dialectic (Wardy 1996: 103). At times during the early Republic, teachers of 
rhetoric and rhetorical schools were treated with suspicion
27
. This was perhaps because 
Roman aristocrats sought to limit the power and influence of ‘new men’ who did not 
descend from aristocratic families and so would not have experienced rhetorical training. 
Naïvely, it was believed that if these new men could not find teachers to train them in how 
to speak and argue well, they would be paralysed into inaction. Unsurprisingly, this 
intervention did not displace rhetoric from the school curriculum for long and, despite the 
‘evolutions of institutions and the vicissitudes of history’ (Pernot 2005: 87), the study of 
                                                 
27
 In 161 BC, a decree of the Senate expelled philosophers and rhetoricians from Rome. Again in 92 BC, 
Crassus, as censor, issued an edict with his colleague forbidding schools of rhetoric. 
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rhetoric continued to include the study of Greek and Latin grammar, classical literature and 
history, logic and the composition and delivery of speeches. There was a virtual equation 
of an enlightened education with rhetorical training and in the evolving civic dynamic from 
Republic to Empire, rhetoric had changed from being primarily a political weapon to being 
the principal ingredient in Roman education and cultural life, a position it held ‘until the 
end of antiquity’ (Clarke 1996: xiii). Rhetoric has suffered a turbulent status in education 
since Classical times but it is not within the scope of this study to conduct a historical 
survey of its inclusion in the curriculum. Rather, I focus only on the present day and in the 
final section of this chapter, I identify how rhetoric is being interpreted and taught in the 
USA as a compositional course focussed on fluency in academic writing. I demonstrate 
how it is differently interpreted by Classics teachers in Scotland, as a tool for literary 
criticism. Neither of these interpretations does justice, I claim, to the potential educational 
benefits of rhetoric, hence the urgency of this study. 
Rhetorical pedagogy today 
Where rhetoric is currently taught, it is viewed through different lenses. From my 
professional experience in the Classics classroom, the study of rhetoric involves the close 
analysis of Classical literature in Latin and Greek, investigating how the author has used 
the rhetorical framework and rhetorical techniques to communicate in a particular way. 
Several times in its long history, the study of rhetoric has contracted to simply the study of 
style, consisting of memorizing long lists of techniques (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 6). I 
argue in the chapters which follow that the study of rhetoric is a far richer and more 
diverse discipline than simply learning lists of rhetorical techniques, although familiarity 
with these is an important stage in the learning process. Knowledge of rhetoric helps 
interrogate the impact of communication and facilitates improved understanding of 
authors’ motivations. In Scotland it is only in Latin and Greek28 that students have any 
contact with the basic elements of Classical rhetorical theory and even then this exposure is 
limited to the deconstruction of prose and verse literature.  
                                                 
28
 Subsequent discussion will be limited to Latin as the withdrawal of Greek described in Chapter One will be 
very difficult to reverse.  
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In the USA, rhetoric is viewed through a different lens. Sometimes called ‘writing across 
the curriculum’, rhetoric appears as a first year course in almost half of the universities in 
North America (Bourelle 2009: 35). Taught, in the main, by English instructors, this brand 
of rhetorical education is often linked to improving expression in academic writing (Berlin 
1988, Fleming 1988, Berlin 1996, Booth 2004) and has developed since the 1970s as a 
composition course to combat poor literacy levels among high school graduates upon 
arrival at university (Bourelle 2009). While these courses can involve the construction, 
delivery and criticism of argumentation, they require little awareness of Classical rhetorical 
theory and do not include the study of Latin or Greek literature or language (Murphy 
2012). In cases where an advanced course of study in rhetoric is offered, this tends to 
incorporate logical reasoning and critical thinking (Turner 1998, Kugelmass 2008) rather 
than the study of rhetorical techniques or the delivery of speeches (Crowley and Hawhee 
2012).  
Essentially, the American rhetorical model is exclusively concerned with writing. In 
Chapter Three I demonstrate ways in which I consider rhetoric to be of value in the 
improvement of writing skills but I argue that it contributes to literacy which also involves 
reading, speaking and listening. The optimal approach to rhetoric, I contend, is one which 
allows learners to both construct and deconstruct communication and critically analyse 
theories of discourse, composition, and argumentation. This model of rhetorical pedagogy 
was the norm in the Classical world but has become fragmented in contemporary 
conditions. In the following chapters, I will suggest that the rhetorical theories of Aristotle, 
Cicero and Quintilian outlined here are valuable not only for the learning and teaching of 
rhetoric but also for the preparation of citizens for democracy. In the Classical world, 
rhetorical ability was inextricably linked with citizenship and I argue in Chapters Four and 
Five that this Classical conception of rhetoric has the potential to boost political literacy 
and help learners to understand how language choices ‘form character and make good 
citizens’ (Neel 1988: 211).  
In many ways the opposition of Plato to rhetoric, summarised in this chapter, is just as 
important as the support of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian: it is from the intricate, 
complex and tangled web of contested meaning that a revised conception of rhetoric will, I 
hope, rise like the proverbial ‘Phoenix from the ashes’. This chapter did not set out to 
define rhetoric: it has, however, given some indication of the multiple and, at times, 
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divergent interpretations of the term from thinkers in the Classical world to educators in 
the present day. As a first step in stimulating such a rebirth, the next chapter defends 
rhetoric in CfE by identifying its contribution to cross-curricular skills promoted in the 
policy; literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking.  
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Chapter Three 
The contribution of rhetoric to 
three cross-curricular skills 
This chapter outlines the possible contribution rhetoric can make to the development of 
three skills, identified as being cross-curricular in CfE: literacy, critical thinking and 
critical literacy. Despite these skills being the responsibility of all practitioners, some doubt 
surrounds what is meant by these terms (MacLellan and Soden 2008, Oberski 2009, 
Priestley and Humes 2010, Priestley 2010 and Reid 2012) and how teachers might begin to 
deliver these skills successfully through the curriculum. After a brief analysis of how these 
three skills are conceived in CfE, I defend a possible model for their teaching through 
rhetoric. Specifically, I propose that the Classical rhetorical framework offers a useful 
structure around which students can learn to weave arguments and that the process of 
doing so provides opportunities for the development and application of literacy, critical 
thinking and critical literacy. I offer a defence of rhetoric which centres on its capacity to 
improve learners’ ability to communicate confidently and coherently in society through 
increased familiarity with methods of constructing and deconstructing argument. This, in 
turn, would help them to base their beliefs, opinions and actions on considered judgement 
which is of particular importance for the cultivation of responsible citizens, the subject of 
the next chapter.  
Firstly I will investigate the depiction of literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy in 
Scottish education policy in an attempt to clarify what is meant by these three cross-
curricular skills. Secondly, my claim that the study of rhetoric is able to contribute 
positively to the acquisition and development of these skills is supported with close 
reference to the Classical rhetorical framework, the Literacy/English experiences and 
outcomes (Scottish Government 2009a) and the effective contributor key capacity in CfE. 
Thirdly, building on the argument I introduced in Chapter One, that democracy needs 
citizens capable of reasoned and informed criticism, I outline three ways in which I 
consider the rhetorical framework to offer benefits additional to the pedagogical tools used 
currently by teachers in secondary schools: a focus on speaking and listening, oral 
performance skills and social/political distance from the culture under study. Finally, I 
build on the link made between literacy and citizenship in CfE by connecting the cross-
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curricular skills of critical literacy and critical thinking with the key capacity of responsible 
citizenship, something which CfE does not do. Furthermore, I claim that an increased focus 
on argumentation will reap rich rewards for Scottish education and democracy. 
Literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy 
Literacy 
In 2002 the Scottish Executive released the ‘National Statement for Improving Attainment 
in Literacy in Schools’ (Scottish Executive 2002a). This included the establishment of the 
‘Home Reading Initiative’ (Scottish Executive 2002b) to encourage parents to read with 
their children in an effort to boost literacy levels for both adults and children in Scotland. 
In 2003, upon the launch of the Scottish Survey of Achievement (2006c), the Executive 
renewed its support of this statement by announcing that it would take action against 
schools which failed to develop adequate literacy skills in their pupils. In 2004, the 
Scottish Executive’s findings (SEED 2004d: 1) into children's competence in the three Rs 
showed that half of early years to secondary pupils were not reaching national standards in 
writing. Consequently the reform package, ‘Ambitious, Excellent Schools’ (SEED 2004c), 
was launched in November 2004. These initiatives, however, generated minimal 
improvement and, as a result, literacy received greater emphasis in CfE and became a 
cross-curricular priority in the new 3-18 curriculum. 
Competence and confidence in literacy, including competence in grammar, 
spelling and the spoken word, is essential for progress in all areas of the 
curriculum. Because of this, all teachers have responsibility for promoting 
language and literacy development. Every teacher in each area of the 
curriculum needs to find opportunities to encourage children and young people 
to explain their thinking, debate their ideas and read and write at a level which 
will help them to develop their language skills further. With an increased 
emphasis upon literacy for all children and young people, teachers will need to 
plan to revisit and consolidate literacy skills throughout schooling and across 
the curriculum (Scottish Executive 2006b: 16). 
The literacy experiences and outcomes reflect this curricular imperative and take as their 
focus the development of skills in using language, particularly those that are used regularly 
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by everyone in their everyday lives. Alternative conceptions of literacy which are based on 
reading and writing alone and which are limited to the printed word
29
 have been rejected as 
archaic by CfE policymakers, who are keen to ‘future-proof’ (Scottish Government 2009a: 
20, 23, 111, 126, 127, 150, 151, 2009b: 32, 36) the definition of literacy, conscious of the 
potential for ongoing educational and technological change. Literacy has been redefined 
within CfE as, 
the set of skills which allows an individual to engage fully in society and in 
learning, through the different forms of language, and the range of texts, which 
society values and finds useful (Scottish Government 2009a: 1).  
This definition is intentionally far less prescriptive than the one in Scotland’s previous 5-
14 curriculum which emphasised the substantive content of literacy with spelling, 
punctuation and grammar featuring prominently (Scottish Education Department 1991). In 
a shift away from the prescription of knowledge, the literacy framework in CfE specifically 
prioritises three groups of skills: listening and talking, reading, and writing. Each of these 
areas is thought to be essential for successful learning in all areas of the curriculum, hence 
the involvement of all teaching staff, regardless of their individual specialism. Literacy is 
thus prioritised in the policy literature, being linked to employability and lifelong learning: 
‘being able to read and write accurately, to listen carefully and to talk clearly about ideas 
will increase the opportunities for young people in all aspects of life’ (LTS 2011a: 1). It is 
envisaged that all teachers will make important contributions to ‘developing and 
reinforcing literacy skills through the learning activities they plan... and through 
communicating with young people
30’ (LTS 2011a: 1). Employers, too, have a 
responsibility to ensure that employees are ‘supported to develop the literacy skills they 
need to do their job and to advance their career’ (Scottish Government 2010a: 11). While I 
understand that literacy is linked to employability, I consider that its impact has greater 
reach; it is vital for the functioning of democracy as it enables deliberation, self-expression 
and collaboration. Although literacy is certainly of significance to all learners within 
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 The American National Assessment of Adult Literacy (2003) provides such a definition of literacy: 
‘literacy is the ability to use printed and written information to function in society, to achieve one's goals, and 
to develop one's knowledge and potential’. 
30
 In response to ‘Offender learning: options for improvement’, the government encourages all agencies who 
work with young people and adults in the justice system to ensure that resources are directed to identify and 
support those with specific literacy needs (Scottish Government 2010b: 12). Hence it is a policy priority that 
young people who are neither in school nor in employment are still given appropriate access to literacy 
education. 
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society, I will limit my discussion to school learners who are in the secondary phase of 
their education as this is where my professional context and primary interests are situated. 
Critical thinking 
Literacy, as I have indicated, receives renewed focus in CfE and, as a skill thought 
necessary for all young people to engage fully in society, has become the responsibility of 
all teachers. Another skill which is considered essential for all young people is critical 
thinking, which, as an attribute of the effective contributor capacity (the learner can ‘apply 
critical thinking in new contexts
31’ [Scottish Government 2009b: iii]), forms part of the 
core of the curriculum. Unlike literacy, there is no definition of critical thinking provided 
in CfE and only five
32
 of the eight curricular areas detailed in ‘Building the Curriculum 1’ 
(Scottish Executive 2006b) make mention of it. This begs the question, what does critical 
thinking actually involve? How might a student know if he/she were competent at the 
skill? I reproduce the explanations supplied in the policy documentation in an effort to 
discover what conception of critical thinking CfE depicts: 
(a) Health and Wellbeing: ‘Personalisation, critical thinking, active learning and the 
development of practical and performance skills and practical abilities should be 
features of the learning and teaching in health and wellbeing programmes’ (Scottish 
Executive 2006b: 10). 
(b) Languages: ‘Learners will exercise their intellectual curiosity by questioning and 
developing their understanding, and use creative and critical thinking to synthesise 
ideas and arguments’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 13). 
(c) Religious and Moral Education: ‘Learners will develop the skills of reflection, 
discernment, critical thinking, and deciding how to act when making moral 
decisions’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 22) and ‘in accordance with an informed 
conscience’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 27).  
                                                 
31
 Though what is meant by ‘new contexts’ is not made clear. 
32
 There is no reference to critical thinking in the curriculum areas of Expressive Arts, Mathematics or 
Technologies. This is perhaps an oversight within the suite of policy documents as my discussions with 
teachers of these subjects suggest that there are a number of ways in which critical thinking is incorporated 
into the teaching and learning in these areas.  
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(d) Science: ‘Through first-hand observation, practical activities, open-ended 
challenges and investigations, and discussion and debate, children and young 
people can develop a range of skills in critical thinking as well as literacy, 
communication and numeracy’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 31) and ‘through 
involvement in a wide range of open-ended experiences, challenges and 
investigations they can develop critical thinking skills and appreciate the key role 
of the scientific process in generating new knowledge’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 
32). 
(e) Social Studies: ‘learners will develop the capacity for critical thinking, through 
accessing, analysing and using information’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 34) and ‘as 
their knowledge and understanding broadens through investigative, creative and 
critical thinking – individually and in groups – children and young people can 
develop attributes which will be important for their life and work’ (Scottish 
Executive 2006b: 35).  
 
These descriptions of the curriculum’s possible contributions to the development of critical 
thinking do not provide one coherent conception of what is meant by the skill. Rather, it 
would appear that critical thinking can encompass synthesis of ideas, reflection, analysis, 
investigation and creativity, with none of these being of primary importance in the 
cultivation of the skill. With such limited elaboration of what is meant by critical thinking 
in CfE, it will be necessary to augment the policy extracts with reference to the critical 
literature in the field to provide an adequate foundation on which to build my defence of 
rhetoric for the development of the skill. Critical thinking has been variously described as 
‘the correct assessment of statements’ (Ennis 1962: 83), ‘reasonable, reflective thinking 
that is focussed on deciding what to believe or to do’ (Ennis 1981: 143) and  
‘[a] student’s ability to be accurate and seek accuracy, be clear and seek clarity, 
be open-minded, restrain impulsivity, take a position when the situation 
warrants it, and be sensitive to the feelings and level of knowledge of 
others’(Marzano, Pickering and McTighe [1993] in Bers 2005: 16). 
The ability to decide what to believe, in a wide variety of contexts, is, in my view, an 
especially important tool to have in modern life. The etymological root of ‘critical’ is 
‘kritikos’ in Classical Greek which means ‘judge’ and this forms the basis of my argument 
that any attempt at thinking critically must, by necessity, aim to make some sort of 
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judgement. In this regard, I disagree fundamentally with the definition provided by 
McPeck (1981: 156) who suggests that a critical thinker is someone who ‘knows how to 
suspend judgement for the purpose of using his epistemic understanding of an issue, and 
does in fact do so’. The suspense of judgement, central to McPeck’s account, misses the 
point entirely. Rather, making judgement is at the forefront of the ability and a necessary 
component of the ‘critical’ skill. CfE is explicit about the need for learners to be able to 
apply critical thinking in new contexts (Scottish Government 2009b: iii) and I interpret this 
to mean that they require training in methods of assessing, analysing and decoding 
information which allows them to critically examine their own stance and arrive at a 
considered judgement which they are subsequently able to justify. More will be said about 
the skill of critical thinking later in this chapter. I move now to an initial analysis of a 
related skill, critical literacy. 
Critical literacy 
Like critical thinking, critical literacy requires the exercise of judgement but in relation to 
the construction and deconstruction of communication. In this sense, it combines elements 
of critical thinking and literacy. There exists, however, some ambiguity as to what exactly 
is meant by critical literacy; Reid (2012) conducted research with Scottish teachers relating 
to the presentation of critical literacy in CfE and records confusion and concern among 
them as to what this skill actually comprises. Despite regular references to critical literacy 
in CfE policy documents, in only two places are explanatory details provided: 
In particular, the experiences and outcomes address the important skills of 
critical literacy. Children and young people not only need to be able to read for 
information: they also need to be able to work out what trust they should place 
on the information and to identify when and how people are aiming to persuade 
or influence them (Scottish Government 2009a: 1).  
Literacy experiences and outcomes emphasise the development of critical 
literacy. Progress here can be seen as children move from dealing with 
straightforward information towards analysing, evaluating and being aware of 
the trust that they should place on evidence (Scottish Government 2009a: 3).  
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It is also referred to as an ‘advanced literacy skill’ (Scottish Government 2010a: 4) and 
gradation of the skill into levels of complexity is supported by the critical literature with 
respect to the development and application of critical skills. I have identified three levels 
from the discussion of the skill in the critical literature. At its simplest level, it appears to 
be concerned with the ability to state the main purpose of a text and draw inferences. At its 
more complex level, it is a method of approaching discourse that foregrounds and 
questions power relations
33
 (Shor and Pari 1999: 21). At its most complex, it acts as an 
impetus towards change, encouraging learners to take on the world at large and, by 
understanding systems of injustice, to arm themselves to challenge those systems of 
privilege and power (Cooper and White 2006: 31). It calls for a predisposition to 
deconstruct and critique all forms of discourse, exposing systems of dominance, 
oppression and advantage (Cooper and White 2006, Stevens and Bean 2007).  
It appears to me that the conception of critical literacy promoted by CfE is at the simpler 
end of the complexity spectrum and that what is meant is closer to ‘critical hermeneutics... 
the study of discourse and textual strategies’ (Cooper and White 2006: 143) or critical 
reading. Critical reading, a sub-skill of critical literacy, emphasises such skill-based tasks 
as distinguishing fact from opinion and, at a more advanced level, recognising propaganda 
in texts. Critical reading asserts that through ‘careful, thoughtful exegesis meaning which 
resides in texts can be deduced’ (Stevens and Bean 2007: 6). In essence, engaging in 
critical reading is a search for a verifiable reading, whereas critical literacy is the 
endeavour to work within multiple plausible interpretations of a text. Gee ([1996] in 
Stevens and Bean 2007: 25) summarises very well: ‘part and parcel of being a critical 
reader is being able to recognise the various discourses, or ways of being, doing and acting 
that are communicated via texts’. Critical literacy, however, at its most developed level 
motivates social or political action to redress inequalities and injustices. Despite critical 
literacy being noted in CfE as an important skill, it is not associated anywhere in the policy 
literature with transformation through action. I therefore claim that the conception of 
critical literacy in CfE is a diluted one, equivalent to the less sophisticated skill of critical 
reading, and that such a move represents a missed opportunity for policy makers as critical 
literacy in its stronger form is, I think, a highly desirable educational goal for Scottish 
learners. In the next chapter, I illustrate this missed opportunity in more detail by 
proposing a new link between critical literacy and responsible citizenship. Here, I elaborate 
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 Interestingly, this meaning was called social-epistemic rhetoric by Berlin (1988, 1996). 
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on my claim that the study of rhetoric can not only fulfil the aims of critical literacy 
education as it is conceived in CfE but can also take learners beyond critical reading to 
develop more refined critical literacy skills.  
Rhetoric (including critical hermeneutics, metalanguage
34
, critical reading and discourse 
analysis) provides a tool-kit, I suggest, which helps learners develop literacy, critical 
thinking and critical literacy skills and provides for them a valuable and relevant method 
for seeing beyond the veil of verbiage, the occluding ‘rhetoric’ surrounding every aspect of 
daily life from schooling to politics and advertising. In this regard, I analyse rhetoric’s 
potential role in fulfilling the Level Four
35
 experiences and outcomes of CfE in relation to 
these three cross-curricular skills to support my claim. I have identified particular ways in 
which rhetoric can contribute to the English and Literacy experiences and outcomes. In 
order to demonstrate these contributions, I have selected three key features from Classical 
rhetorical theory, which I consider to relate directly to the three cross-curricular skills. 
These will be illustrated through the following connections: audience awareness (literacy), 
organisation of ideas (critical thinking) and rhetorical techniques (critical literacy).  
Awareness of audience (literacy) 
In Quintilian’s school of rhetoric, boys36 had not only to identify and select what they were 
going to say based on what they could infer about the level of linguistic sophistication of 
their likely audience, but they were also required to practise adjusting their position mid-
speech in response to audience reaction. These exercises contributed to the development of 
literacy since they demanded that learners express their position using vocabulary 
appropriate to both the nature of their argument and the needs of their listeners. There were 
additional factors to consider; for the Greeks and Romans, the effectiveness of an orator 
did not depend solely on the quality of the oratory but rather, following Aristotle, on the 
pathos and ethos appeals which included adaptability, bearing and deportment. The orator 
needed to know how best to address and affect his audience both through what he said and 
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 Known as ‘language about language’ (Stevens and Bean 2007: 25). 
35
 It is expected that most learners will achieve Level Four outcomes and experiences in the early years of 
secondary school. I have chosen this level as it corresponds most closely to my professional context (Level 
One is Early Years, Level Two is Primary Four, Level Three is Primary Seven). 
36
 Only boys received rhetorical training in the Ancient world. Some girls attended primary school but the 
majority of their education concerned household tasks, taught by members of the family. 
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how he said it. This ability to use words wisely relied on a good command of literacy skills 
and continues to form part of the education thought vital for young people as is shown by 
the experiences and outcomes of CfE: 
Having explored and analysed the features of spoken language, I can use these 
independently, adopting and sustaining an appropriate register to suit my 
purpose and audience. 
ENG 4-03a 
When listening and talking with others for different purposes, I can: 
 communicate detailed information, ideas or opinions 
 explain processes, concepts or ideas with some relevant supporting 
detail 
 sum up ideas, issues, findings or conclusions. 
LIT 4-09a 
I can communicate in a clear, expressive manner when engaging with others 
within and beyond my place of learning, and can independently select and 
organise appropriate resources as required. 
LIT 4-10a 
I can engage and/or influence readers through my use of language, style and 
tone as appropriate to genre. 
ENG 4-27a 
I can independently select ideas and relevant information for different 
purposes, organise essential information or ideas and any supporting detail in a 
logical order, and use suitable vocabulary to communicate effectively with my 
audience. 
LIT 4-06a 
Scottish Government (2009a: 131, 132, 134, 144) 
As was the case in the Classical world, it is still considered important for learners to 
acquire skills which will allow them to gauge the purpose of different types of 
communication and to tailor the content, style and tone to the needs of their audience. One 
approach taken to fulfil these literacy outcomes has been identified as an example of good 
practice: learners at Beeslack Community High School in Penicuik (Education Scotland 
2013) are trialling the use of ‘literacy mats’ which provide models of different types of 
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writing (for example, letter, press release, short story, newspaper argument) and remind 
users of the success criteria for each type. Coloured, laminated sets of these mats are 
available across the school so that young people can use them whenever they are producing 
text in a specific format. While these might support learners in the skills of organising 
ideas and choosing appropriate language, I am concerned that the strategy breeds 
dependence on school-based resources and does not adequately inculcate the necessary 
skills for self expression, creation of texts, audience-awareness and logical ordering. My 
concern stems from uncertainty about how these learners might cope in unfamiliar 
circumstances when they leave school and enter further training or work – will they take a 
mini laminated version of the literacy mats with them (in their wallets) to which they may 
refer? Might they, deep down, lack confidence in their abilities to make appropriate 
choices concerning vocabulary, structure and argument because of their dependency on the 
mats? An alternative approach, I suggest, is offered by rhetoric. At the heart of Classical 
rhetorical theory was the responsibility of the orator to gauge his audience and use 
appropriate vocabulary and style to suit its linguistic awareness and needs. The study of 
rhetoric offers a systematic and versatile framework which, if practised and supported in 
the classroom, removes the need for supplementary resources and helps learners acquire 
and improve literacy skills, delivering lifelong benefits beyond the experiences and 
outcomes of CfE.  
 In support of this claim, I point to the primary stage in the Classical rhetorical speech-
making process, inventio, which demands that students learn basic planning skills and ask 
‘discovery questions37’ (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 100) concerning the nature and content 
of what they want to communicate as well as encouraging them to consider carefully their 
audience. This ensures that students not only analyse their position from various social and 
emotional perspectives but also that they structure their communication in such a way that 
it will deliver their message with maximum effect to any given audience. The rhetorical 
framework places emphasis on the selection and delivery of the right words for the task, 
foregrounding vocabulary acquisition and application. This is a prerequisite for the ability 
to rouse an audience’s emotions and appeal to their collective and individual needs, which 
is a fundamental characteristic of the good orator (Quintilian, Institutio Oratorio 12, 2.10). 
I acknowledge that CfE does not have, as its purpose, the creation of good orators per se. 
Rather, it seems more likely that it aims to create young people who are adept at 
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 For example who, what, why, where, when, how and through what means? 
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communicating effectively in everyday life but I claim that the ability to plan, structure and 
deliver sound arguments, through the study of rhetoric, is highly beneficial to learners of 
literacy. Use of literacy mats as showcased in Penicuik is certainly one method of 
improving learners’ confidence in literacy but I caution that such confidence is short-lived 
and highly reliant; there is the need to cultivate literacy alongside critical skills if learners 
are to enjoy genuine and transformational confidence in their ability to express themselves 
orally and in writing. The study of rhetoric includes, at its most basic level, the study of 
language, style, tone and oral presentation but it goes beyond the features linked with 
literacy education to incorporate the critical thinking skills required for classification and 
arrangement in the disposito stage.  As was seen above, the literacy outcomes in CfE 
require learners to select information independently and organise it in a logical order; here 
too rhetoric can help. 
Organisation of ideas (critical thinking) 
In this section, I explore the connection between critical thinking and the organisation of 
ideas and show, in the discussion which follows, how literacy and critical thinking are 
foundational to the development of critical literacy. Critical thinking helps students to 
organise their thoughts and formulate their ideas in relation to a particular subject and 
allows them to analyse and synthesise how a ‘small group of concepts fits together as a 
logical system to make up the foundation of a discipline, or how those concepts fit in with 
the central questions’ (Nosich 2005: 66). The arrangement of one’s ideas and decisions 
regarding the most effective way to structure them (disposito) constituted perhaps the most 
fundamental stage of the rhetorical process but, with the loss of rhetoric from the 
curriculum, these same skills have become associated with critical thinking and frequently 
act as indicators of ‘critical’ abilities. When composing argument, critical thinking is 
required when ordering the ideas one wants to expound. Yet critical thinking encompasses 
a wide range of skills, some of which involve organisation, others of which require 
judgement and analysis. For example, Knight (1992: 67) identifies that critical thinking 
includes, ‘identifying all the possible ways to organise [information], understanding the 
implications of each classification system and finally choosing a particular scheme of 
organisation for a stated reason’. To do so in a rational way requires the ability to judge the 
plausibility of specific assertions, to weigh evidence, to assess the logical soundness of 
inferences, to construct counter arguments and alternative hypotheses (Nickerson, Perkins 
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and Smith 1985: 4-5). There has been some separation, however, of thinking skills and 
critical skills. Thinking skills such as: argumentation, definition, problem solving and 
decision making, conceptualisation or classification and creativity (Knight 1992: 67), are 
required at the initial stages of such an endeavour. Yet ‘critical’ skills are needed to 
monitor and improve the quality of that judgement and include interrogation of thought at a 
deeper level: ‘interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, presentation of argument, 
reflection and disposition’ (Bers 2005: 16), explanation and self-regulation (Calderone 
2005). The Classical rhetorical framework combines these skills and for this reason I 
propose that it offers a valuable pedagogical model and is worthy of reconsideration within 
CfE. 
 
As was shown in Chapter Two, for the Greeks and Romans rhetoric involved planning, 
writing, learning and delivering communication, usually in the form of argument with the 
goal of persuasion. While the shifting cultural norms between the Ancient world and 
current conditions mean that the role played by argumentation in society has changed (the 
implications of this change will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Five), the need for 
students to be able to consider carefully the content, order and presentation of their ideas is 
still acknowledged as relevant in CfE. 
By considering the type of text I am creating, I can independently select ideas 
and relevant information for different purposes, and organise essential 
information or ideas and any supporting detail in a logical order. I can use 
suitable vocabulary to communicate effectively with my audience. 
LIT 4-26a 
Using what I know about the features of different types of texts, I can find, 
select, sort, summarise, link and use information from different sources. 
LIT 4-14a 
I can make notes and organise them to develop my thinking, help retain and 
recall information, explore issues and create new texts, using my own words as 
appropriate. 
LIT 4-15a 
Scottish Government (2009a: 137, 143) 
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These skills, I suggest, correlate closely with the inventio (planning stage described above), 
the disposito (arrangement), and the refutatio (refutation of the opponent’s argument) 
stages of the rhetorical framework. These steps all involve the ability to select and organise 
information, offering opportunities for the exercise and improvement of both critical 
thinking skills and literacy skills. There has been much criticism (Knight 1992, Brown 
1998, Barnes 2005, Paul 2005) of current educational trends which fail to teach students 
the fundamentals of argumentation with the result that students are unable to break 
arguments down into premises and conclusions, and to spot common fallacies, leaving 
them oblivious to ‘questionable classifications, unknowable or questionable statistics, and 
covert biases’ (Knight 1992: 66). There are already alternative pedagogical methods which 
seek to address these deficiencies in the teaching of argumentation, for example Beyer 
(1988) recommends for text production the formulation and execution of basic step-by-step 
approaches for problem solving: recognition, representation, formulation of a solution 
plan, execution and evaluation. Browne and Keeley (1986) and Knight (1992: 67) teach 
frameworks of interpretation which require students to a) identify the presence of an 
argument, b) delineate conclusions and premises, including missing premises c) analyse 
each premise independently, including any common fallacies associated with the premise 
d) ask what other information or points of view should be considered and e) determine, 
finally, if they are persuaded to accept the conclusion and for what reasons.  I claim that 
these pedagogical approaches aim at a more simplistic study of critical thinking than the 
approach provided by rhetoric. In support of this position, I highlight two features: the 
efficiency of the rhetorical framework and the unique contribution of the refutatio.  
Firstly, knowledge of the whole rhetorical framework
38
 requires that rhetors think critically 
about the evaluation of components including definition, cause, consequence and effect 
both when constructing and analysing communication. The current pedagogical approaches 
are limited to either construction or analysis; this effectively doubles the learning required 
by students and does not offer as efficient an approach as the combined approach 
encapsulated by rhetoric for the study of argumentation. Secondly, the inclusion of the 
refutatio in the rhetorical framework requires deeper critical thinking skills because it 
compels the students to put themselves in another person’s situation (usually their 
opponent) and forces them to see the world as ‘the other’ sees it, requiring them to frame 
questions that they might otherwise never ask (Knight 1992: 68). The refutatio requires 
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 exordium, narratio, disposito, confirmatio, refutatio and conclusio. 
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students of rhetoric to go beyond the basic critical thinking needed to consider possible 
approaches and construct one position, to actually articulate an incisive counter-argument 
and provide justification for their own superior position. In this way, the rhetorical 
framework model not only delivers the opportunity for critical thinking skills but actually 
demands a higher order skill from students, one they will undoubtedly find challenging but 
which promises to enhance their cognitive understanding and reasoning abilities.  
Once the key ideas and the structure of the argument have been identified and organised, 
consideration must be given to how best to communicate these to the audience, which 
requires the application of critical literacy skills. As outlined above, critical literacy skills 
exist at three levels of complexity and I suggest that only the first two of these levels are 
represented as desirable in CfE but contend that the strongest level is not encouraged. I 
claim that rhetoric can contribute to a fuller development of the skill and, in support, point 
to the centrality of rhetorical techniques in Classical rhetorical theory. In the next section, I 
evaluate ways in which renewed focus on these linguistic devices could improve critical 
literacy. 
Rhetorical techniques (critical literacy) 
Critical literacy, understood at its simplest level as the ability to state the main purpose of a 
text and draw inferences, is accorded importance in CfE as is shown by the following 
experiences and outcomes. 
To show my understanding across different areas of learning, I can: 
 clearly state the purpose, main concerns, concepts or arguments and use 
supporting detail  
 make inferences from key statements and state these accurately in my 
own words  
 compare and contrast different types of text. 
LIT 4-16a 
As I listen or watch, I can: 
 clearly state the purpose and main concerns of a text and make 
inferences from key statements  
 compare and contrast different types of text 
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 gather, link and use information from different sources and use this for 
different purposes. 
LIT 4-04a 
Throughout the writing process, I can review and edit my writing 
independently to ensure that it meets its purpose and communicates meaning 
clearly at first reading. 
LIT 4-23a 
Scottish Government (2009a: 132, 138, 141) 
But as was suggested earlier, I think this basic conception of critical literacy ought to be 
expanded, moving it beyond literacy and bringing it closer to the conception which 
includes the exercise of judgement and higher order thinking skills. Developed critical 
expertise in the construction and deconstruction of communication, rather than the ability 
to summarise, will, in my opinion, allow learners to ‘engage fully in society’ (Scottish 
Government 2009a: 1). The use of rhetorical techniques is pervasive in texts of all kinds 
and the ability both to persuade and to recognise persuasion in the communication of 
others is pleasingly represented in CfE’s conception of critical literacy. 
To help me develop an informed view, I can identify some of the techniques 
used to influence or persuade and can assess the value of my sources. 
LIT 4-08a 
To help me develop an informed view, I can recognise persuasion and bias, 
identify some of the techniques used to influence my opinion, and assess the 
reliability of information and credibility and value of my sources. 
LIT 4-18a 
I can persuade, argue, evaluate, explore issues or express and justify opinions 
within a convincing line of thought, using relevant supporting detail and/or 
evidence. 
LIT 4-29a 
Scottish Government (2009a: 133, 139, 144) 
Rhetoric is often associated with persuasion and a vital part of Classical rhetorical 
education, both for construction and deconstruction purposes, is a study of the techniques 
and tropes used by the orator to improve the style and impact of his communication. Study 
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of this sort is still prescribed today in both English (SQA 2000: 6) and Latin (SQA 2008: 
17) at Standard Grade level
39
. The study of rhetorical techniques in English, however, 
makes for a diluted form of learning since the linguistic features used in Classical literature 
are more plentiful and diverse and offer increased exposure to communication designed to 
persuade. To support this position, I shall compare the rhetorical techniques commonly 
studied by students in English and Latin. Through the study of English students typically 
encounter figures of speech including: metaphor, simile, alliteration, hyperbole, anticlimax 
and rhetorical question. Through the study of Latin they encounter all of these as well as 
chiasmus, tricolon, apostrophe, praeteritio, litotes, antithesis, prolepsis, ellipsis, polyptoton 
and homoioteleuton
40
. While many people may not have heard of these lesser known 
rhetorical techniques, I claim that exposure to an increased number of literary devices 
facilitates deeper learning of critical literacy. These techniques continue to be used in 
contemporary communication (Leith’s [2011] book identifies numerous examples from the 
speeches of modern politicians) so the greater students’ familiarity with their formation 
and possible manipulative effect, the more likely it is that they can decipher what is meant 
from the manner in which it is delivered. Surely the more informed students feel about 
language, the more confident they will be in applying their critical skills to the germane 
tasks
41
 of construction and deconstruction?  
Moreover, I suggest that the study of rhetoric at school equips students with the ability to 
recognise the use (and abuse) of these techniques in the communications they encounter 
through enhanced critical literacy skills but also improves their literacy skills by 
integrating these rhetorical techniques into their own written and spoken communications. 
Rhetorical devices can be taught in English but the study of Latin literature offers an 
authentic and linguistically rich body of literature written expressly for rhetorical purposes. 
The ‘rhetorical’ literature of Cicero, for example, acts as a model of good argumentation 
which showcases the appropriate and effective use of a wide range of linguistic techniques. 
The corpus of such literature is greater in Classical Greek and Latin than it is in English 
and this, together with the rich legacy of rhetorical pedagogy, behoves Scottish teachers, 
tasked with delivering literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy in CfE, to reconsider 
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 The first public exams taken by students (aged approximately 15) in the Scottish school in which I taught. 
Other exams (Intermediate One and Two) are offered by SQA at this level but I have not taught these 
courses. 
40
 These rhetorical techniques occur commonly in Latin literature and examples of their use are explained in 
the glossary on pages ix and x. 
41
 Also referred to as ‘analysis and genesis’ by Newlands and Murphy (2010: 18). 
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the potential contribution of rhetoric. Furthermore, I maintain that rhetoric has a unique 
role to play in the curriculum by uniting in one framework these three cross-curricular 
skills. In this way it offers a more efficient pedagogical approach to curricular skills which 
are currently treated separately and delivered in isolated ways by practitioners. 
A possible pedagogy: suasoriae and controversiae 
In this section, I point to the merit of exercises used by teachers of rhetoric in the Classical 
world and argue that they offer a useful pedagogical model for us today since they provide 
a more efficient method for the cultivation of literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy 
education, than ‘modern’ exercises which vary in challenge, scope and effect. I highlight 
two advantages of employing rhetorical exercises in the teaching of these cross-curricular 
skills: firstly, the social and cultural protection they offer and secondly, the increased focus 
on speaking, listening and the impact of oral presentation. First, I will outline the 
educational merits, as I see them, of the rhetorical exercises undertaken by Roman learners 
to further substantiate my argument that they should be revived. 
Quintilian and Cicero provide details of the two types of rhetorical exercises given to 
students of rhetoric two thousand years ago. It is clear that even in the Roman world, 
rhetorical ability was considered to be a developmental process; after appropriate 
knowledge of the parts of speech had been acquired, it was necessary to work on 
application of the skill. Learning how to read closely and write substantively were 
preliminary skills on which rhetorical ability could be built. The developmental nature of 
the process of becoming critical, both Ancient and modern, is summarised well, I think, by 
Glaser ([1985] in Cromwell 1992: 38) who suggests that three elements are needed:  
‘attitude of being disposed to consider in a thoughtful, perceptive manner the 
problems and subjects that come within the range of one’s experience, 
knowledge of the methods of logical enquiry and reasoning and skill in 
applying these methods’.  
Critical thinking, therefore, is not something which can be passively absorbed, it requires 
active engagement and the application of knowledge and reason. Bers’ (2005: 15) tripartite 
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division of critical thinking identifies three stages of knowledge. Declarative knowledge 
requires that a student knows the facts and the concepts of the discipline. Procedural 
knowledge requires more sophistication; the student knows how to reason, inquire and 
present knowledge in the discipline. The final stage is called metacognition and is an 
advanced thinking skill: the student at this level is able to set goals, determine when 
additional information is needed and assess the fruitfulness of a line of inquiry. I propose 
that these can be broadly compared to literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy. The 
similarity between Ancient and modern approaches to these skills and abilities suggests 
that they are of enduring value and it is to the success of Rome’s rhetoric that I think we 
should look for pedagogical inspiration. 
Suasoriae and controversiae were designed to instil in students of rhetoric this 
combination of attitude, knowledge and skill. The suasoria exercise, while occupied with 
flights of fancy of what might have been and the imaginative anachronism of placing 
oneself in history, also taught the rhetorical, logical, and compositional structure 
(disposito). In this activity, the student was asked to imagine himself
42
 as a figure from 
history (or mythology) and present an argument outlining his choice of action in a 
dilemma. Quintilian gives examples including Numa considering whether to be king 
(Instituo Oratoria 2, 4) and Cato considering whether to marry (Instituo Oratoria 3, 5). 
Other topics are drawn from the comparison of things, for example whether a country or 
city life was more desirable, and whether the merit of a lawyer or a soldier was the greater 
and whether political offices should be sought. Another element of Roman rhetorical 
training was the composition of controversiae, fictional law cases, in which the student had 
to ‘act’ either for the defence or the prosecution. In both exercises, argument was 
formulated according to the rhetorical framework and was supported with carefully 
considered, reasoned points and justified conclusions. I would say that suasoriae and 
controversiae are the ancestors of modern critical thinking exercises. Paul (2005: 32), 
discussing contemporary approaches to the teaching of critical thinking, emphasises that 
students ‘must think their way through what they read and write’. The framework provided 
by rhetorical exercises provides learners with a strategy for the organisation of their 
thoughts and formulation of their critical response.  
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 Again, the male pronoun is used because only boys received rhetorical training in the Ancient world. 
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The benefits of reviving rhetorical exercises include increased linguistic confidence, more 
emphasis on checking assumptions and the exercise of informed judgement. In the critical 
skills classroom, which, I argue could be a rhetoric classroom, students are helped to 
acquire the skills to catch language in the act of formation and to recognise and assert the 
effects of that formation. Being critical thus ‘involves adopting an active, challenging 
approach to reading and textual practices’ (Cooper and White 2008: 200). The distinction 
that critical thinking requires not only a disposition but a willingness to engage with the 
thinking process in a concerted fashion begins to explain why many critical thinking 
courses have ‘failed’ to achieve their objectives, simply because the curriculum designer 
presupposed active, willing participation from the students in the pursuit of changed 
thinking processes (Jost 2003, Brookfield 2005, Paul 2005). By studying rhetoric, students 
will be acquiring a lifelong predisposition to exercise considered judgement when faced 
with the multiple and often conflicting messages they receive from texts, films, novels, 
digital sources, political figures and a host of other discourse forms (Stevens and Bean 
2007). Through the exercise of critical skills, Brookfield suggests this is possible, by 
recognising and researching the assumptions that undergird thoughts and actions then 
‘hunting them down and checking them’ (Brookfield 2005: 50). Clearly, practice is 
essential for this process; students must have plenty of opportunity to be ‘rhetorical’ in 
class.  
Rhetorical exercises and students’ situated perspectives 
 
There has been some debate among practitioners as to whether critical thinking instruction 
should be grounded in student experience. Those in favour (Dlugos 2003, Petraglia and 
Bahri 2003, Bers 2005, Nosich 2005) suggest that when students apply reason to determine 
how some subject matter relevant to themselves conflicts with or reshapes their own real-
life goals, assumptions, decisions, and points of view, they become more engaged with the 
subject matter and more committed to acquiring the skill. Petraglia and Bahri (2003: 35) 
identify discussions about divisive issues (for example, race, religion, gender, sexuality) as 
being particularly useful in cultivating critical thinking skills and developing empathy. 
From my own classroom experience, I know that when students feel what it is like to be 
moved by powerful rhetoric, positively and negatively, they realise that they also possess 
the power to do so. What becomes problematic, however, is when students have strong 
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feelings on a topic but have not yet developed their rhetorical ability adequately to express 
their position in a reasoned way. In these circumstances, emotions can run high and 
tongues can begin to speak rather too freely. Brookfield (2005: 55) suggests an alternative 
approach. He considers that critical thinking should be targeted as an incremental 
movement in which learners begin far away from their own ideas and experiences and 
gradually move toward direct analysis of them.  
To be ‘critical’, a student should be able to both analyse and evaluate concepts with which 
they are personally acquainted and familiar and they should be able to organise and 
formulate basic ideas about something relatively unknown. This means that students must 
first learn the mental protocol of identifying and researching assumptions by looking at 
familiar ideas and actions from a distinctly unfamiliar vantage point. Asking questions of 
this sort, concerning the historical, social and political contexts that permeate and 
foreground any text is integral to the inventio stage of the speech making process. The 
reintroduction of rhetorical suasoriae (and conceivably controversiae) achieves these 
objectives but offers additional protection for students from discussions of sensitive and 
divisive issues which have the potential to socially alienate them from their peers and 
teaching staff. Debates and exercises based on fictional or remotely historical events, 
provide alternative contexts, which begins to address a deficiency of some current methods 
of teaching critical thinking. Brookfield (2005: 51) identifies ‘cultural suicide’ as a failure 
of the approach suggested by Petraglia and Bahri above; students fear that if they critically 
question conventional assumptions, justifications, contemporary structures, and actions too 
far then they risk being excluded from the culture that has defined and sustained them up to 
that point in their life. While I do not think that the content of literacy, critical thinking and 
critical literacy lessons ought to be censored or prescribed, as it is surely the responsibility 
of the teacher to exercise appropriate professional judgement in the selection of discussion 
topics, I do think that the development of critical skills should be free from personal 
trauma or social discomfort and maintain that suasoriae and controversiae have unique 
contributions to make in this regard, especially in the early stages of critical literacy 
development
43
. 
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 Debates and discussions based on ‘real life’ issues and opinions are better suited to the advanced stages of 
critical literacy study, as here they can contribute to transformation through social action, the goal of the most 
developed concept of critical literacy about which more will be said in the next chapter. 
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The democracy of fifth century BC Athens and the Republic of first century BC Rome 
offer ideal, self-contained societies which can serve as case studies for the exercise of 
critical literacy. When teaching rhetoric, Roman educators encouraged students to take on 
the persona of a variety of characters, real and fictional, from all ranks and locations 
throughout the Empire in an effort to get the boys to think, speak and act as ‘others’. Of 
course, retrieval of this approach today would require that students develop a clear 
understanding of the mechanics of such societies and that they become knowledgeable 
enough to position themselves on both sides of a social crisis. It is not only suasoriae and 
controversiae which can offer social protection for learners of rhetoric; the study of 
Classical literature offers a rich forum for the safe expression of ideas and opinions. Bean 
and Moni (2003) and Harper and Bean (2006) recommend the use of multicultural 
literature as a powerful vehicle for teaching critical literacy practices. I would argue that 
Classical literature (including but not restricted to rhetorical treatises) is indeed valuable 
for this purpose as the non-fictional letters of Pliny, Seneca and Cicero on slavery, the role 
of women and the treatment of foreigners provide an insightful counterpart to the themes 
of fictional plays which include: the effect of war on society (Aristophanes’ Lysistrata); 
the individual’s struggle against authority (Sophocles’ Antigone); and xenophobia, 
marriage and betrayal (Euripides’ Medea). Stevens and Bean (2007: 26) highlight issues 
such as democracy, freedom, equity and social justice and claim that these lend themselves 
to critical literacy questions and discussion; these are the core themes of much Classical 
literature, particularly Greek tragedy. In an interesting inversion of the common allegation 
that Latin and Greek are ‘dead’ languages, irrelevant to citizens of the 21st century, the 
Classical texts I have identified (and many others) provide fertile ground for the 
presentation of knowledge as a social construction linked to norms and values (the aim of 
critical literacy according to Aronowitz and Giroux [1985: 132]), and they demonstrate 
modes of critique that illuminate how, in some cases, knowledge serves very specific 
economic, political, and social interests. In teaching the aforementioned texts, these are 
exactly the questions which would be asked. By removing current conditions from the 
society under study, the focus on argumentation through suasoriae and controversiae or 
the appreciation of Classical literature, also has the potential to reduce the tension between 
schools being places of authority, and critical literacy demanding that the authority be 
questioned. Thus the ‘protection’ on offer to students is also extended to teachers who are, 
themselves, positioned outside the cultural context being discussed without jeopardising 
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the powerful transformative role of critique which can advance students’ confidence with 
language, self expression and engagement in communication with others.  
Speaking and listening 
The focus of suasoriae and controversiae was the construction and delivery of a speech. 
The argument expounded thus far is vulnerable to the criticism that speech making is of 
lesser value in contemporary society than it was in the Classical world (given the current 
widespread publication of written communication from books and magazines to blogs and 
Twitter) and, as such, is no longer an important aim for school education. Taking this view, 
the pedagogical approach offered by rhetoric may not appear so valuable for learners in the 
21
st
 century. In response to this position, I contend that although the speech is the focus of 
Ancient rhetorical education, the rhetorical framework can be used when constructing or 
deconstructing any written or spoken communication
44
 which involves making and 
justifying an argument. In this regard, the rhetorical exercises described above fulfil many 
of the desired activities associated with the aims of critical thinking according to Paul 
(2005: 30): 
to provide occasions on which students think their way to conclusions: defend 
positions on difficult issues; consider a variety of points of view; analyse 
concepts, theories and explanations; clarify issues and conclusions; solve 
problems; transfer ideas to new contexts; examine assumptions; assess alleged 
facts; explore implications and consequences; and increasingly come to terms 
with the contradictions and inconsistencies of their own thought and 
experience.  
They are, then, I contend, still highly relevant and fulfil many of the desired outcomes of 
literacy and critical skills. The promotion of literacy in CfE exhorts teachers to create 
situations where students can:  
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 By CfE’s definition, ‘a text is the medium through which ideas, experiences, opinions and information can 
be communicated’ and can be ‘spoken, heard, written, visual or mixed media’ (Scottish Government 2009b: 
10). 
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listen, talk and share... thinking; debate... ideas; read, find, select, sort and 
summarise information; understand and compare texts; write; develop and use 
effective vocabulary (creating texts) and build on the many languages used in 
Scotland (LTS 2011a: 2). 
The results of the Scottish Survey of Numeracy and Literacy (Scottish Government 2013) 
indicate that of the three areas in the literacy framework, listening and talking skills are the 
least developed
45
 among Scotland’s secondary school learners. Of the children surveyed46, 
only 46 per cent were performing well or very well in ‘listening and talking’ (Scottish 
Government 2013: 18). These results demonstrate that the time is right to consider a new 
approach. That the experiences promote the importance of listening and talking and of 
effective collaboration in the development of thinking and in learning suggests to me that 
conditions are conducive to an increased focus on argumentation. By argumentation, I do 
not mean the aggressive exchange of resolutely held positions with the aim of ‘winning’; 
rather I assert that argumentation involves reasoned and structured communication which 
can lead all sides to new positions, although more will be said about this role for rhetoric in 
Chapter Five. Here, my focus is to show that the rhetorical framework provides more than 
a tool for the construction and deconstruction of arguments, it has the potential to increase 
learners’ confidence47 in speaking and listening and offers an alternative pedagogical 
approach which Scottish teachers might usefully consider.  
Listening skills are important since the vast majority of decisions that we make about 
everyday events are made on the basis of hearing oral arguments – from the claims of 
advertisers or politicians to assessments of world events and social phenomena. Speaking 
skills, too, are vital as Shor and Freire (1987: 73) highlighted, urging teachers to tell their 
students, ‘you need to learn how to command the dominant language48, in order for you to 
survive in the struggle to transform society’. Knight (1992: 69) suggests that a possible 
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 ‘Reading’ at S2: 84 per cent of children surveyed are performing well or very well (Scottish Government 
2013: 10) and ‘writing’ at S2: 64 per cent of children surveyed are performing well or very well (Scottish 
Government 2013: 14). Only 1 per cent was performing beyond the expected level in each area of literacy 
education. 
46
 10,100 pupils and 4900 teachers in 2,100 schools took part (Scottish Government 2013: 1). 
47
 Brookfield (2005: 51) notes that ‘impostorship’ occurs when students feel, at some deeply embedded level, 
that they possess neither the talent nor the right to become critical thinkers. When asked to critically analyse 
the ideas of experts, learners often feel under-qualified to do so and worry that criticism marks them out as 
disrespectful. Here, I think the rhetorical framework acts as a great leveller as the stages of the process 
provide a ‘way in’. Hirshberg (1992: 115) notes that when students improve their ability in structuring 
arguments, they are empowered through the development of their thinking skills. 
48
 The role of Classical languages in this regard will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Six. 
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way to support the ‘habit of analysing oral arguments’ is to ‘make every discussion an 
exercise in argumentation’. This approach encourages students to become accustomed to 
asserting and defending positions and evaluating the strength of all arguments as they are 
presented in the relative ‘safety49’ of the classroom. Through disagreement and challenge, 
arguments can be probed, criticised and weak positions revealed. Roman rhetorical 
exercises, I claim, provide a useful method for the creation of a classroom culture focussed 
on improving speaking and listening skills through the study of argumentation. In these 
circumstances, students have the opportunity to combine creativity
50
 with critical thinking 
in an atmosphere that encourages the free play of ideas which is, in turn, supportive of the 
construction and delivery of sound arguments. More needs to be done to improve students’ 
speaking and listening skills, both to increase standards of literacy but also to facilitate 
fuller participation in civic life. Rhetoric can provide additional preparation for citizenship: 
as well as skills associated with speaking and listening, it equips students with heightened 
awareness of the impact of subliminal and non-verbal techniques (for example, hand 
gestures, voice variation and speaker to audience eye contact) used to persuade. With the 
widespread use of audio and video media outputs for communication and advertising 
purposes, this additional dimension of rhetorical study is worthy of careful reconsideration.  
actio – the Roman rhetorical art of delivery and performance 
If students are to feel confident in analysing the connection between knowledge and power, 
they must consider not only what is communicated but also how it is communicated, taking 
into account the use of body language and voice; I am concerned that this element of 
speaking and listening skills is underrepresented in current literacy curricula, especially 
since it is estimated that 65 per cent of meaning is communicated nonverbally (Burgoon 
1985). CfE does not prescribe that oral performance skills or presentation styles should be 
learned in the curriculum but these formed an integral part of Roman rhetorical training; 
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 Teachers can lessen the fear of participation by setting the tone and explaining that beliefs and opinions are 
respected but bad arguments are challenged.  
50
 Thinking creatively, described as a sub-skill of critical thinking by Hirshberg (1992) and Knight (1992) 
encompasses the habit of using alternative thinking strategies and asking hypothetical questions. 
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actio (delivery) was the fifth canon of speech
51
 which every orator had to consider when 
writing and practising his communication. Delivery, Cicero asserts in de Oratore 3, 56: 
has the sole and supreme power in oratory; without it, a speaker of the highest 
mental capacity can be held in no esteem; while one of moderate abilities, with 
this qualification, may surpass even those of the highest talent. 
Through delivery, the orator sought not only to persuade and move the audience's minds, 
but also to recommend himself to them, as was explained in Chapter Two: the Romans 
believed that the outward appearance of a person was an image of their inward personality 
and character. Their manner of dress, walking and gestures was indicative of the sort of 
man he was (ethos) and this impacted on the audience’s perception of his status and 
trustworthiness. In terms of voice, Quintilian tells that the ideal orator had to have the 
voice of a tragic actor and the delivery of a very good stage professional (Institutio 
Oratoria 11, 3, 111). He thought it advisable for students of rhetoric to undertake lessons 
in enunciation, gesticulation, and miming from a professional actor and training in body 
movements from a good gym instructor (Institutio Oratoria 11, 3). Training in posture and 
gesticulation, too, were vital for the future orator, and he notes the movements which help, 
and those which damage the performance, systematically passing from the head to the feet. 
He provides examples of the sorts of gestures students of rhetoric must learn. Some are 
expressions of emotion; certain head movements show shame, doubt, admiration, or 
indignation he says (Institutio Oratoria 11, 3, 71). He does not, however, describe them as 
they are too well known – though, unfortunately, not to us. With hand signs he often is 
more instructive not least because, as he writes, 'they are almost as expressive as words' 
(Institutio Oratoria 11, 3, 86). 'Wonder', both surprise and admiration (admiratio), is best 
expressed, he suggests, as follows:  
 
the right hand turns slightly upwards and the fingers are brought in to the palm, 
one after the other, beginning with the little finger; the hand is then reopened 
and turned round by a reversal of this motion; regret or anger is indicated by 
the clenched fist, pressed to the breast (Institutio Oratorio 11, 3, 104). 
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 These are inventio (invention), disposito (arrangement), elocutio (style), memoria (memory) and actio 
(delivery). 
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The gestural language together with the rest of the performance is directed towards the 
emotions, not the reason
52
, of the audience: 'all emotional appeals will inevitably fall flat, 
unless they are given the fire that voice, look, and the whole comportment of the body can 
give them' (Institutio Oratoria 11, 2). The body signs of the orator demonstrate his own 
emotions which in turn are used to excite similar emotions in the audience. Thus, gestures 
serve the aim of psychagogia (‘winning of men's souls', as Plato deprecatingly called it 
[Phaedrus 261a]); a goal attained by targeting the emotions, not the intellect of the 
audience, especially when addressing huge crowds of fellow citizens or judges in Greece 
or Rome. The study of rhetoric reveals that gestures underline and amplify the message of 
language by stressing the emotional, non-rational elements of communication. In arguing 
that students need increased awareness of these non-verbal methods of persuasion to help 
them become adequately critical consumers and producers of communication, I point to the 
rich body of material offered by the rhetorical exercises described by Quintilian and 
Cicero. Suasoriae and controversiae offer opportunities to promote activities which 
foreground speaking and listening, skills which are essential for the cultivation of literacy 
in CfE. However, as has been demonstrated by the additional benefits conferred by the 
rhetorical framework’s focus on actio, I consider that rhetorical exercises make important 
contributions to critical thinking and critical literacy skills too. 
 
Why critical skills require a more considered approach 
There ought to be a coherent and robust approach to the teaching and learning of critical 
skills in Scottish classrooms. In addition to the reasons outlined above, there are two 
further factors which ought to be considered; the role played by critical skills in lifelong 
learning and the connection between critical literacy and citizenship. Firstly, helping 
students develop well-honed critical filters to deconstruct how they are being positioned by 
messages in texts and, equally important, how to construct their own messages is an aspect 
of lifelong learning (Brookfield 2005: 49) which, I have suggested, rhetoric can help to 
improve. It does so, I claim, by enriching the learning of school pupils through its 
provision of a framework for the decoding and encoding of communications, written and 
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 This concept was introduced in Chapter Two and the tension between reason, passion, the emotions and 
rhetoric will be connected with the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Young and Benhabib in Chapter 
Five. 
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oral. The overwhelming nature and amount of communication in today’s world (Stevens 
and Bean 2007) makes critical thinking an essential skill, I argue, and more must be done 
to boost students’ ‘limited skills to decipher, question, validate, and reason’ (Barnes 2005: 
12). Detailed understanding of linguistic techniques will, I have argued, better prepare 
learners to express their ideas coherently and persuasively (in debates, academic settings 
and in everyday conversation) and application of the rhetorical framework will improve 
learners’ critical skills, allowing them to pick apart the specificities of power, 
representation, and purpose laden in all texts. Given that we are all now potential 
consumers to be swayed by highly creative, cunning and powerful media messages 
designed to get our attention, and ultimately to persuade us to purchase products (Stevens 
and Bean 2007: 23), the agenda for improving the teaching and learning of critical skills is 
urgent. Browne and Meuti ([1999: 162] in Barnes 2005: 6) identify that ‘critical thinking is 
perhaps the most oft-cited post-secondary learning objective, although common classroom 
practice belies its importance’. Unfortunately, schooling has tended, in its use of textbooks 
and other print-based texts, to privilege superficial, factual-level comprehension while 
leaving questions of power and representation unexplored (Stevens and Bean 2007). The 
wide-reaching impact of digital communication means that critical skills practitioners can 
no longer afford to think only locally but need to pay attention to the lifelong benefits for 
learners of being able to analyse and question the social, cultural and economic effects of 
globalisation on language use, opportunity and power. Students need to be taught to 
evaluate not only the content of a text but also how it does its work, what language choices 
are made and why. Discourse analysis at this micro-level is crucial in aiding students to use 
texts critically as meaning-making tools between themselves and the world around them. 
Brown (1998: 177) insists that  
development of the critical faculties, to which all people are potentially heirs, is 
not a means to an end, nor even one of many desirable ends; it is the primary 
social end.  
By the ‘primary social end’, I think Brown means the capacity to be a critically informed 
and aware citizen within an active and collaborative civic society. I concur with Brown’s 
view that the ability to exercise critical skills is a vital goal of education and brings lifelong 
benefit to those who become ‘critically’ competent and confident. Furthermore, the ability 
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to think critically has also been associated with improvement
53
 in collaborative and civic 
skills. Thinking critically involves working with (and sometimes against) one’s 
relationships with others, physically or mentally, in order to address contingent situations 
(Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 25) and, in this sense, it ‘helps the individual cooperate with 
others’ (Glaser 1985: 26). As was shown above, the use of suasoriae and controversiae 
compels learners to present arguments for both sides which requires them to consider 
opinions, feelings and motivations of those with alternative views. This exercise in 
empathy provides helpful preparation, I argue, for participation in the civic sphere. And the 
structured exploration of definitions, language use, assumptions, evidence, reasoning, and 
conclusions has the potential to cultivate democratic habits of mind and facilitate 
collaboration. For Glaser (1985) critical thinking combines an intellectual ability, a 
strategy for dealing with the world and a factor contributing to good citizenship. Kretovics 
(1985: 51), challenging the focus on functional literacy in US educational policy, makes a 
connection between the formal teaching of critical skills and participation in civic matters. 
He claims that critical thinking and critical literacy provide students with the conceptual 
tools necessary to critique and engage in society, more aware of its inequalities and 
injustices.  
The ability to examine, digest and ponder not only what is communicated but to ask 
questions of the ‘gaps, spaces and interrelationships between and among pieces and 
systems of knowledge’ (Cooper and White 2006: 200) is vital, in my view, for Scottish 
learners as they develop as citizens in a democracy. Indeed, an aim for the new Scottish 
curriculum is to ‘be inclusive, be a stimulus for personal achievement and, through the 
broadening of pupils’ experience of the world, be an encouragement towards informed and 
responsible citizenship’ (Scottish Executive 2004a: 11) and if learners are to become such 
citizens, they must move beyond simply understanding the meaning of communication to 
‘filtering it for positionalities, agendas and purposes’ (Stevens and Bean 2007: 17); key 
skills facilitated by the critical faculties and given structure, I argue, by the study of 
Classical rhetoric. The ability to see beyond meaning to positionality helps learners to 
adapt to new contexts, a skill considered important in the effective contributor capacity of 
CfE. When students learn how to ‘read the world and their lives critically and relatedly’ 
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 There is a pervasive body of evidence to suggest that the study of critical thinking can accelerate the 
development of students’ higher order thinking and literacy abilities, as well as improving their motivation 
for learning (Lochhead and Clement 1979, Chaffee 1985, Chance 1986, Schonfield 1987, Chaffee 1992, 
Olson and Babu 1992, Brown 1998).  
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(Shor and Pari 1999: 20), they develop a critical consciousness, fostering the capacities to 
deal with ambiguity, negotiate the bewildering pace of social and technological change and 
to search for justice and equity by reading the meanings behind the text. Students 
accustomed to the practice of argumentation and the exchange of ideas and opinions 
through debates or discussions are more likely, I suggest, to begin to share willingly their 
own social and political positions and are also better placed to develop a collective vision 
of what it might be like to live in the best of all societies. In searching for ways in which 
such a vision might be made practical, I claim that rhetoric, by requiring that students 
prepare and deliver their arguments in a logical order and in accordance with the common 
framework encasing the five canons of speech, boosts their self-confidence and motivates 
them to engage actively as citizens ‘in shaping the future of their society rather than 
accommodating to it’ (Nickerson, Perkins and Smith 1985: 5).   
I have shown, in this chapter, that rhetoric can help deliver several of the literacy and 
English experiences and outcomes as well as one element of the effective contributor 
capacity in CfE. In this regard, I have suggested that the rhetorical framework offers a 
pedagogical possibility for the combined learning and teaching of three cross-curricular 
skills: literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy. Furthermore, advantages of rhetoric 
over current pedagogy were highlighted: the increased exposure to linguistic techniques 
used to persuade, the social protection offered by suasoriae and controversiae for students 
and teachers, the efficient progressive framework for argument formation, the focus on 
non-verbal methods of communication and the impact of voice and delivery (actio) and the 
centrality of critical skills which can have additional benefits for lifelong learning and civic 
collaboration.  
The curious treatment of critical literacy revisited 
In concluding this chapter, I revisit the curious treatment of critical literacy in CfE. As was 
discussed above, the conception of critical literacy in CfE appears to aim at something 
beyond reading for understanding and the exercise of ‘advanced literary skills’ including 
analysis, interpretation and evaluation. I have already made the point that these skills are 
consistent with critical reading or critical hermeneutics but do not, in my view, encompass 
the social and political dimension which is required in the more common conception of 
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critical literacy (Shor and Pari 1999, Cooper and White 2006, Stevens and Bean 2007, 
Cooper and White 2008, Darder et al. 2009). The approach adopted in CfE may be the 
result of a misinterpretation of the term; Cooper and White (2006: 32) comment that the 
popularisation of the words ‘“critical literacy” guts it of its radical content and trivialises 
its meanings’. What makes critical literacy ‘radical’ is that, after critiquing relationships 
among language use, social practice and power to unveil social inequalities and oppressive 
institutional structures, there is an expectation that steps will be taken to redress any power 
imbalance, calling for systemic change through political engagement and social action 
(Cooper and White 2006: 17). Oriented toward self in social context, critical literacy 
combines questioning received knowledge and immediate experience with the goals of 
challenging inequality and, crucially, developing an activist citizenry (Shor and Pari 1999: 
10). This is the point at which I believe that the teaching of rhetoric and the teaching of 
critical literacy intersect with citizenship education; rhetoric offers a critical framework for 
the analysis and genesis of communication and by equipping learners with the critical 
skills they need to be able to express themselves in an appropriate and articulate way, they 
are better placed to become politically literate and socially active. This connection between 
critical literacy and citizenship does not exist in CfE, with detrimental implications, I 
believe, both for the policy and for the students it aims to educate. In the next chapter I 
explore in more depth what is meant by the key capacity of ‘responsible citizen’ in 
Scotland’s CfE and consider ways in which the study of rhetoric in the curriculum can 
cultivate and fulfil its associated skills and attributes. 
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Chapter Four 
Responsible citizenship: a capacity in need of 
philosophical analysis and pedagogical development 
In this chapter I continue to develop my argument for the reintroduction of rhetoric in the 
school curriculum with particular reference to its potential contribution to citizenship 
education, one of the curriculum’s key capacities. I revisit the claim made in the previous 
chapter that rhetoric can contribute positively to the cultivation of critical skills but here 
claim that these abilities are of particular use to citizens as they learn how to conduct 
themselves responsibly in society. I explore what is meant by the responsible citizen 
capacity but given that the policy describes the attributes of the responsible citizen only 
briefly and shies away from fuller definition, I propose that we might better understand the 
intentions of the policy authors if we subject three areas of the attributes to interpretation 
on a continuum from ‘minimal’ to ‘maximal’ conceptions (McLaughlin 1992). These are: 
citizens’ knowledge and understanding; their critical reasoning ability and their proclivity 
to participation. In analysing how these categories have been conceived in CfE, I argue that 
the policy authors have been too cautious in their vision for responsible citizenship; they 
appear to alienate maximal conceptions of citizenship in favour of an approach which 
broadly construes citizenship minimally but which consequently yields more questions 
than answers. This creates ambiguity for teachers and students as to what responsible 
citizenship requires and is likely, I think, to give the impression that maximal 
interpretations are undesirable: a dangerous outcome which I fear has the potential to dilute 
the potency of citizenship education now and in the future.  
Placed at the heart of the curriculum as a key capacity, CfE’s conception of the responsible 
citizen is disappointingly flaccid and requires support and scaffolding from deeper analysis 
of citizenship trends in the philosophy of education to make it fit for purpose in the 
dynamic civic arena of contemporary Scotland. In concluding this chapter, I point to the 
apparently changing nature of policy priorities and to some promising examples of best 
practice identified in related policy documents which, I argue, exhort a new approach to 
citizenship education and which motivate a maximal interpretation. ‘Justice-oriented 
citizenship’ (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 242) is such a conception of citizenship which, 
although not currently taught extensively in schools (Westheimer and Kahne 2004, Biesta 
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2008, Zipin and Reid 2008, Biesta 2011, Swalwell 2013), is the one which I think we 
ought to support and promote for responsible citizenship and democratic education in 
Scotland. That rhetoric combines skills of self-representation with those of critical analysis 
and active participation makes it worthy of reconsideration, I propose, as a pedagogical 
method for the cultivation of justice-oriented citizenship in current conditions. 
Minimal and maximal conceptions of citizenship 
McLaughlin (1992: 236) identifies that ‘much of the ambiguity and tension contained 
within the concept of citizenship can be roughly mapped in terms of minimal and maximal 
interpretations of the notion’. I consider McLaughlin’s distinction to be instructive for the 
present endeavour since it allows for multiple interpretations of citizenship to be viewed as 
part of a continuum, not as discrete theories (McLaughlin 1992: 236). Since all 
conceptions of citizenship exist within a fluid civic domain inhabited by divergent political 
beliefs and are set against the contested nature of democracy itself, the continuum 
facilitates a method of philosophical analysis which eschews precise definition and fixed 
classification.  Indeed, the responsible citizen capacity in CfE seems to imply a variety of 
conceptions and there is the potential for confusion in trying to determine the extent to 
which knowledge and understanding, critical reasoning and participation are necessary or 
desirable features. In order to establish a philosophical foundation for the further analysis 
of CfE policy which follows, clarification of what is meant by minimal and maximal 
conceptions of citizenship will be helpful.  
Four features of citizenship which McLaughlin identifies to illustrate the difference 
between minimal and maximal interpretations are: identity, virtues, political involvement 
and social prerequisites. In terms of identity, a minimal interpretation of citizenship centres 
on the legal status granted to a citizen. A maximal interpretation sees identity manifest 
itself as the conscious membership of community and a shared commitment to democratic 
culture. In this sense, identity ‘is dynamic rather than static in that it is seen as a matter for 
continuing debate and redefinition’ (McLaughlin 1992: 236). The virtues required by a 
citizen within a minimal conception are primarily local and immediate in character. This 
might involve helping others through the demonstration of public-spiritedness, for example 
by participating in a neighbourhood watch initiative. Interpreted maximally, the citizen has 
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a responsibility to seek social justice for all. In a minimal interpretation of citizenship, 
political involvement extends only to the exercise of individual voting rights whereas the 
maximal interpretation requires full participation in democracy. Social prerequisites 
concern the extent to which citizenship is seen as an ‘egalitarian status in terms of theory 
and intention’ (McLaughlin 1992: 237) in which case a minimal interpretation is content 
that citizenship is granted and a maximal one is concerned that social disadvantages of 
various kinds must be considered if that status is to be achieved ‘in any real and 
meaningful sense’ (McLaughlin 1992: 237). In the exploration (of what is intended by 
CfE’s ‘responsible citizen’ capacity) which follows, I use the framework provided by 
minimal and maximal interpretation to try to determine where on the continuum CfE’s 
intended approach rests. A useful starting point for such a quest is the contextualisation of 
CfE’s capacity within the broader education for citizenship policy landscape. 
Education for citizenship and the responsible citizen capacity 
In the UK, in the last two decades, there has been renewed interest in education for 
citizenship. A Citizenship Advisory Group was established in the 1990s (chaired by 
Professor Bernard Crick) to articulate the contemporary meaning of citizenship, drawing 
on philosophical ideas dating back to Ancient Athens but essentially focussing on modern 
democracy. The National Curriculum Council concluded that ‘education for citizenship is 
essential for every young pupil’ (Jones and Jones 1992: 30) and in the Crick Report (Crick 
1998), citizenship was recommended as a separate subject on England’s national 
curriculum. In 1999 LTS, presumably prompted by the innovation south of the border and 
motivated by the advent of devolution, investigated the present and future role of 
citizenship in Scottish schools and created a paper for discussion and development entitled 
‘Education for Citizenship in Scotland’ (LTS 2002). This, together with the 2006 
publication by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of education (HMIe) ‘Education for 
Citizenship’, informed the inclusion (Biesta 2008) of ‘responsible citizen’ as one of the 
four capacities, and a purpose of the new curriculum in Scotland.  
Within CfE, responsible citizens are depicted as individuals who have ‘respect for others’ 
and ‘commitment to participate responsibly in political, economic, social and cultural life’ 
and who are able to 
79 
 
develop knowledge and understanding of the world and Scotland’s place in it; 
understand different beliefs and cultures; make informed choices and 
decisions; evaluate environmental, scientific and technological issues; [and] 
develop informed, ethical views of complex issues (SEED 2004a: 12).  
I suggest that these attributes can be separated into three categories of ability which 
citizens must possess to qualify as ‘responsible’ in CfE. One concerns the extent of 
citizens’ knowledge and understanding, another concerns their critical reasoning ability 
and the third concerns participation. I shall subject each of these categories to analysis 
using the framework of minimal and maximal interpretation described above.  
Knowledge and understanding 
The conception of citizenship promoted by CfE acknowledges that citizens must learn 
about ‘the world and Scotland’s place in it’ as well as undertaking the task of 
understanding ‘different beliefs and cultures’, both of which require the acquisition of 
knowledge but are not directly linked to any deeper civic skills. The privileging of the 
individual’s knowledge and understanding in this way is indicative of a minimal 
interpretation of citizenship which prioritises the provision of information and does not 
require ‘understanding of virtues and dispositions of the democratic citizen conceptualised 
in fuller terms’ (McLaughlin 1992: 238). For example, an interpretation of developing 
‘knowledge and understanding of the world and Scotland’s place in it’ and understanding 
‘different beliefs and cultures’ at the extremely minimal end of the continuum might be 
exemplified by students learning about a cultural phenomenon which will have limited 
impact on their understanding of democratic citizenship. This might, for argument’s sake, 
include the study of the range of costumes worn by Greek folk dancers across towns and 
regions of the archipelago. Learners could develop understanding of this different culture 
through the study of local traditions of fashion, music and performance and could conduct 
a comparative study with Scotland. Such an activity would, as far as I can see, satisfy the 
two attributes of the capacity which relate to cultural understanding but could equally be an 
activity conducted as part of the Social Studies or Expressive Arts curricula. There is 
nothing about this type of activity which makes citizens more responsible, rather it only 
serves to make them more informed; the two are not directly linked. Admittedly, CfE’s 
exhortation through the capacity that responsible citizens ‘understand different beliefs’ 
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affords investigation of slightly more controversial issues which may have more to 
contribute to the development of responsible citizenship. For example, the development of 
knowledge and understanding surrounding the issue of female genital mutilation by the 
Oromo tribe in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya will certainly help Scottish citizens feel more 
aware of and informed about alternative beliefs and their concomitant cultural practices but 
possessing knowledge is not enough to engage responsibility, in my view.  
Citizens become responsible, I suggest, when they possess the skills to critically analyse 
alternative beliefs and can articulate and defend their views in a way which shows respect 
for others and an awareness of democracy and social justice. The focus on the individual 
amassing knowledge in order to understand alternative social and cultural approaches is 
undoubtedly one stage in the process. Indeed, knowledge and understanding are closely 
linked with the aims of international education and the development of global citizens 
(LTS 2011a). Knowledge and understanding certainly have a preparatory role to play but 
are insufficient for responsible citizenship, in my view, since they stop short of improving 
students’ sense of agency or advancing their competence in political literacy, elements 
which I consider necessary to move beyond a basic conception of citizenship. The absence 
of any explicit mention of shared commitment to public virtues and social justice, 
combined with the focus on the individual’s knowledge and understanding aligns with a 
minimal interpretation of citizenship; McLaughlin suggests that such conceptions do not 
have any ‘concern to ameliorate the social disadvantages that may inhibit the students from 
developing into citizens in a significant sense’ (McLaughlin 1992: 238). The danger of a 
minimal interpretation of this kind being taught in schools is that it can lead students to 
receive ‘merely an unreflective socialisation into the political and social status quo’ 
(McLaughlin 1992: 238) which is insufficient, I advance, both for education and 
democracy in Scotland.  
Critical reasoning 
At this stage, it is helpful to remember that citizenship, according to McLaughlin (1992: 
237) should not be considered as a set of distinct concepts but is better viewed as a 
‘continuum of interpretations’ in which minimal conceptions are no less concerned with 
‘ideological content or significance’ (McLaughlin 1992: 237) than their maximal 
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counterparts. Rather, the main difference concerns the degree of critical understanding and 
questioning that is seen as necessary to citizenship. In this regard, upon first reading, it 
appears that the conception of citizenship promoted in CfE does not consider critical 
faculties important since it makes no explicit mention of them. However, upon closer 
inspection, it is clear that critical ability is considered desirable since, according to the 
capacity, responsible citizens must be able: to apply the knowledge they have gained to 
complex issues; to evaluate, which involves judging both sides of an issue; and to make 
decisions in an ethical manner. These skills require more than knowledge and 
understanding; they command engagement from the critical faculties. As was discussed in 
the previous chapter, rhetoric has much to offer the cultivation of critical thinking and 
critical literacy skills. I will return to the role of rhetoric towards the end of this chapter; 
the focus here is on ways in which the development of critical faculties can fulfil aspects of 
responsible citizenship.  
A summary of what is meant by critical thinking is provided by Kuhn ([1999] cited in 
Maclellan and Soden 2008: 32) and revisiting it here will be instructive. She identifies that 
critical thinking involves separating beliefs from evidence; imagining beliefs alternative to 
one’s own and knowing what evidence would support these; providing evidence which 
supports one’s own beliefs while rebutting the alternatives and weighing up reasons for 
believing what is alleged to be known. Although critical skills are not explicitly mentioned 
in the responsible citizen capacity, a strong connection is made between them in the LTS 
(2002) ‘Education for Citizenship’ document which claims that education for citizenship 
must promote ‘the need to base opinions, views and decisions on relevant knowledge and 
on a critical evaluation and balanced interpretation of evidence’ (LTS 2002: 12). The 
ability to interrogate beliefs, critically examine evidence and apply reason is closely 
connected with the skills included in the responsible citizen capacity which indicates that 
responsible citizens ‘make informed choices and decisions; evaluate environmental, 
scientific and technological issues; [and] develop informed, ethical views of complex 
issues’ (SEED 2004a: 12). Despite the lack of overtly ‘critical’ language in the responsible 
citizen capacity, the Curriculum Review Group suggested the importance of being able to 
subject values, responsibility and matters of social justice to critical scrutiny in a purpose 
of the curriculum:  
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to make our young people aware of the values on which Scottish society is 
based and so help them establish their own stances on matters of social justice 
and personal and collective responsibility (SEED 2004a: 11).  
The ability to establish one’s own stance is inextricably linked, in my view, to the exercise 
of critical judgement and in a later policy recommendation, being a responsible citizen 
requires ‘critical and independent thought’ (HMIe 2006: 3). The approach favoured by the 
policy authors of implying but not specifying the development of critical abilities in 
relation to responsible citizenship is an interesting choice and it suggests a minimal 
conception of citizenship once again centred on individual ability and disposition. It seems 
somewhat incongruous to me that they should avoid so completely any connection between 
citizenship and critical skills since included in the attributes is ‘the commitment to 
participate responsibly’ (SEED 2004a: 12) in various spheres of civic life. I wonder how it 
is possible to enable learners to discern responsible participation from irresponsible 
participation without clear support for the centrality of critical skills in citizenship. If read 
closely and interpreted maximally, the responsible citizen capacity requires that citizens 
develop and exercise critical skills to allow them to subject aspects of their lives (both 
personal and public) to critical scrutiny.  
The connection between responsible citizenship and leading the examined life has long 
been considered strong (elements were raised for discussion in Plato’s Apology, Aristotle’s 
Politics, St. Augustine’s Confessions and Descartes’ Meditations) but perhaps the CfE 
policy authors were all too aware of contemporary objections to such a conception of 
citizenship. An objection to a maximal interpretation of critical reasoning in CfE’s 
responsible citizen capacity comes from those who wish to retain democratic autonomy 
because it creates space for citizens to choose the extent to which they participate in 
democratic processes. Following this view, any demand that citizens participate or engage 
critical reason is ‘to go beyond the demands of liberal neutrality’ (Galston 1989: 100 in 
McLaughlin 1992: 241). Freedom, Galston maintains, ‘entails the right to live the 
unexamined life as well as examined lives’ so public education ought not to induct citizens 
into the belief that critical reason is an essential skill for citizenship. This view is 
characteristic, I assert, of the extremely minimal end of the continuum of citizenship. Yet 
the responsible citizen capacity, one of the four key capacities at the core of Scotland’s 
new curriculum seems to imply that the ability to reason critically is desirable in order to 
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make informed decisions and develop ethical views about complex issues. Where does the 
challenge from democratic autonomy leave critical reasoning and responsible citizenship?  
This tension is eased if the curriculum is viewed as the vehicle through which citizens 
learn the skills and knowledge they require to reason and participate in society and if they 
retain the choice to exert these skills fully, partially or not at all at various stages 
throughout their lives. In such a way the capacity as currently conceived can, I think, 
survive this challenge since it can facilitate both minimal and maximal interpretations, 
although I claim that it ought to be interpreted maximally. While I agree that, to preserve 
democratic autonomy there ought to be no compulsion to reason critically, I consider it 
vital for responsible citizens to learn the skills required for critical reasoning, whether they 
then choose to apply them immediately and extensively or not. A sensible location for 
these skills to be developed, I affirm, is in the school, and as was explained in the previous 
chapter, critical thinking and critical literacy, both of which rely on critical reasoning 
ability to establish opinions and positions after careful consideration of all factors of 
influence in any given situation, are important elements of education for citizenship. The 
ability to judge the impact of intrinsic and extrinsic factors is vital to undergird responsible 
participation.  
Participation 
Just as the responsible citizen capacity is open to minimal and maximal interpretations in 
terms of critical reasoning, the same is true with respect to participation. The policy 
authors again appear to have chosen their wording with meticulous precision, perhaps 
eager to tread the path of least resistance in an effort to avoid as much contestation as 
possible from political theorists and philosophers of education. The responsible citizen 
capacity says that citizens must hold a ‘commitment to participate responsibly in political, 
economic, social and cultural life’ (SEED 2004a: 12) but does holding a commitment to 
participate actually motivate or involve participation? Clearly there has to be some 
willingness on the part of citizens to put their learning into practice. For example if, as 
Biesta (2008) suggests, the conception of citizenship implied in CfE is taken to correlate to 
Westheimer and Kahne’s  (2004: 241) description of the ‘personally responsible’ citizen, 
such a citizen would be expected to participate by ‘picking up litter, obeying laws, staying 
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out of debt, contributing to food or clothing drives or volunteering to help those less 
fortunate in a soup kitchen or senior centre’ but as I see it, such a person could be a 
responsible citizen in CfE if they knew how to do these things and possessed commitment 
to participate but did not actually take part. The wording of the capacity, then, seems to 
require only a minimal interpretation of participation. Such a minimal interpretation 
accommodates democratic autonomy by not requiring participation (just the commitment 
to do so) but the validity of this conception is undermined by subsequent policy documents 
which, in contrast, promote active and participatory conceptions of citizenship for which a 
maximal interpretation is required. I now support this claim with reference to policy 
literature and identify some potential hazards associated with these conceptions of 
citizenship. Subsequently, I suggest that the philosophical contention surrounding 
participation and its inconsistent treatment in CfE create complications for the conception 
of responsible citizenship intended on Scotland’s new curriculum.  
Active and participatory citizenship 
The commitment to participate becomes connected with ‘active citizenship’ in CfE, a term 
which does not appear within descriptions of the responsible citizen capacity but is 
mentioned in other policy documents (‘Building the Curriculum 1’ [Scottish Executive 
2006b: 15, 35, 36], ‘Building the Curriculum 4’ [Scottish Government 2009b: 44], and 
throughout the guidance document ‘Developing Global Citizens within CfE’ [LTS 2011a]) 
as being an important element of citizenship education. Yet it attracts very uneven 
treatment in the experiences and outcomes (Scottish Government 2009a); only the 
curricular area of Modern Languages is associated with the development of active 
citizenship. Through the study of Modern Languages, learners ‘gain insights into other 
ways of thinking and other views of the world and therefore develop a much richer 
understanding of active citizenship’ (Scottish Government 2009a: 172). Languages are also 
said to offer ‘opportunities for interdisciplinary work by providing a global dimension to a 
variety of curriculum areas and, particularly, to the areas of active citizenship and cultural 
awareness’ (Scottish Government 2009a: 176). In the development of global citizens, all 
curriculum areas are exhorted to encourage ‘children and young people to develop and 
articulate their own informed world view and become active citizens as well as creative, 
critical thinkers’ (LTS 2011a: 13). ‘Active citizenship’, then, appears in CfE in piecemeal 
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fashion without any clear explanation of what it means or how it might be best cultivated 
in learners. This is perhaps an indication that its meaning was not well understood by 
policy authors, that they were unable to reach consensus on its importance or that they 
desired to leave the capacity open to multiple interpretations
54
. Analysis of its use in the 
four policy documents identified above suggests that active citizenship denotes moving 
beyond personal responsibility to active participation in which critical reasoning and 
collaboration with others is required. In demanding these extra dimensions (collaboration 
and critical reasoning), active citizenship mitigates a risk associated with a more general 
conception of participation: that participation can militate against responsible citizenship.  
As Kymlicka and Norman argue (1994: 361), ‘emphasising participation does not yet 
ensure that citizens participate responsibly – that is, in a public-spirited, rather than self-
interested or prejudiced way’. In fact, citizens who choose to participate vociferously in 
public might do so for their own gain, at the expense of ‘less powerful groups whose needs 
are greater’ (Enslin and White 2003: 122). Central to the conception of active citizenship is 
the need for learners to make choices which are informed by their critical faculties and 
which conform to ethical and responsible standards of conduct. I propose, then, that this 
challenge to participatory citizenship can be defused by stressing commitment to morality 
and virtues, beyond the local, which is required by maximal conceptions of citizenship. 
The act of participation is neither virtuous nor base by nature, rather it is the intention of 
the participant which is of primary significance in determining its morality. In the context 
of a pluralistic democracy, what is required is the concrete specification of which public 
virtues ought to be upheld. This represents an opportunity for the exercise of active 
citizenship and, as I will argue in the following chapter, I consider that the process can be 
facilitated by democratic deliberation. Active citizenship, then, requires a maximal 
interpretation of citizenship and, as reference to the critical literature attests, it goes beyond 
mere participation to demand a commitment to responsible participation informed by open 
and robust methods of democratic deliberation; ‘engaging in debate, discussion and 
controversy, and using skills of engaging with and arguing with alternative viewpoints’ 
(Ross 2008: 69) ‘in the search for possible answers’ (Brown and Fairbrass 2009: 6). This 
commitment to participate in controversy and deliberate with others is far removed from 
minimal interpretations of the capacity which stem from the focus on cultural knowledge, 
understanding and the possession of ‘commitment to participate responsibly’. That later 
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policy and guidance documentation provides a clear impetus towards a more ‘active’ 
conception of citizenship highlights the changing priorities of citizenship in CfE and 
indicates that, as the suite of policy documents develops, the conception of responsible 
citizenship is becoming increasingly ambitious, prescriptive (LTS 2011a) and less 
sympathetic to minimal interpretation. There are, however, some risks attached to active 
citizenship which make it potentially undemocratic and exclusive and which ought to be 
examined. 
Despite being closely connected with participation in CfE, the conception of active 
citizenship described in CfE appears to limit qualifying acts to those performed in the 
public sphere. There is no mention of active citizenship in relation to activity done ‘in the 
private realm by way of reproduction and care of dependents’ (Enslin and White 2003: 
119). This public conception of active citizenship poses the risk that activity done at home 
does not qualify as active and, consequently, those who actively participate in the private 
sphere are not seen as performing their civic duty and cannot be citizens ‘at home – at least 
beyond a minimal sense of citizenship’ (Enslin and White 2003: 119). There is certainly a 
tension here since responsible citizenship is limited to commitment to participate in 
‘political, economic, social and cultural life’; the absence of any reference to private or 
domestic life implies that CfE has not given due consideration to this tension associated 
with activity. The citizen is a very complex being and requires sensitive treatment across 
the continuum of citizenship but particularly within maximal interpretations, such as those 
demanded by active citizenship. The role of the individual is inadequately developed in 
CfE, I suggest, since citizens are also private individuals whose situation can make 
participation difficult. The authors of CfE, however, appear to have insufficiently 
considered the ramifications of active citizenship since there is no indication of alternative 
ways in which citizens can participate actively in society. I caution that such an approach 
has the potential to marginalise the participation of some citizens and that the absence of a 
coherent approach to the inclusion of active citizenship on the policy agenda means that it 
remains open to minimal and maximal interpretation. The reluctance of the policy authors 
to promote the critical engagement (with others through democratic deliberation) required 
for the conception of active citizenship defined by Ross (2008) and Brown and Fairbrass 
(2009) above, in both public and private, does a disservice, I think, to schools, teachers and 
learners as there is less likelihood that a maximal interpretation will be pursued. 
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A maximal interpretation of active citizenship, though, offers exciting possibilities for an 
increased focus on political literacy and could accommodate increased awareness of the 
democratic dimensions of participation. Located ‘predominantly at the social end of the 
spectrum’ and lacking ‘an explicit political and democratic dimension’ Biesta (2008: 45) 
considers the personally responsible conception of citizenship which is implied by CfE 
(given that six of the seven defining features of the responsible citizen capacity focus on 
individual abilities and attitudes) to be inadequate for preparing citizens to participate 
responsibly in advancing democracy. A fundamental problem with the conception of the 
personally responsible citizen is that it is overly oriented to social life (for example, giving 
to charity, volunteering and environmental projects [LTS 2011a]) and is not sufficiently 
directed toward political participation. There is the danger that ‘voluntarism and kindness 
are put forward as ways of avoiding politics and policy’ leading to young people ‘learning 
that citizenship does not require democratic governments, politics, and even collective 
endeavours’ (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 243). The resultant conception of citizenship 
promotes inclusive and participatory ways of social interaction in a range of communities, 
‘but not necessarily or explicitly in the context of political and democratic practices and 
processes’ (Biesta 2008: 45). Biesta, though, has perhaps been a little hasty in his 
condemnation. I consider that CfE provides scope for positive change in this regard since 
responsible citizens have ‘the commitment to participate responsibly in political life’ 
which creates opportunities for the teaching and learning of deeper and richer conceptions 
of democratic participation. ‘Developing Global citizens within Curriculum for 
Excellence’ ([LTS 2011a] published after Biesta’s 2008 remarks) also indicates that 
teachers ought to cultivate political aspects of citizenship. In their teaching, they ought to 
‘demonstrate democratic principles through pupil voice and participation in all aspects of 
classroom practice’ (LTS 2011a: 14) while delivering ‘the knowledge, skills, values, 
attitudes and attributes required for children and young people to participate and contribute 
actively and successfully as global citizens’ (LTS 2011a: 20); perhaps the clearest 
indication to date that a maximal interpretation is favoured. In fulfilling such aims, I 
consider it vital for responsible citizens to feel empowered as political actors who have an 
understanding both of the opportunities and the limitations of individual political action, 
and who are aware that real change (affecting structures rather than simply operations 
within existing structures) often requires collective action through public and political 
initiatives. CfE does, I think, hint that the political dimensions of citizenship are important 
in citizenship education and this ought to become a cue for teachers to do more to promote 
awareness of forms of political literacy that position democratic citizenship beyond 
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individual responsibility. Encouragingly, the types of participation exemplified as good 
practice in ‘Participation and Learning’ (LTS 2007) indicate that these more ambitious 
aims are being targeted in response to the responsible citizen capacity in CfE and that a 
strongly maximal interpretation is considered desirable. 
The case for difficult citizenship and the role of rhetoric in its 
development 
In ‘Participation and Learning’, participation is highlighted as a priority in current Scottish 
educational policy: 
The rationale for Curriculum for Excellence has at its core the notion of 
improved student participation in order to develop the four capacities: 
successful learners, confident individuals, responsible citizens and effective 
contributors. The same policy perspective can be found in other legislation and 
guidance, such as; Determined to Succeed, Better Behaviour – Better Learning, 
Assessment is for Learning and the Additional Support for Learning (Scotland) 
Act (LTS 2007: 6). 
‘Improved student participation’ is not intended to mean simply increased participation but 
rather the examples of good practice suggest that the conception of student participation 
implied is undergirded by critical reasoning and used as a method of transformation with 
social justice as its end. In one example from the document, a pupil in Primary Seven 
launched a school action group to consider access needs for disabled pupils when he 
experienced difficulty in assisting a fellow pupil in a wheelchair to get around the school. 
Another example concerns a group of ‘young Gypsy Travellers from across Scotland who 
run workshops in schools to try to change attitudes and to challenge the discrimination that 
many face on a daily basis’ (LTS 2007: 41). These initiatives attest to a maximal 
interpretation of responsible citizenship in which learners are educated to be able to take 
responsibility for social and political problems which may, or may not, affect them and are 
equipped with appropriate tools to seek systematic solutions. This interpretation I consider 
to align well with ‘difficult’ (Bickmore 2005) or ‘justice-oriented’ (Westheimer and Kahne 
2004: 242) citizenship. ‘Difficult’ citizenship ‘requires raising questions about the stories 
underlying geographic, political, and historical phenomena, and thereby disrupting the 
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repetition of comforting knowledges’ (Bickmore 2008: 60). ‘Disruption’ comes much 
closer to the concept of activity which I associate with ‘responsible’ citizenship and this 
view of ‘justice-oriented’ citizenship represents a paradigm shift from the law-abiding, 
environmentally aware and charitable activity associated with personally responsible 
participation. In this maximal interpretation of citizenship, students are encouraged and 
empowered to take effective political action since this conception of citizenship calls 
explicit attention ‘to matters of injustice and to the importance of pursuing social justice... 
by analysing and understanding the interplay of social, economic and political forces’ 
(Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 242). This resonates with what was, for Crick, the essence 
of education for citizenship, that students should have an ‘inquisitive turbulence about the 
manifold relationships of ideas to institutions’ (Crick 2000: 15).  
In contrast to the local priorities conceived within a minimal interpretation, responsible 
citizenship construed maximally requires that activity is informed by the critical faculties 
and supported by an explicit understanding of democratic principles, values and procedures 
on the part of the citizen. I am not suggesting that students must, necessarily, be 
encouraged to start campaigns, protest or become warriors for social causes but am rather 
of the opinion that the ability to ask difficult questions and pursue solutions oriented to 
social justice form part of responsible citizenship within a political society and, as I argued 
above, a sensible location for the development of these skills is the school. I have shown 
that responsible citizenship as conceived in CfE is open to multiple interpretations and this 
flexibility represents exciting possibilities for increased focus on the teaching and learning 
of difficult citizenship in Scottish schools. It is this empowering and transformative form 
of citizenship which I consider has the most to offer Scottish education and democracy and 
which we ought to promote in a maximal interpretation of responsible citizenship. In so 
doing, I argue that rhetoric has a unique and valuable role to play. 
Rhetoric, critical reasoning and political involvement 
There are possibilities, I posit, for rhetoric to facilitate the learning and teaching of a 
maximal interpretation of responsible citizenship; as a pedagogical tool it can boost critical 
literacy and increase political involvement. I defend this position by highlighting its 
contribution to improvement in self expression and critical skills which, crucially, allow 
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citizens to articulate the complexity of their participation. The rhetorical framework thus 
offers a route to democratic confidence for young citizens, in that it foregrounds a range of 
skills and competencies which equips them with germane skills vital for responsible 
citizenship: the ability to deconstruct the communication of others and to construct 
communication which effectively expresses their views. This ability to ‘recognise and 
respond thoughtfully to values and value judgements that are part and parcel of political, 
economic, social and cultural life’ (LTS 2002: 12) was recognised as a key feature of 
education for citizenship as described in ‘Education for citizenship: a paper for discussion 
and development’ (LTS 2002). Furthermore, CfE states that the curriculum ‘must promote 
a commitment to considered judgement and ethical action’ and ‘should give young people 
the confidence, attributes and capabilities to make valuable contributions to society’ 
(SEED 2004a: 11). I think the teaching and learning of the rhetorical framework provides 
an ideal preparation for the fulfilment of these aims, since, as was shown in the previous 
chapter, it combines research, argument formation, justification, consideration of 
alternative viewpoints and effective delivery. It can act as a vehicle, I maintain, for 
effective self expression and a tool which facilitates active participation through the 
articulation of complex civic issues in a collaborative and deliberative manner. In this 
connection, I consider that rhetoric has the potential to empower students, make them more 
critically literate, build their confidence and help them come to know and ‘value their 
potential for positive action’ (LTS 2002: 12). The awareness of this potential and the 
ability to harness it is beneficial, I maintain, when undertaking the ‘disruption’ encouraged 
by difficult citizenship. 
Political involvement, interpreted maximally, requires participation, but as was indicated 
above, participation can be a problematic concept. Of particular interest here, is that 
participation does not necessarily demand that students consider and engage with issues 
beyond their immediate concerns and responsibilities. I claim that rhetorical training can 
improve the ‘responsibility’ of citizenship because it involves reflection, articulation and 
deliberation. The use and development of critical skills to reflect on and articulate the 
reasoning behind participation not only validates the civic activity but also encourages 
students to think beyond their immediate rights and responsibilities to consider what 
participation may be required of others (either individuals or institutions) to further the 
social or political cause. Rhetoric furnishes learners with skills to articulate the complexity 
of their active participation, a facet of citizenship education which I consider we ought to 
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promote in the hope that when they are asked to articulate and critique their participation 
in, for example, local problem-solving civic initiatives, students might come to realise that 
activity of this nature does not confer deeply transformative effects (Ross and Munn 2008) 
and that their efforts can have greater impact. The ability of individuals within society to 
hold and articulate different conceptions of the good life, different values and different 
ideas about what matters to them is vital, I think, to the functioning of a democratic society 
and education for citizenship is linked to the development of ‘a healthy and vibrant culture 
of democratic participation’ (LTS 2002: 9) which helps young people ‘develop strategies 
for dealing effectively with controversy’ (LTS 2002: 9) as ‘controversy is normal in 
society and sometimes has beneficial effects’ (LTS 2002: 12). I argue that rhetoric can 
provide a common communicative framework for diversely positioned participants
55
, 
equipping citizens with tools to articulate their dissent and reject any perceived 
homogeneity. This process of reflection, articulation and deliberation may, as a result, open 
up increased cognitive space for more detailed consideration of alternative conceptions of 
society and lead to a better understanding of, and commitment to, justice-oriented 
citizenship. 
Education for democracy in Scotland: some recommendations  
Responsible citizenship, then, is a capacity of the curriculum which is open to minimal and 
maximal interpretation. Upon initial reading, that six of the seven features of the capacity 
involve individual skills, attitudes, dispositions and abilities might suggest that a minimal 
or personally responsible conception of citizenship is implied, however I hold that the 
inclusion of ‘commitment to participate responsibly’ indicates scope for more maximal and 
participatory conceptions of citizenship. Participation and active citizenship are variously 
presented in the suite of policy documents and insights from philosophy of education show 
that, inadequately considered, they can endanger maximal interpretations of democracy. 
Having explored complications arising from personally responsible, active and 
participatory conceptions of citizenship I suggest that a more desirable conception of 
responsible citizenship for Scottish democracy is difficult or justice-oriented citizenship 
since these go some way to redress the deficit in political literacy (Phillips, Piper and 
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Garratt 2003, Biesta 2008) and generate scope for increased empowerment of learners as 
social transformers.  
Democracy in Scotland needs a more robust approach to the cultivation of responsible 
citizens than is envisaged by minimal interpretations of the capacity. This claim is based 
on the distinctive nature of Scottish education, democracy and culture. As Humes (1983: 
151) notes, a cohesive and enduring feature of Scottish culture is the ‘resistance to ongoing 
English cultural imperialism’ and in the negotiations for autonomy I argue that Scots 
require the skills to articulate their distinctiveness and to represent their ideas in local, 
national and global debates about citizenship, education and democracy. Paterson (2000) 
summarises the distinctive traditions of Scottish education in terms of four themes: social 
openness, the public character of the system, breadth, and passion for ideas. Traditionally, 
education in Scotland has rejected capitalist and consumerist influences and has instead 
been based on non-elitist, non class-based, meritocratic and egalitarian principles 
(Campbell 2000: 4) with concerns for ‘social fairness’ (Keating 2009: 107). Synonymous 
with this system is the ‘lad o’ pairts’ (Raffe 2004: 3, Freeman 2009: 328), the young man 
of humble background to whom education offers opportunity and advancement and who is 
able to rise through this democratic system. The egalitarian nature of Scottish education 
means that there is a commitment to everyone having the opportunity to have their say and 
I claim that Scottish democracy requires that young Scots should have not only knowledge 
of their rights and how to exercise them but they need to be equipped with skills to take 
action (with others or independently) ‘and to contribute informed opinions to discussion 
and debate’ (Deuchar 2003: 30). They need the communicative competence to engage in 
cultural and community development and change (Deuchar 2003: 36). The maximal 
interpretation I promote extends beyond pedagogical approaches which privilege the 
transmission of knowledge and cultivation of personal responsibility to focus on the 
cultivation of critical reasoning, self-expression and political participation. Therefore I 
affirm that the time is right to reclaim a strategy from the Classical past, more suited to the 
aims of justice-oriented citizenship, and my suggestion centres on the learning and 
teaching of rhetoric. 
This chapter has indicated that citizens’ ability to articulate and explain their participation 
through the exercise of critical reasoning is important for a maximal interpretation of 
responsible citizenship. According to Aristotle, to lead the good life and to fulfil our 
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humanity, we must enter into the polis as citizens and into political relationships with other 
citizens. He saw politics as an activity among free citizens which concerned how they 
governed themselves by public debate (Crick 2008: 16) as ‘to be political and to live in a 
polis meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through 
violence’(Arendt 1958: 26-27). Rhetoric, one method of operation for this communication 
was so successful that it became a necessary skill for participation in democracy and there 
is much to be gained, I maintain, from revisiting the Classical conception of responsible 
citizenship which was inextricably linked to critically informed oral participation. This 
focus on democracy, talking and citizenship will be pursued in more detail in the next 
chapter which further advances my claim that rhetoric can play an important role in 
preparing citizens for participation in democratic deliberation. 
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Chapter Five 
Rhetoric for democratic deliberation 
This chapter aims to defend the reintroduction of rhetoric by considering its potential 
contribution to democratic deliberation. Building on the claims made in previous chapters 
that rhetoric can contribute positively to the development of literacy and the critical 
faculties, I aim to show that the learning and teaching of rhetoric in school has the potential 
to inform and facilitate democratic deliberation, a skill which I claim is conducive to 
responsible citizenship in Scotland. This will involve examining complex philosophical 
issues surrounding the interplay between rhetoric, the emotions, truth and reason and, in 
my analysis, I engage with the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Young and Benhabib. 
Central to my argument is a clear distinction between Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric 
and that of Plato and Kant; I emphasise that rhetoric need not be associated with vacuity of 
meaning or the occlusion of truth for nefarious ends. Following Aristotle, I promote a 
positive conception of rhetoric which is valuable to citizens as ethical and responsible 
individuals operating within democracy where there is a need to collaborate in civic 
decision making. Young (1996, 1997, 2002) acknowledges the value of rhetoric for 
democratic deliberation but Benhabib (1996) refutes the claim that it is of use. My 
argument moves beyond these positions: I contend that Benhabib has not fully considered 
the contribution rhetoric can make to deliberation yet I accommodate only part of Young’s 
suggestion regarding the use of alternative methods of communication. In addressing the 
objections of Kant and Plato to rhetoric, I suggest that the emotions have an important role 
to play in engaging reason, developing critical skills and making decisions. In this regard, I 
defend the position that rhetoric offers opportunities for students to learn about persuasion 
(and coercion) and empathy, and can help them to build narrative imagination through 
consideration of ‘the other’. In making this argument, I draw on Aristotle’s concept of 
deliberative rhetoric in combination with the speech-making framework provided by 
Classical rhetorical theory and assert that such a conception of rhetoric could, following 
Young, give a voice to the traditionally underrepresented and marginalised groups in 
society thereby improving equality and inclusion within deliberative democracy. I do, 
however, concede that a shift in deliberative culture from the consent-obsessed model 
favoured in the Ancient world to the discursive model preferred in the present day requires 
a partly revised conception of rhetoric, more relevant for current conditions. But in so 
presenting, I suggest that certain elements of Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric should be 
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retained as they have much to offer current understandings of rhetoric and democratic 
deliberation. 
First, expanding on my interpretation of the intentions of CfE with regard to responsible 
citizenship, and building on the discussion in the previous chapter about the distinctiveness 
of Scottish democracy, I consider what space is made for democracy in CfE policy and 
explain why I hold democratic deliberation to be a suitable political goal for education in 
Scotland. Secondly, I identify ways in which rhetoric, when practised within a context of 
democratic deliberation, can contribute positively to the cultivation of literacy skills, 
critical faculties and citizenship. My argument centres on the claim that rhetoric provides 
an accessible, adaptable and common communicative framework which is of benefit to 
those deliberating within democracy. I acknowledge, however, that tensions surround this 
position; rhetoric has been seen as inconsistent with democratic deliberation because it is 
commonly associated with inequality of status and is thus accused of being exclusionary; it 
appeals to the emotions, not reason; it can aim at self-interest, not the common good; and it 
is monological and therefore may not be conducive to deliberative discussion or 
conversation. I raise and respond to each of these objections in turn, drawing on the 
theories of both Ancient philosophers and modern deliberative theorists to defend and 
promote the value of rhetoric in the Scottish curriculum and for society.  
Democratic education in Scotland 
‘Education for Citizenship in Scotland’ (LTS 2002: 6), a policy which predates CfE, 
explicitly linked the need for citizenship education to the ‘advent of the Scottish 
Parliament’, the establishment of which encouraged a ‘fresh focus’ on the importance of 
people living in Scotland ‘being able to understand and participate in democratic 
processes’. Concerns about ‘disaffection and disengagement from society’ (LTS 2002: 6) 
led the review group to conclude that education had a ‘key role’ to play in fostering a 
modern democratic society, ‘whose members have a clear sense of identity and belonging, 
feel empowered to participate effectively in their communities and recognise their roles 
and responsibilities as global citizens’ (LTS 2002: 7). Despite this clear link between 
citizenship and democracy in 2002 policy documentation, there is no mention of 
democracy in CfE’s ‘responsible citizen’ capacity (nor in any of the other three). In fact, 
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‘democracy’ appears only once in all six CfE policy documents released prior to 2011. The 
sole reference comes in ‘Building the Curriculum 1’ which states that the Social Studies 
curriculum area can teach about ‘decision making in a democracy’ (Scottish Executive 
2006b: 37) as part of the ‘People in Society’ topic. The complete absence of ‘democracy’ 
or explicit mention of democratic aims in the vision and purpose of the curriculum 
documentation is a surprising, some might say, worrying, omission. The omission is 
especially strange when considered alongside the multiple references to democracy and 
democratic citizenship contained in the guidance document, ‘Developing Global citizens 
within CfE’ (LTS 2011a), which is very clear about the democratic goals of citizenship 
education inspired by the new curriculum: in facilitating the development of citizens now, 
‘the practitioner nurtures an active, democratic and participatory ethos’ (LTS 2011a: 17) 
by utilising a ‘variety of approaches56 [to learning] which make connections to real-life 
contexts’ where ‘the learner participates in democratic processes’ (LTS 2011a: 16). 
Teachers should ‘encourage democratic and participative methodologies in the learning 
and teaching of global citizenship’ (LTS 2011a: 13).  
The guidance document, then, makes it clear that teachers have a role to play by modelling 
democracy in their teaching methods for the cultivation of global citizens. It seems 
incongruous to me that a rich understanding of, and commitment to participate in, 
democracy is desirable for global citizens but is beyond the standard required for 
responsible citizens. I find this disparity interesting. Biesta (2008: 47) comments that the 
‘framework for education for citizenship is rather implicit about its normative orientations 
and political choices’, perhaps to maximise its appeal to a broad political and ideological 
spectrum. As was highlighted in Chapter One, such vagueness does not help teachers or 
students, though, as they are left questioning for what sort of society the curriculum needs 
to prepare citizens. If the CfE policy and guidance documents are taken holistically, as a 
suite of related policy publications, I consider that CfE points broadly (though frequently 
implicitly) towards democracy as its political goal despite lacking philosophical and 
empirical bases for this perspective. As I showed in the previous chapter, the policy 
authors expected that engagement with the curriculum would equip students with the skills 
necessary to participate actively and responsibly in society. The LTS (2011a) guidance 
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document is instructive in this regard. One of the key principles for developing global 
citizens is to: 
develop an awareness and understanding of engagement in democratic 
processes and be able to participate in critical thinking and decision making in 
schools and communities at local, national and international level (LTS 2011a: 
14). 
Alongside this awareness and understanding of democratic processes, ‘our democratic 
societies need creative people who recognise the importance and value of participation and 
making their voices heard’ (LTS 2011a: 8). One way in which I propose this aim can be 
fulfilled is through the promotion of democratic deliberation, informed and facilitated by 
the teaching and learning of rhetoric. Rhetorical training supports the creation of useful 
discourse by citizens, and provides the tools and perspectives that enable democratic 
audiences to evaluate, and critique, the discourses they encounter, skills which I consider 
essential for responsible citizens, successful learners, confident individuals and effective 
contributors in Scottish democracy. 
Democratic deliberation 
According to Bohman (1998), Dryzek (2000), Chambers (2003) and others
57
, democratic 
theory has taken a ‘deliberative turn’58 (Hansen 2012: 12). Deliberation is conceived of as 
a process in which arguments on both sides of a problem or issue are considered by 
members of the public who participate in decision making on matters of relevance and 
importance to public life, as equals. It assumes that no one can determine beforehand what 
the right answer to the given political question is; and therefore, ‘a prima facie duty exists 
to hear different viewpoints and to give them, and those who present them, the sort of 
respect we would ask for ourselves’ (Bentley 2004: 115). Deliberation offers citizens with 
opposing views the opportunity to explain and justify the foundations of their beliefs in an 
effort to transform the alternative opinions held by fellow deliberators and in so doing 
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enable all sides to reach new and acceptable positions for collective action (McDonald 
2012: 200). Importantly, participating in public deliberation of this sort can be seen as 
constituting citizenship (Asen 2004: 189) since individuals become citizens by discursively 
- and I suggest rhetorically - engaging one another collaboratively and critically in the 
public sphere. Having to articulate your position, listen to others, adjust your position and 
formulate new positions exercises the skills I have hitherto connected with the teaching 
and learning of rhetoric: literacy (particularly listening and speaking), critical literacy and 
critical thinking. In Athens, the practice of democracy was predicated on the assumption 
that citizens possessed the capacity to reason together, in public (as well as in private), and 
that the results of those deliberations would (in general and over time) conduce to the 
common good. Composing, delivering, criticising and judging arguments are skills at the 
core of democratic deliberation, I argue, and the exercise of these cross-curricular skills 
‘promotes democratic practice immediately’ (Ivie 2002: 277) and provides an ideal 
opportunity for students to use their rhetorical knowledge for the purpose of civic 
participation. As was argued in Chapters Three and Four, the linguistic and analytical skills 
studied as part of rhetorical education contribute positively to the cultivation of 
competence and confidence in civic participation and the production of citizens who can 
critically assess the complex dimensions of democratic decision making. Ober (2005: 130) 
reminds us that the legacy left to us by Classical Greece has much to offer our 
contemporary understanding of deliberation: then, as now, deliberating ‘meant listening as 
well as speaking; accepting good arguments as well as making them’.  
Deliberative rhetoric 
Aristotle, in addition to his definition of rhetoric discussed in Chapter Two (‘the faculty of 
discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever’ 
[Rhetoric 1356a2]) wrote that the function of rhetoric is to ‘deal with things about which 
we deliberate’ (1357a12) and in the Nicomachean Ethics, he describes deliberation as a 
kind of excellence of thinking (1142b15) used when we deliberate about future things 
which are in our power, fluid, open to change and not fixed (1112b7). In Politics 
(1.1253a2) he claimed that we are political animals and as such our happiness as 
individuals depends to a great extent on what happens in our community. Young et al. 
(2010: 433) endorse Aristotle’s conclusion that we are political animals and suggest that 
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‘we must reframe politics as our job description’. In the Classical Athenian conception of 
the polis, discursive engagement in civic life was inextricably linked to the duty of 
citizenship and the process of democratic deliberation is one aspect of Athenian political 
life which I propose warrants reconsideration in the current climate. Aristotle claimed that 
the political community is centred around communication with each other concerning what 
we think is ‘advantageous and harmful, and therefore just and unjust’ (Politics 1253a3). 
Democratic deliberation necessarily involves speech and argument because it requires the 
sharing of our reasoning, and the means by which we communicate our reasoning to each 
other in public deliberation is the particular form of persuasive speech Aristotle called 
deliberative rhetoric (Rhetoric 1.3.1358b5). Thus for Aristotle, deliberation is a kind of 
argumentation or collective thinking in which a group is trying to decide on the best course 
of action in a situation requiring choice but also involving uncertainty. Deliberative 
rhetoric seeks to persuade us that one course of action rather than another will best serve 
the common good or advantage (Rhetoric 1351b). As such, it has two basic elements: some 
form of public reasoning, in which citizens exchange their views about matters of common 
interest; and an opportunity to consider together this exchange of opinion and argument to 
reach decisions about which collective action to support. In the Greek model, deliberative 
rhetoric was integral to the political life of the polis; it was an art which was meant for 
everyday politics within the citizen body and was necessary for the improvement and 
advancement of civic life, minor or major.  
In demanding the construction, analysis and adaptation
59
 of argument, Aristotle’s 
conception of deliberative rhetoric could be viewed as a tool for communicative 
empowerment which has the potential to lead individuals and groups to action. For this 
reason, and given the worrying backdrop of civic disengagement (Dewey 1927, Putnam 
2000, Putnam and Feldstein 2003, Hogan 2008, Nussbaum 2010, Biesta 2011) I consider 
that the time is right to re-evaluate the possible contribution of rhetoric to democratic 
education. Dewey (1927: 208) argued that the means of political learning lay in 
communication, ‘the essential need’, he wrote, ‘is the improvement of the methods and 
conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public.’ In the 
new millennium, the USA is still trying to address this deficiency in its education system: 
Putnam (2000) lists many initiatives underway in the USA to improve civic engagement, 
replenish the nation’s social capital and to rebuild deliberative communities. Surprisingly, 
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however, Hogan (2008: 76) records that few of these efforts have emphasised the most 
fundamental requirement of a sustainable deliberative democracy: citizens with the 
communicative competencies needed to participate in civic life. If citizens are to 
participate competently and confidently, it is vital that they know how to articulate their 
own views and how to listen to others.  
The best answers to problems of political alienation and civic disengagement 
are to be found not in new information technologies, but in a revival of some of 
the oldest traditions in rhetorical theory and practice (Hogan 2008: 77).  
I concur with Hogan’s position and suggest that the teaching and learning of rhetoric is 
complementary to the successful enactment of democratic deliberation. Aristotle’s 
conception of deliberative rhetoric, I believe, has potential benefits for democratic 
education in Scotland and while I do not hold that rhetorical training is a necessary 
condition of citizenship, I defend that it has much to offer the cultivation of responsible 
citizens, particularly through increased linguistic and critical competence in deliberative 
contexts. There are, however, objections to this view from theorists who consider rhetoric 
unsuitable for deliberative purposes. I intend to consider four of the most challenging 
objections to my claim that rhetoric contributes positively to democratic deliberation and 
these I shall now address as challenges from; equality, emotions, self interest and 
monology.  
The challenge from equality 
Norval (2007: 65), among others
60
, notes that arguments for equality are central to 
democratic deliberation as we must treat each other as equal partners, ‘individuals must be 
given the space to speak, and we must listen to each other, and justify our positions to one 
another’ (Norval 2007: 22). Historically, rhetoric, as a method of communication, has been 
considered unequal since in Classical Greece only those who were free-born male citizens 
were permitted to participate in public discussions and in Rome rhetoric arguably became a 
tool of the elite to manipulate the commoners into voting a particular way in judicial and 
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deliberative contexts. In both Greece and Rome, women, slaves and foreigners were 
voiceless; they had no political rights and were helpless to effect any change in their 
positions. Hence the restriction of rhetorical education and practice to learned men might 
be seen as a contributory factor to the ongoing suppression of already marginalised 
members of society. Modern criticisms of the use of rhetoric in deliberation object to these 
origins which seem undemocratic by modern standards and lambast its use by, largely, 
wealthy, well-educated, Caucasian men with a particular personal interest, these being 
found primarily among the politicians of developed, Western nations. There are a number 
of intertwined issues which need to be untangled, here, to properly evaluate rhetoric’s 
alleged incompatibility with equality in democratic deliberation. How does rhetoric fit with 
argumentation and is there just one acceptable method of communication within 
deliberative contexts? If there are multiple methods, what value is added by the rhetorical 
framework? Aiming at persuasion and most effective in conflictive environments, can 
rhetoric be reconciled with the democratic aims of deliberation and its commitment to 
equality of participation and influence? It is to these questions that my argument now 
turns. 
Benhabib holds that there is just one accepted form of communication within deliberative 
democracy: critical argumentation (1996: 82). Her stance here echoes Habermas (1993: 
163) who held that argumentation was ‘the only truly legitimate mode of discursive 
communication as it renders the deliberative process rational and confers on it authority’. 
She defends this position by privileging the peculiar 
rhetorical structure of the rule of law and insisting that the moral ideal of 
impartiality is a regulative principle which should govern not only our 
deliberations in public but also the articulation of reasons by public institutions 
(1996: 83).  
She suggests that without such a focussed approach to the equality and impartiality of 
communication, the open justification of opinions and the admission of reasons and 
motivations behind particular stances, neither the ideal of the rule of law nor reasoned 
deliberation can be sustained. Benhabib’s position is contrary to that of Young (1997) who 
argues that such a restricted approach within deliberation is exclusionary. She considers 
that it attempts to homogenise and neutralise what differentiates us as participants in the 
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deliberative process and hence negates the distinctive situated knowledge and 
understanding that diversely positioned participants can bring to the deliberative process 
(1996, 1997). She advocates a move beyond deliberative democracy to what she terms 
‘communicative democracy’ (1997: 60) where the uniformity and impartiality of 
communication are abandoned in favour of a more inclusive model of communication 
which accommodates social and cultural difference. Young justifies this position by 
highlighting that the ‘norms of deliberation are culturally specific and often operate as 
forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of some people’ (1997: 63) and proposes 
‘three elements that a broader conception of communicative democracy requires in 
addition to critical argument: greeting, rhetoric and storytelling’ (1997: 69). These, she 
suggests, recognise the situated nature of the speakers and ‘supplement argument by 
providing ways of speaking across difference in the absence of significant shared 
understandings’ (1997: 69). In promoting more inclusive methods of communication 
within communicative democracy, I consider that Young’s selection of rhetoric is of 
particular interest. Whereas Benhabib discounts it from democratic deliberation because it 
moves people to action ‘without having to render an account of the bases upon which it 
induces people to engage in certain courses of action rather than others’ (1996: 83), Young 
recognises its positive capacity to ‘get and keep attention’ and to situate the ‘speaker, 
audience, and occasion’ (Young 1997: 71) which, she holds, serves a connecting 
function
61
.  
These divergent positions concerning rhetoric stem from brief discussions of the subject by 
both Benhabib (1996, 2002) and Young (1996, 1997, 2002); elements of the position of 
each are commendable but I consider that there is scope for a deeper interrogation of the 
issues surrounding their divergence. Like Benhabib, I will advance that critical 
argumentation has an important role to play as a method of communication within 
democratic deliberation but will argue that alone, it is not enough. If we lose rhetoric, as 
Benhabib suggests, I claim that we lose something important from citizen exchange and 
citizen education. Following Young, I will suggest that it is necessary to engage and 
embrace difference when communicating with the ‘other’ within democracy and that 
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accounts which include other forms of expression are superior to Benhabib’s. However,  
following Benhabib, I question the validity of Young’s recommendation of storytelling and 
greeting as suitable communicative media for public deliberation, focussing instead on the 
educative benefits of rhetoric which are, I think, more central to democracy. In an 
elaboration of Young’s position, I defend rhetoric’s capacity to reach ‘the other’ by 
focussing on the opportunity it presents to participants within deliberation for the 
cultivation of empathy and narrative imagination through ethopoeia and refutatio.  
Benhabib may have prematurely discounted rhetoric, I suggest, without fully appreciating 
that critical argumentation is a necessary preliminary stage in the speech making process. I 
contend that rhetoric is thus compatible, at least in part, with the focus on critical 
argumentation she proposes. Confirmatio required that orators present logical arguments 
supported with evidence to support their position (Cicero, de Inventione 1.24-41; Cicero, 
de Oratore 3.52-201; Quintilian, Instituto Oratoria 5.1-12). If critical argumentation is 
viewed as a subsidiary skill of rhetorical competence, there is little conflict with 
‘contemporary deliberationalists [who] tend to think that there is only one right way to 
conduct a reasonable discussion, only one acceptable way to talk’ (Shiffman 2004: 110). 
Because the rhetorical framework presents a unified method of communication, I maintain 
that deliberators are more likely to experience equality in representation, participation and 
influence than if Young’s alternative communicative methods of storytelling and greeting 
are accommodated.  
I acknowledge that greeting can act as a lubricant for discussion and can welcome 
disengaged groups into deliberation but I do not consider it to be a profound ingredient in 
the deliberative process. Storytelling can certainly make contributions to deliberation 
although it may have more of a role to play in association or exemplification than in 
argumentation. In evaluating the implications of the story, the plurality of deliberators and 
their diverse cultural and narrative understanding may actually involve them constructing 
their own internal explanatory arguments which might undermine the attempt at improving 
understanding across diversity, although it could simultaneously contribute to improved 
equality in communicative representation. Benhabib (1996: 83) notes that democratic 
deliberation requires ‘discursive language which appeals to commonly shared and accepted 
public reasons’ and identifies that greeting would produce arbitrariness since the power of 
a greeting can be hard to detect and that storytelling could lead to capriciousness since 
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there will be those who cannot understand the story. While I do not doubt that some people 
may feel most able to communicate within deliberative settings using greeting or 
storytelling, I concur with Benhabib (1996) in identifying that there are risks attached to 
encouraging such approaches, including the spread of confusion and misinterpretation 
among deliberators since I contend that there remains a need for argumentation at some 
level in all forms of deliberative communication. Both greeting and storytelling have their 
place within deliberation but of the three elements of communication which Young (1997) 
suggests as necessary supplements to argumentation for deliberation, I consider rhetoric to 
be the most substantial. Rhetoric, then, ought to be the first step in preparing Scottish 
citizens for democratic deliberation and we ought not, initially, to encourage the alternative 
types of discourse Young wants to accommodate. This position is motivated by my 
primary concern; what we teach in the classroom prepares students for life beyond and, in 
this regard, I consider the purpose of democratic education to be to induct everybody into 
reasoned critical argument. 
Rhetoric can minimise perplexity within deliberation, I propose, since it offers a 
communicative method which combines critical argumentation (Benhabib’s chosen 
method) and some of the more inclusive elements Young suggests. In addition to critical 
argumentation, rhetoric promises an additional advantage which I consider merits attention 
in response to Benhabib’s rejection; by necessarily regarding, articulating and responding 
to the positions of ‘the other’, it enables a connection between speaker and audience which 
is enhanced by the consideration of emotions, narrative imagination and empathy.  
Whereas critical argumentation is associated with the production of appeals to reason and 
logic based on evidence about things known, rhetoric involves persuasive argumentation in 
conflictive environments where uncertainty abounds. Matters for discussion within 
democratic deliberation tend to involve disagreement regarding how best to proceed 
collectively when the eventual outcome is unknowable. Rhetoric, then, through its 
persuasive appeal to the emotions in reaching consensus
62
 is more suited to deliberation 
than critical argumentation alone which presumes that one argument can be conclusive and 
final when the subject matter is unknown, a position which Aristotle thought was untenable 
(Rhetoric 1. 112b7).  
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 The extent to which consenus ought to be regarded as the end of deliberation is contested (Bohman 1996, 
Young 1997, Chambers 2003, 2009, Dryzek 2010). Clearly, citizens need to make decisions but if consensus 
is required, it is likely that the most dominant participants in deliberation will ‘win’. This endangers the 
inclusive nature of the process. 
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Classical rhetorical theory represents another improvement on critical argumentation, I 
contend, because the inclusion of refutatio (refutation of opponent’s argument) as one of 
the parts of speech requires that the speaker consider opposing positions and, after 
articulating them, respond to them in a critically informed way. In many cases, this 
involves the use of ethopoeia, a technique which required orators to put themselves in the 
place of others and give a speech as that other character. The obligatory process of 
‘becoming the other’ (Cicero, de Inventione 1.42-51, Quintilian, Instituto Oratoria 5.13), 
represents for contemporary deliberative democracy a valuable opportunity to engage with 
the thoughts and feelings of marginalised and oppositional groups and should lead to 
improved mutual understanding and respect between participants in deliberative settings. 
In this sense, rhetoric goes some way to cultivating narrative imagination
63
, compassion 
and empathy which may contribute to the transformation of original position which Young 
considered important to the discursive process (1997: 68).   
The transformative potential of rhetoric  
That members of deliberative communities are diversely positioned is clear and 
Benhabib’s concept of ‘egalitarian reciprocity’ recognises that ‘within discourses, each 
should have the same right to various speech acts, to initiate new topics and to ask for 
justification of the presuppositions of the moral conservation’ (2002: 107). It is difficult, 
though, to balance such a notion of egalitarian reciprocity with her preference for critical 
argumentation as the uniform method of communication, as within critical argumentation 
there are bound to be variances in citizens’ argumentative ability (if it can be learned 
through experience, we can foresee a general increase in ability over time). Diversity in 
individual experience can, in turn, contribute to the perception of authoritativeness in a 
deliberative forum and we can reasonably see that members of the community with both 
more life experience and more argumentative ability will have a more robust sense of 
which speech acts are useful and which are incompatible with deliberative consensus. 
Critical argumentation can be taught through reference to logic, literacy and causality but I 
contend that rhetoric offers a structured, defined and accessible framework, which provides 
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 This is Nussbaum’s term and encompasses a broad meaning including ‘cultivating powers of imagination 
that are essential to citizenship... [and] the capacity for sympathetic imagination which will enable us to 
comprehend the motives and choices of people different from ourselves, seeing them not as forbiddingly 
alien and other, but as sharing many problems and possibilities with us’ (1997: 85). 
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a more cohesive practical communicative solution, offering particular value to those who 
are traditionally poorly represented within deliberative contexts. 
In subversion of the view that rhetoric is a tool for perpetuating inequality I agree with 
Crowley and Hawhee (2012: 5) who claim instead that it offers an avenue to ‘rectifying 
power inequities among citizens’. In this regard, it can empower them ‘to move from being 
governed to having agency’ (Hauser 2008: 255) and can equip them with the capacity to 
negotiate across difference. Beyond the ‘bonding’ function of rhetoric outlined by Dryzek 
(2010: 327) (this concerns communication between people who are similar in social 
background, therefore not inclined to air differences and as a result associate only with 
those who agree with them), I consider that rhetoric can be viewed as a bridge ‘between 
people with different social characteristics and backgrounds’ (Dryzek 2010: 327) thereby 
improving the equality of opportunity to participate in discursive fora. A bridge is 
necessary, I suggest, because in deliberative democracy, conflict is inevitable. ‘For a 
rhetorical democracy to flourish, controversies should be welcomed, encouraged, 
stimulated, and even organised in order to implicate ordinary citizens in decision making’ 
(McDonald 2012: 201). A healthy society is, in my view, marked by conflictive relations 
and rhetoric serves as an inventional resource for establishing and negotiating the ‘relations 
by which it continually produces itself’ (Hauser 2008: 240). Conflicts among groups and 
classes permeate modern democratic societies and conflictive relationships represent the 
origin of rhetoric; they ‘are the wellspring from which rhetorical practices flow’ (Hauser 
2008: 238). The rhetorical framework, then, can act as a bridge between those traditionally 
trapped in asymmetrical power relations to communicate using a uniform method: it 
represents an opportunity to link differently situated and differently disposed actors when 
they ‘call into question the opinions of others... bring them into the light for examination 
and negotiation, and... listen to each other’ (Crowley and Hawhee 2012: 5). I see a rich 
vein of training within communication and citizenship education for rhetoric
64
 to represent 
freedom from victimisation and the repositioning of those who have historically been 
unheard, as well as those whose early education, upbringing, and cultural roots have 
discouraged active participation in civic life.  
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 More will be said in the next chapter about the conception of rhetoric which could fulfil this aim. While the 
Classical rhetorical theory and speech-making process are highly instructive in ‘bridging’ rhetoric, Latin and 
Greek have little to offer the construction of contemporary deliberative communication. Hence I propose that 
communications are delivered in English but in concert with the Classical model. In helping build this skill, 
both Classical and modern speeches (for example those of Winston Churchill or Barack Obama in Appendix 
A) could be usefully analysed. 
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In time, this bridging function of rhetoric could have positive ramifications including: 
narrowing the gap in social cohesion and improving confidence and competence in civic 
engagement, two areas which were marked for improvement in Scotland by the 2007 
OECD report. Hauser (2008: 244) suggests that ‘equity is essential to maintaining 
horizontal relations among citizens participating in a deliberative process that is more than 
nominally democratic’ and rhetoric, I posit, because of the structured nature of the 
framework, widens access and grants equity to the contributions of all citizens in 
deliberative processes. Its contribution to understanding ‘the other’ and articulating their 
position necessarily involves critical engagement at an emotional level which contributes 
positively, I argue, to the cultivation of narrative imagination and empathy. However, this 
could also be seen as a negative feature of rhetoric within democratic deliberation if 
speakers inappropriately appeal to the emotions and passions of fellow citizens rather than 
their reason. That rhetoric includes persuasive appeal not just to reason, but also to 
passions, desires and appetites makes it eminently useful to democratic deliberation, I will 
suggest. Following Aristotle and Young, I claim that the emotions play a vital role in civic 
decision making and that the centrality of emotionally persuasive appeals to rhetorical 
communication is positive both for reaching consensus in deliberative settings and for 
helping citizens to develop their critical faculties. 
The challenge from the emotions 
Within Classical rhetorical theory, the orator can engage and employ his own emotions, 
and those of his audience, in three ways. First there is the gauging of the audience’s 
emotion by the orator, in which he considers how he might best align his words to 
successfully persuade his listeners to come to accept a specific claim. When an orator 
invents new arguments, he ought to begin the process within the citizens’ opinions rather 
than outside them, Aristotle (Rhetoric 2.1) suggests, since through the study of the 
structure of people’s characters and emotions he could find deliberative pathways within 
which to best frame his arguments. Young considers rhetoric to be of benefit in this regard 
since it involves ‘orienting one’s claims and arguments to the particular assumptions, 
history, and idioms of [the] audience’ (Young 2002: 65). Secondly, through the delivery of 
ethopoeia and refutatio the orator uses ‘empathy to figure out what his audience is thinking 
about an issue, what they accept on the issue, or can be brought to accept’ (Walton 2004: 
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319) and begins to engage and stir up suitable emotions through his performance. I made 
the argument above that the need for speakers to consider both the sympathetic and the 
dissenting voices within the communities in which they communicate improves their 
awareness of the ‘other’ within contemporary democratic deliberation. Successful public 
speakers, then, will generally have to measure the emotional temperature of their audience, 
incorporate corresponding sensitivity into their arguments and acknowledge that the 
audience’s emotional position plays an important role in the argumentative process. 
Thirdly, the final stage in the emotional process, the Classical orator selects the appropriate 
level of language (for example, embellished style [ornate], fitting [apte] or modest 
[decore]), shaping the speech to the audience’s perceived emotional needs and displaying 
emotion himself, commensurate with the content and aims of his speech. Connolly urges 
that the appeal to and display of emotion ought not to be seen as ‘extra seasoning’ (2007: 
147), but rather a crucial step in the communication of ideas.  
For Plato, this appeal to the audience’s particular emotional needs was deceitful and 
rhetoric’s propensity to delight and please the people’s appetites made it nothing more than 
a form of flattery (Gorgias 463b) or manipulation which was incompatible with reason. 
The adaptation of oneself to the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of an audience amounted 
to trickery and was inconsistent with the behaviour of a good citizen (Gorgias 503b). Thus 
rhetoric was, for Plato, a type of speech which he likened to the art of cooking; used to 
cater to, and to indulge, the undisciplined and restless appetites of the people (Gorgias 
464b). It created the appearance of grace and pleasure in the conscious embellishments of 
speaking and performing by appealing to the senses, an appeal thought inappropriate for 
rational speech (Gorgias 472c). In Plato’s view, the philosopher uses speech to instruct, 
and thus to improve the listener, aiming at what is best for them by appealing to reason 
which acts as the guide and ruler of the soul by ‘disciplining the appetites and controlling 
the passions’ (Fontana 2004: 42). Rhetoric, in contrast, he saw as ‘knack’ (Gorgias 462c), 
‘a kind of influencing of the mind by means of words’ (Phaedrus 261a) and he saw 
rhetoricians as men who ‘steal away our souls with their embellished words’ (Menexenus 
235a); in this way, he despised the ‘negative effect of rhetoric’s persuasive appeals on the 
capacity of auditors to exercise rational judgement’ (Shiffman 2004: 101). 
Plato’s concerns were shared by Kant who also complained of rhetoric’s incompatibility 
with reason. Conceiving of rhetoric as a dialectic which borrows from poetry only so much 
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as is needful to win minds to the side of the orator before they have formed a judgement 
and to deprive them of their freedom (Kant, Critique of Judgement 53. 172), he believed 
that rhetoric ‘moved men like machines’ (Critique of Judgement 5. 328n). In contrast, 
reason ‘is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be 
permitted to express without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto’ (Kant, 
Critique of pure reason, A738-739, B766-767). In this conception, the appeal to the 
emotions of the audience acts as a barrier to reason, hindering citizens’ exercise of 
freedom. The criticism of rhetoric by Plato and Kant, that it is irrational, anticipates more 
recent arguments by some advocates of deliberative democracy, who contend that true 
democracy is characterised by reasoned public discourse. Habermas stated that 
deliberations should be determined ‘by the force of the better argument’ so that 
participants in deliberation are ‘required to state their reasons for advancing proposals, 
supporting them or criticising them’ (McCarthy 1975: 108), a position which draws on 
Plato’s condemnation of rhetoric for not explaining the reason anything happens, and is 
clearly the impetus for Benhabib’s criticism65 of rhetoric highlighted above. Certainly, the 
modern conception of democratic deliberation rests on the assumption that when a group 
of people get together and deliberate, if they weigh the relative merits of both sides of an 
issue thoughtfully and carefully, the conclusion they arrive at is reason-based and 
supported by objective evidence (Walton 2004: 303).   
Hence democratic deliberation in current conditions becomes a rational basis for action. In 
the Ancient world, however, deliberation was seen as representing an important framework 
of argumentation in its own right, including appeal to the passions and emotions to support 
a conclusion and I consider that this represents an approach to deliberation which is worthy 
of reconsideration. With reference to Aristotle’s conception of deliberative rhetoric, I 
intend to contest the position taken by Plato, Kant, Habermas and Benhabib by suggesting 
that rhetoric can helpfully supplement critical argumentation for democratic deliberation 
because the appeal to emotions improves judgement by engaging practical reason and 
providing richer opportunity for the development of critical faculties. 
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 As was explained earlier in this chapter, Benhabib comments that rhetoric ‘moves people and achieves 
results without having to render an account of the bases upon which it induces people to engage in certain 
courses of action rather than others’ (1996: 83).  
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Aristotle argued that judgement about the possible courses of action presented in the public 
sphere ought not to exclude partiality and passion as, together with the emotions, they have 
important roles to play in deliberative situations (Rhetoric 2.1378a). He held that emotions 
such as pity, shame and friendship were connected to our capacity to judge issues and 
choose courses of action (Rhetoric 1378a22-24). The political emotions of anger, honour, 
and their relatives help give citizens the mixture of ‘sympathy and detachment’ (Rhetoric 
1368b-1369a) that make for good practical judgement. His theory centres around the 
conception that emotions and reason are not separate components of the psyche but rather 
that neither can operate without the influence of the other (or can even be made to do so 
entirely [Rhetoric 1356a]). Following Aristotle, Nussbaum (1986: 214) supports the 
cooperation of reason and emotion and warns that  
if we starve and suppress emotions and appetites, it may be at the cost of so 
weakening the entire personality that it will be unable to act decisively; perhaps 
it will cease to act altogether.  
This view conflicts with the approach taken by proponents of democratic deliberation who, 
by adopting critical argumentation as the only acceptable method of communication, treat 
citizens as if they were solely intellects, without emotions. This approach is not conducive 
to effective decision making within deliberation, however, because, as Cicero noted, ‘men 
decide far more problems by hate, love, lust, rage, sorrow, joy, hope, fear, illusion, or some 
other inward emotion than by reality, or authority or any legal standard, or judicial 
precedent, or statute’ (de Oratore 2.178). Emotions engage judgement rather than obscure 
it and I hold (following Aristotle, Cicero and Young) that citizens’ decision-making 
capacity is enhanced by the collaboration of reason and emotion, a position made 
impossible by the purely rational deliberation required by Plato, Habermas and Benhabib.  
Furthermore, the judgements we make cannot, I think, be conceptualised as the outcome of 
a single motivational cause, but are rather the result of a wide and variable combination of 
competing motivations. That rhetoric requires an emotional connection between the 
speaker and the audience often reveals these motivations and situated interests and 
provides opportunities for the development of critical faculties. Citizens come to view each 
other not as passive consumers but as autonomous deliberators who are deserving of 
respect and whose practical judgement deserves to be engaged, not just, I maintain, 
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through logical reasoned argumentation but by speakers who stir up their emotions to 
execute particular emotional reactions from them. Exposure to persuasive and emotive 
appeals of this sort is a positive attribute of rhetoric within deliberation precisely because it 
necessitates that citizens engage their critical faculties and employ their powers of practical 
reasoning in the realisation that ‘empathy, emotion and reason are all necessary 
ingredients’ (Connolly 2007: 148) in making judgement and that deliberative decision-
making should be informed not just by critical argumentation but by all aspects of 
personality and experience. Aristotle repeats in Nicomachean Ethics (10.9), that the best 
deliberative judgements are made when individual emotional responses are subjected to 
criticism by the rational awareness of circumstances and events. This does not equate to 
emotion being dominated by reason but rather requires that the germane faculties work in 
tandem. That rhetorical communication affords importance to persuasive appeal to the 
emotions allows participants in democratic deliberation to develop critical skills in 
analysing ‘the various ways something can be said, which colour and condition its 
substantive content’ (Young 2002: 64-65) and this presents opportunities, I maintain, for 
richer critical analysis. But what if speakers do not have the good of the community as 
their core purpose? The abuse of rhetoric for self-seeking ends will now be examined.  
The challenge from self-interest 
Having argued that appeal to the emotions is a positive attribute of rhetoric and useful 
when used in democratic deliberation, I now sound a note of caution by identifying that 
there are hazards involved with excessive appeals to emotion. If used inappropriately, 
rhetoric can be made to serve self interest and persuasion can work against the common 
good, both outcomes which are incompatible with the aim of democratic deliberation. By 
outlining Plato’s concerns in this regard, I will show that there are risks involved for 
commitment to reason and truth but contend, following Aristotle, that rhetoric itself is, 
indeed, compatible with the search for truth (and by extension the common good). I claim 
that the risks are inextricably linked to the ethics of the speaker and audience. Democratic 
education, I propose, ought to include some training in civic virtues and I maintain that 
rhetoric can provide a useful forum for the acquisition, exercise and development of 
excellence in such virtues as thinking and speaking for noble purposes within deliberative 
democracy. 
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Plato expresses concern that rhetoric aims at the gratification of citizens and claims that by 
neglecting the common good and privileging self-interest, orators treat ‘the people like 
children, attempting only to please them’ (Gorgias 502d). In aiming to please the passions 
and appetites, rather than to instruct or improve the mind and soul, Plato treats rhetoric as a 
matter of obscurantism and denies that it is an art, claiming that it is but an imitation of an 
art, in that it does not rest upon a true knowledge of its object (Gorgias 453a). He points to 
the ability of orators to argue both sides of an issue as evidence for their lack of true 
knowledge. Because, for Plato, reason leads to a single, simple truth, he concluded that the 
orators’ ability to use clever words for diverse positions goes against reason and hinders 
the discovery of truth.  
He whose speaking is an art will make the same thing appear to the same 
persons at one time just and at another, if he wishes unjust... he will make the 
same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite 
(Phaedrus 261d).  
In such a way, then, Plato thought that orators used rhetoric to make ‘the weaker account 
look the stronger’ (Schiappa 1999: 54) in an effort to improve their own individual position 
within society, ‘to save one’s own skin to wrest a liberty which is only license, and to take 
power at any cost’ (Gorgias 466c, 486a-d) (Pernot 2005: 47). Socrates even has the 
Sophists Polus and Callicles admit (Gorgias 466c, 486a-d) that political rhetoric is 
designed ‘to pursue the competitive advantage of the orator, at the expense of his 
adversaries and auditors, by means of duplicitous, emotionally manipulative speeches’66 
(Shiffman 2004: 99). Such a disregard for truth is potentially problematic for contemporary 
theories of democratic deliberation which aim at the common good
67
 and rely on 
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 The abuse of rhetoric was not limited to the Sophists in Classical Athens. Cicero tells how orators 
sometimes used ethically objectionable techniques which philosophers would find ‘not only wanting in 
discretion but positively unseemly and disgraceful’ (de Oratore 1.53.227). The space of politics in Ancient 
Rome, more than in Greek democracy, was filled by dispute, contingency, inconsistency, unreason, and 
passion hence why Roman politics were awash with orators who sought to distort the public good by fooling 
citizens into allowing the interest of some partial association to claim their loyalties rather than thinking of 
the good of the whole. This individualistic or ‘interest-based’ model (Healy 2011: 297) was, at times, used as 
a technique of deception: ‘Cicero had boasted that he had thrown dust in the eyes of the jury in the case of 
Cluentius’ (Quintilian, Instituto Oratoria 2.17.21).  
67
 At this stage it is important to acknowledge that a considerable number of tensions surround the extent to 
which democratic deliberative theory aims at  justice and/or truth and the extent to which it relies on shared 
moral commitments and/or reason (Benhabib 1996, Knight and Johnson 1997, Hauser and Benoit-Barne 
2002, Hicks 2002, Young 2002, Chambers 2003, 2009). I do not propose to address these issues in detail 
since they are not of primary importance to the present study. Instead, I restrict my discussion to an 
exploration of ways in which the potential abuse of rhetoric for the purpose of self-interest can be reconciled 
with its use as the most desirable method of communication within democratic deliberation. 
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commitments to inclusion, equality and reason from participants (Hicks 2002). What must 
be remembered here, though, is that Polus, Callicles and Gorgias were Sophists who were 
committed to the pursuit of power without regard to any ethical motive (Gorgias 452e), 
thus they do not represent the best use of rhetoric in society. Plato describes rhetoric as a 
producer of persuasion (Gorgias 453a) used by orators who behave like vultures, swooping 
on and attacking vulnerable prey
68
 (Garsten 2009: 177). Within such a conception of 
rhetoric, the orator has no need to know the truth about that which he speaks, rather he 
simply has to discover a ‘technique of persuasion so as to appear among the ignorant to 
have more knowledge than the expert’ (Gorgias 459d). He, therefore, has no knowledge of 
what is right or wrong, noble or base, just or unjust; he is simply pleasing the people and 
pretending to be knowledgeable for the sake of securing his own ends.  
Plato’s concerns regarding rhetoric’s potential to deceive are shared by Kant who viewed 
rhetoric as ‘the art of deluding by means of a fair semblance’ (Critique of Judgement 53). 
In the forum of civil law, he considered rhetoric unsuitable because it allowed for ‘talking 
people over and of captivating them for the advantage of any chance person’ (Kant 1951: 
171). For Kant, as for Plato, it was through an appeal to the passions that the orators 
moved, and deceived their audiences. He warned that rhetoric robbed ‘their verdict of its 
freedom’ (Critique of Judgement 192) by winning over men’s minds to the side of the 
speaker using coercive power to deny autonomous decision making, thereby preventing an 
adequate opportunity for reason to weigh the matter.  
However, I cannot agree with Plato or Kant in their dismissal of rhetoric for the purposes 
of public deliberation since I identify as fundamentally flawed their conception of rhetoric 
as one which is, at its core, coercive. I reject that this is so. I suspect that Plato has 
conflated rhetoric with Sophism and in so doing has misinterpreted the full scope of 
rhetoric, ignoring its capacity to improve discourse in the public sphere through eloquent 
argument formation and, through persuasion, to expedite deliberative decision making. At 
the heart of my defence lies the assumption that not all use of rhetoric is necessarily to 
deceive or occlude truth. By concentrating on the abuse of rhetoric to serve the nefarious 
ends of Sophistic, politically ambitious, vain-glorious men, Plato is simply identifying one 
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 Plato depicts the citizenry (demos) as one that was ‘easy to manipulate, gullible, distracted, and lacking 
motivation for the task of self-governance’ (McDorman and Timmerman 2008: xv) so Garsten’s simile here 
is apt in representing the Sophists as predatory. 
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of many vices to be found in the public arena and I consider that his dissatisfaction would 
be better directed towards the men, not the realm of rhetoric. Aristotle clarifies this point: 
nothing makes an argument, claim or position persuasive in the abstract (Rhetoric 
1356b27). It has to convince another person, who as we saw above in Aristotle’s account 
of deliberative rhetoric, will have an individual character and will be subject to various 
irrational (as well as rational) influences. While rhetoric may be a catalyst, it is not, I 
defend, a producer of persuasion. As I see it, persuasion in the strict sense identifies a way 
of influencing that is neither manipulation nor pandering. The speaker who manipulates his 
audience in order to bring them to a belief or action without their consent, as Kant thought 
orators moved men ‘like machines’ (Critique of Judgement 5. 328n), has not persuaded but 
coerced. In contrast, the speaker who merely finds out where his audience itches and then 
scratches there, as Plato thought pandering Athenian orators did, has failed to change his 
listeners’ minds at all. To truly persuade people is to induce them to change their own 
beliefs and desires in response to what has been said. Although the passive voice is used 
‘being persuaded’, we recognise the difference between being persuaded and being 
indoctrinated or brainwashed; the difference lies in the active independence that is 
preserved when we are persuaded. An orator does not coerce; he merely puts words into 
the air. Thus I reject the notion that rhetoric has the propensity to bring about a mindless 
conformity in its adherents, moving people ‘mass-like (Plato), crowd-like (Kierkegaard) 
and herd-like (Nietzsche)’ (Jost and Hyde 1997: 10). This allegation ignores the part to be 
played by members of the audience. In the brief moments of conscious or unconscious 
reflection that occur while we listen to a sales pitch or a campaign speech, an active 
process of evaluation and assimilation occurs in our minds (Garsten 2009: 7) enabling us to 
make a judgement. The extent to which that judgement is influenced by the choice and 
arrangement of words depends on the extent to which the audience is willing to be 
persuaded. 
Factors governing the willingness of the audience to be persuaded include the ethical 
education of the orator, the ethical education of the audience and the extent to which the 
audience has the opportunity to develop critical faculties when digesting communication 
within the public sphere. Admittedly, there is nothing inherent to the art of rhetoric which 
prevents its use for unethical ends. Reciprocity within deliberation becomes untenable and 
moral transparency is occluded when the commitment to the common good is sacrificed 
for reasons of self-interest. There are inescapable tensions here, between Aristotle’s claim 
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that rhetoric, used justly, can do much good (Rhetoric 1355b) and its infamy for being a 
powerful instrument of public thinking that can be used deceptively, to make a bad 
argument look good (Walton 2004: 297). However, rhetoric, I defend, still offers 
something a democratic polity should desire: non-coercive persuasion which is 
fundamental to the ethics of deliberative democracy (Chambers 1996). The solution, I 
suggest, lies not in removing rhetoric from deliberation but rather in educating against the 
abuse of rhetorical power through appropriate citizenship education. It is likely that this 
‘should be directed at least in part to the sorts of virtues that promote the ethical use of 
power’ (Bentley 2004: 132) and should equip students with skills to distinguish the 
dispositions or states of character that tend to undermine the exercise of civic virtues. In 
this regard, I think that rhetoric has a valuable role to play in helping citizens to recognise 
that ethical, evaluative and emotional climates determine the form and extent of 
persuasion.  
The misuse of rhetoric and excessive appeal to emotions undoubtedly bring hazards. Yack 
(2006: 433) reminds us that ‘emotions help us judge the value of competing proposals, 
[but] we must be willing to accept the risks that they will mislead us as well’. The best 
defence against the abuse of power, I contend, is the wide distribution of power. Since 
rhetoric is a linguistic form of power and it can be taught, it follows that it should be 
taught. The power rhetoric provides has to be supported by a sound ethical grounding since 
the way rhetoric is practised will depend on the moral character of the practitioner. Since 
moral character is something that is developed through education, rhetorical practice will 
only ever be as good as the broader education citizens receive so, following Aristotle 
(Rhetoric 2.6.1106a), I propose that ethical learning must be studied alongside the art of 
rhetoric. Cicero suggests that citizens, if they allow their reason and emotions to work in 
tandem as Aristotle suggested, need not be disengaged hearers of the sweet music of a 
speech (de Oratore 2. 33-34), pleased and gratified by speakers’ rhetoric, but rather they 
can become trained listeners of music (aures eruditae), judging orators by their logos, 
pathos and ethos (Connolly 2007: 127). It is this training of critical faculties and orienting 
of moral compasses which should enable citizens to filter the positive uses of rhetoric from 
the corrupt ones. In democratic deliberation, citizens can think collectively and responsible 
citizens (interpreted maximally as discussed in the previous chapter) should engage their 
critical faculties to consider the best course of action not just for themselves but for others.  
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Instead of isolating rhetoric from democratic deliberation because it can be misused to 
serve the self-interest of the few, a more fruitful approach might be to view rhetoric as a 
communicative framework for the many for the exchange of ideas, which permits the 
additional benefits of learning about the governance of reason and emotion. By exercising 
the critical faculties to develop filters for rhetoric’s ethical and unethical use, then, citizens 
have the opportunity to develop critical skills at a deeper level than if communication 
within deliberation were restricted to critical argumentation. While I hold that this is the 
case, there exists a strong challenge to the suitability of rhetoric as a communicative 
method within deliberation. As I have already discussed, central to theories of democratic 
deliberation is equality of opportunity of political influence whereby an individual’s assent 
to an argument advanced by others must be uncoerced. Also crucial, though, is that 
individuals must have equal capacity to advance persuasive claims (Knight and Johnson 
1997: 282). Although I have argued that rhetoric provides a structured, accessible and 
common framework for communication which facilitates equal participation, I turn now to 
consider whether this notion of dialogue is fundamentally incompatible with Classical 
rhetorical theory. 
The challenge from monology 
In addition to the challenges presented by rhetoric’s emotional appeal and its abuse for 
self-interest, it is also criticised by contemporary democrats
69
 because, as a monological 
form of communication used by a speaker to persuade an audience with no right of reply, it 
does not meet the moral requirement of equal political participation in deliberation. As was 
outlined in Chapter Two, rhetoric originated from the need for Greeks to represent 
themselves through the articulation of their rights to settle disputes after tyranny was 
overthrown. In this sense, rhetoric was conceived as a monological endeavour which 
involved one man speaking for each ‘side’ of an issue, others listening then voting to 
determine the outcome. Although Aristotle hints at a time in the fifth century BC when 
deliberative rhetoric was used for the collective consideration of the best course of action 
for a community of citizens to take through reasoned (and impassioned) communication, 
since the formal structuring of the parts of speech developed by Cicero and Quintilian in 
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 Benhabib’s (2002) commitment to ‘egalitarian reciprocity’ maintains that each individual has the same 
symmetrical rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, to ask for reflection about the 
presuppositions of the conversation. Equality also dominates Bohman’s (1996: 16) list of the basic normative 
requirements and constraints on deliberation. 
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the Roman era, rhetoric has once again become a pursuit associated with the delivery of 
speeches in agonistic civic circumstances. Herein lies a problem: deliberation, nowadays, 
is meant to be a forum for the exchange of ideas (Chambers 2009) and contemporary 
theories of democratic deliberation
70
 look to conversation as an ideal. Conversation is a 
dialogical method of speaking which, not relying on a defined structure, is at odds with the 
Classical conception of rhetoric which, being rooted in competition, manifested itself in 
carefully structured speeches delivered in conflictive environments like debates. The 
monological nature of rhetoric (by which I mean the lack of provision for ongoing 
discussion), I concede, is difficult to reconcile with democratic deliberation as it is 
currently conceived but I advise that rhetoric ought not to be entirely dismissed from the 
realm of deliberation as it retains some features of value. What follows is justification for a 
partly revised conception of rhetoric. 
In order to maximise rhetoric’s contribution in current conditions, certain characteristics of 
Classical rhetorical theory must be abandoned. The monological nature of rhetoric which 
demanded adherence to one’s original persuasive appeal must be relaxed in favour of an 
openness to ‘learning from, and being challenged by’ (Simpson 2001: 89) the views of 
other citizens. This can also include the dialogical element of adjusting their position to 
suit audience and circumstances. In a refinement of the adversarial nature of rhetoric, I 
suggest that in today’s democracy, it could be more usefully oriented toward collaboration 
and compromise. This does not necessarily entail the abolishment of rhetoric to make room 
for conversation, however, since I foresee potential risks with conversation. For Cicero, 
conversation (sermo) was a theoretical activity designed to uncover and explore 
philosophical questions conducted in private by elite and aristocratic men. That 
conversation is more suited to small groups than to an assembly is highlighted by Shiffman 
(2004: 110) who admits that it represents a ‘formidable cognitive therapy, a reasonable 
method for improvement and is good for the soul’ but is a peculiar way to get large groups 
of people with common and divergent interests to agree to bind themselves to a particular 
course of action. It strikes me that conversation can only lead to further conversation, 
discussion to more discussion and in a deliberative sphere where issues of civic importance 
require to be debated and consensus
71
 reached, the structure provided by the rhetorical 
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 Walzer (1990), Bohman (1996), Remer (1999, 2000). 
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 As was highlighted earlier, this is a contested area of deliberative theory (see Manin 1987, Bohman 1998 
and Dryzek 2010 for more extended treatment of the tensions) which cannot be fully investigated in the 
current study.   
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framework offers a possible benefit in this regard. In contrast to the private domain in 
which Cicero viewed conversation, he saw rhetoric as a method of communication more 
suited to a wider, open and popular forum. In such a context, it was a political and moral 
enterprise which aimed to persuade an audience or assembly to act in a particular way. 
Rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, aims to culminate in a conclusive decision since the 
proponent of the argument already has an agenda; a viewpoint or thesis that he/she wants 
the others to accept, unlike deliberation, which is more open to alternative courses of 
action and is usually more collaborative in nature (Walton 2004: 310). I suggest that the 
Classical conception of rhetoric ought to be revised and its meaning reshaped to accelerate 
consensus through multi-logic exchange between participants. For this to be so, there must 
be more willingness than in the Ancient model to develop and evolve one’s position for the 
good of the community. This does not, however, have to be the result of an exclusive focus 
on common ground: in valorising only what we have in common, there is a missed 
opportunity to cultivate genuine ‘respect for difference... commensurate with the justice 
requirement central to the deliberative model’ (Healy 2011: 298). Rather, the tenability of 
each party’s views needs to be held open to critical intersubjective appraisal in 
appropriately structured discursive forms (Healy 2011: 303) and it is here that rhetoric is 
essential in situating critical faculties at the centre of democratic deliberation. The eventual 
decision, far from being imposed by force or other nefarious means, issues out of the 
rhetorical and competitive struggle for advantage located within the public space of 
deliberation. In such a way, I claim, the persuasive and focussed style of rhetorical 
communication can contribute positively to democratic deliberation both by allowing the 
force of the best argument to win and by helping citizens foster the rhetorical skills of 
critical listening, constructing arguments and, most importantly within deliberation, 
engaging in argumentation.  
The use of Classical rhetoric, then, in contemporary conceptions of democratic deliberation 
has been shown to survive, relatively unscathed, three key challenges. Rhetoric can help 
support equality in deliberation through promoting the understanding of difference because 
it necessarily involves seeing situations from the other’s perspective. It is more suitable for 
democratic deliberation, in this regard, than storytelling or greeting since it offers greater 
accessibility of meaning through a single communicative framework designed for use in 
the public sphere. Furthermore, the presentation of both sides of the issue and the prior 
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consideration given to the views of others within the rhetorical framework may expedite 
the decision making process more than storytelling and greeting which are likely to 
facilitate ongoing discussion but may not be conducive to decision-making or collective 
action, owing to their lack of focussed argumentation. Both in streamlining the deliberation 
process and in moving beyond communication focussed on logic to include identification 
with opposing views, I consider that rhetoric represents an improvement on argumentation 
within democratic deliberation. By appealing to the emotions, rhetoric admits input from 
non-rational aspects of the psyche which, according to Aristotle, makes for better civic 
deliberation than purely reason-based methods of communication. While rhetoric need not 
aim at the common good and can be abused for self-interest, Aristotle says that the abuse 
of rhetoric is no worse than the abuse of other things (Rhetoric 1.1.1355b). Since nothing is 
persuasive in itself, the use of rhetoric within deliberation represents an opportunity for 
citizens within democracy to cultivate critical reason and ethical conduct by reflecting on 
and evaluating communication which appeals to their reason, passions, appetites and 
emotions – material which is more richly critical than rational argumentation alone.  
The most challenging objection to rhetoric undoubtedly stems from the tension between 
argumentation and conversation: unfortunately, being monological from its inception, 
rhetoric is not easily reconcilable with conversation or discussion. Rhetoric may help to 
present a persuasive pitch or accelerate consensus within deliberation by arguing opposing 
sides of an issue but I acknowledge that its agonistic approach is of value only in public 
and formal settings for deliberation. Rhetoric as a method of persuasive communication 
has limited relevance to more informal deliberative settings which rely on ongoing 
exchange through conversation and which are considered vital stages
72
 within the 
democratic deliberation process (Hauser 2008) so a partly revised conception of rhetoric is 
suggested. I propose that the strict divisions of the parts of speech of the rhetorical 
framework are relaxed, rhetorical communication is used for multi-logic purposes and 
there is a heightened commitment from all participants to the capacity of rhetoric to move 
all parties to new ground rather than narrowly to ‘win’ one’s case. A healthy deliberative 
democracy requires exercise of the critical faculties and I have explained ways in which 
rhetoric can contribute positively to the cultivation of critical skills: through critical 
argumentation, ethopoeia and refutatio. In this regard, I see more in rhetoric than Young 
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involved is not important. Chambers (2009) suggests that informal conversation between citizens is as 
deliberative as the delivery of critical argumentation in mass democracy.  
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does and by elaborating on her account of rhetoric, I defend that rhetoric can make a more 
profound contribution to deliberation than greeting or storytelling (these methods of 
communication are, however, complementary to rhetoric and, as I stated above, have their 
place within deliberation). Yet I concede that if rhetoric is to enjoy a revival in public 
deliberation, it must eschew narrow historical and political agendas and ‘reemphasise the 
practical tools of democratic citizenship’ (Hogan 2008: 82) which I have identified as 
communicating responsibly by listening and speaking for noble purposes and exercising 
critical skills informed by robust ethical standards. This mirrors very closely Aristotle’s 
suggestion regarding deliberative rhetoric from 2500 years ago; and in suggesting that a 
useful way to improve civic engagement is by looking to ‘some of the oldest traditions in 
rhetorical theory and practice’ rather than new information technologies, Hogan (2008: 
77), I think, is right. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
Previous chapters have defended the inclusion of rhetoric in the curriculum; this final 
chapter sets out to identify its optimal position therein. I claim that Classical languages 
offer the most authentic curricular context for the learning and teaching of rhetoric for 
‘deconstructive purposes’ but note that they offer limited scope for rhetorical construction 
and performance, elements which I concede must be delivered by other subjects across the 
curriculum. I consider carefully some possible pedagogical approaches which would 
accommodate the learning and teaching of Classical rhetoric in CfE and make particular 
suggestions which, on the one hand, prioritise its study through Classical languages but 
which, on the other hand, simultaneously uphold the value of contributions from other 
subject disciplines, most notably English, Modern Studies and Media Studies. The merit of 
a cross-curricular approach to the learning and teaching of rhetoric is acknowledged while 
the unique contribution of Classical languages within such a scheme is valorised and their 
wider educational benefits promoted. Challenges, both theoretical and practical, to the 
curricular solution I advance for rhetoric are considered which both facilitates the analysis 
of this study’s innovative contributions to the field of scholarship and prompts 
identification of further areas of development for this research. Finally, I reflect on ways in 
which my professional practice has been transformed as a result of undertaking this study 
and consider the concomitant implications for my multiple roles within education: as a 
Classics teacher, an advisor on syllabus design and assessment and as a researcher. 
Defending Classical languages as the most authentic context for the 
learning of rhetoric 
There are three reasons why I consider Classical languages to be the most authentic context 
for the learning of rhetoric: the abundance of Classical literature written expressly to be 
persuasive; the enriched learning experience which comes from approaching rhetoric 
through another language and the increased exposure to rhetorical techniques. Firstly, as I 
explained in Chapter Two, rhetoric was integral not only to education systems of the 
Classical world but to the effective functioning of politics and, because it played such a 
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vital role in civic life, there exists a significant corpus of literature which records and 
showcases the inception, development and legacy of rhetoric in the Ancient world. The 
survival of this body of material lends Classical languages an advantage for the teaching 
and learning of rhetoric since the Classical rhetorical texts, adhering strictly in content and 
style to the forensic, deliberative and epideictic rhetorical frameworks, have much to offer 
the modern student of rhetoric as they allow the student to read texts which were produced 
for explicitly rhetorical purposes. As I explained in Chapter One, I have witnessed through 
my own professional practice the positive reaction and genuine engagement with learning 
which result from the teaching of these ‘original’ Classical rhetorical texts73 in Scottish 
secondary schools. In particular, the forensic speeches of Cicero form part of existing 
Scottish Latin qualifications
74
 and I have often observed how successful Cicero’s literature 
is in captivating students’ interest and improving their ability to identify and critically 
evaluate the use of persuasion in communication
75
.  
 
Moving now to the second justification for Classical languages being the most authentic 
context for the study of rhetoric, students are able to increase their critical faculties by 
questioning and examining the author’s choice and placement of words for persuasive 
effect through close linguistic analysis
76
 of the Latin used by Cicero in his law-court 
speeches. This micro-level interrogation and appreciation of literary techniques involves 
reading closely, reflecting on the complexity of rendering Latin into English while being 
true to the author’s original intention with regard to rhythm, sound, connotation and tone. 
This combination of Latin translation and rhetorical evaluation involves higher order 
thinking skills and is, I defend, a more richly rewarding learning experience than either 
analysing Classical rhetorical literature translated into English (where nuance and literary 
depth can be compromised) or indeed modern uses of rhetoric such as the speeches of 
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 My classroom experience is limited to the teaching of Latin rhetorical texts since rhetorical literature does 
not currently feature on the Classical Greek qualifications syllabi at secondary school level. I consider, 
however, that the speeches of Demosthenes (1990) and Lysias (1990) could be very usefully studied by 
learners of Classical Greek, as an alternative to the currently prescribed philosophical text by Plato. However, 
as was outlined in Chapter One, SQA has placed Classical Greek under its low-uptake policy and financial 
constraints threaten the continued assessment of the subject in Scotland. Much more could be said about the 
potential value of Classical Greek in the teaching and learning of rhetoric and this represents an area for 
possible further research. 
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 At Higher (SQA 2003a) and Advanced Higher (SQA 2003b) levels, but recently also at the new CfE 
National 5 level (SQA 2012). 
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 There is not scope in this study for the use of data to support this statement but further quantitative study 
and the collection of related data in this area could be of value. 
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 This skill was previously called ‘interpretation’ on Latin assessment policy documentation but has been, 
aptly in my view, renamed ‘literary appreciation’ after the CfE syllabus and assessment review. 
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contemporary politicians (which tend to include fewer ‘purple patches77’ than their 
Classical predecessors).  
 
Thirdly, while it is true that the recognition and analysis of rhetorical techniques can be 
taught in English language and literature lessons, it is worth restating that which was 
highlighted in Chapter Three that, at school level, the features covered for English exam 
preparation tend to include: metaphor, simile, transferred epithet, alliteration, 
onomatopoeia, personification and pun. In Latin at the same level, many more features 
including, but not limited to, tricolon, hendiadys, anaphora, asyndeton, zeugma, chiasmus, 
synecdoche, praeteritio,  homoioteleuton, paradox, hyperbaton, polyptoton, ellipsis and 
apostrophe are exemplified in the rhetorical literature and lead students to encounter, 
evaluate and appreciate a wider field of persuasive discourse. The forensic speeches of 
Cicero are brimming with these literary devices (see glossary for further explanation) and 
offer a rich, ‘purple’ rhetorical tapestry for close examination, while being of a level 
suitable for study at school. As was indicated in the previous chapter, Cicero employed 
such a range of rhetorical techniques to engage the emotions and minds of the jury in an 
effort to persuade them that he was representing the side of the good men within the 
Republic, either by showing that his client was innocent of wrongdoing if appearing for the 
defence or by questioning incisively if he were appointed as prosecutor. The concentrated 
use of these techniques is significantly more plentiful in rhetorical literature written in 
Latin than in English. Political speeches, such as those of Churchill and Obama, arguably 
come closer than any other literary genre in English to the extensive use of rhetorical 
devices but even they fail to include the expansive range of techniques evident in Classical 
rhetorical literature. The study of Classical rhetoric, therefore, provides richer preparation 
for the analysis of modern English communications.  
This is not to say that rhetoric cannot be taught through English; it can. However I claim 
that the study of rhetoric in English necessitates a diluted form of linguistic analysis which 
is limited from the outset. If rhetorical knowledge, linguistic acuity and the capacity for 
critical judgement are considered important in the development of responsible citizens and 
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 Purple patches (from Latin purpureus pannus, Horace, de Arte Poetica 14-15 [Horace 1929]) of 
communication are ‘brilliant or ornate passages in a literary composition’, called purple because they are 
bright-hued, splendid and associated with the Roman ruling class who wore purple bordered togas. Purple 
dye was very expensive in the Ancient world because it was extracted from murex shells so was the preserve 
of the wealthy and elite members of society, the same people who attended school and were taught rhetoric.  
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critical thinkers, then I consider that the corpus of literature written in Classical languages 
offers fertile ground for the learning and teaching of these skills. The connection which I 
have made between the study of rhetoric and the development of citizenship, literacy, 
critical literacy and critical thinking provides, I think, a compelling call for the re-
evaluation, reinvigoration and reintegration of rhetorical education in Scottish schools and 
the most authentic pedagogical context, I maintain, is offered by Classical languages.  
Educational value vs. efficiency revisited 
There are three challenges to this position which stem from a tension between the most 
efficient method of including rhetoric in the curriculum, and the most educationally 
valuable method. Firstly, opponents of Classical languages might claim that too much 
Latin has to be studied before rhetorical learning can begin for this to be a viable 
pedagogical option. Secondly, there is genuine research evidence that assessments in Latin 
are more challenging than other curriculum subjects so the teaching of rhetoric through the 
medium of Classical languages may exclude some students who would be otherwise 
included if the context for instruction were English. Thirdly, the fact that the study of 
rhetoric in Latin can only ever be deconstructive leads some critics to suggest that 
Classical languages can only prepare learners with half the skills they need. In this section, 
I reject the first two of these challenges, offering counterarguments which I consider more 
compelling than the objections but some concession is required in response to the third 
challenge. In the spirit CfE this concession will take the form of increased collaboration 
with other curriculum subjects in the delivery of rhetoric.   
The first challenge, then, highlights the sheer volume of basic and intermediate language 
work which needs to be undertaken before the study of rhetorical texts in Classical 
languages can commence. Although I remain resolute in my position that learning about 
rhetoric is of significant benefit to students in secondary school, I do acknowledge that 
Classical languages are intellectually demanding and syntactically rigorous, so the path to 
the study of rhetorical literature in Latin and Greek is both long and arduous. In my 
experience, students must study Latin for at least three years before their language work is 
sufficiently robust to begin reading unadapted Latin literature (of the kind written by 
Cicero and including linguistic devices appropriate for rhetorical study by students). There 
125 
 
is, undoubtedly, an argument worthy of consideration from those who identify the 
inefficiency of this approach. To learn Latin just to optimise understanding of the origin 
and importance of rhetoric is, to some extent, unjustifiable when a satisfactory 
understanding can be achieved, with less toil, through English. In response to this position 
I cite two counter-arguments; one stems from the danger of measuring school subjects by 
their efficiency and extrinsic value, the second concerns the additional benefits of Classical 
language learning.  
As was discussed in Chapter One, and as Nussbaum (2010: 127) notes, curricula across the 
globe have been increasingly adapted to produce ‘applied skills suited to profit making’ 
and, as a result, the Arts and Humanities ‘are being cut away’ and dismissed as ‘useless 
frills’ in the context of an overriding imperative ‘to stay competitive in the global market’ 
(2010: 2, 133). The dissolving of the Humanities is linked to the political agenda for 
education to be driven by national economic performance or individual income rather than 
the recognition that they are integral to life as a citizen of the world. The result, she 
complains (2010: 51), is that ‘abilities crucial to the health of any democracy’ are being 
lost, especially the ability to ‘think critically... to probe, to evaluate evidence, to write 
papers with well-structured arguments, and to analyze the arguments presented to them in 
other texts’ (2010: 55). She argues for the return of a course which calls for ‘attention to 
logical structures’ and thus ‘gives students templates that they can then apply to texts of 
many different types’ (Nussbaum 2010: 55). I would posit that the rhetorical framework is 
ideally placed to provide a viable and valuable solution to fill this void. Yet I agree that 
‘critical’ skills and related abilities will look ‘dispensable if what we want are marketable 
outputs of a quantifiable nature’ (Nussbaum 2010: 45), and if we embrace an ‘economic 
growth paradigm rather than a human development paradigm’ (Nussbaum 2010: 24). 
Learning need not be, and in my view ought not to be, driven by extrinsic factors nor its 
validity measured in terms of ‘efficiency’. It is true that the study of Classical languages 
and literatures does not, perhaps, offer the fastest or most direct route to rhetorical 
knowledge but, as I have already argued, it offers the most authentic context for 
comprehensive and robust rhetorical learning and if the development of literary and civic 
skills is deemed important, it makes sense to me for us to look to the creators and masters 
of the craft for instruction.  
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I offer now the second counter-argument in response to the challenge that learning rhetoric 
through Classical languages is inefficient. The study of Latin, I propose, offers far more 
than simply the authentic context for the study of rhetoric, which, although undoubtedly 
valuable, ought not to be seen as the singular goal for Classical language learning. Rather, 
Latin must be valued for the additional contributions it makes to the overarching purposes 
and principles of CfE as well as its ability to improve the development of the four 
capacities (see Appendix B). Classical languages can contribute positively to the 
acquisition and improvement of cross-curricular skills including literacy and citizenship, 
claims which have been examined in depth in Chapters Three, Four and Five, as well as 
providing significant opportunities for cross-curricular learning activities with other 
curriculum areas, for example Health and Wellbeing, Numeracy, History, Art, Modern 
Languages, Science, Mathematics, Geography and Religious Studies. Transferable skills, 
such as the ability to pay meticulous attention to detail, so important in the translation of 
inflected languages, bring benefits to learners in their studies across the curriculum. 
Furthermore, the study of Classical languages provides an enlarged cultural compass and 
improved linguistic foundation for learners on which they can build a myriad of cross-
curricular skills and abilities. I suggest that the reintegration of Classical languages in the 
curriculum be considered, then, not simply for the sake of promoting the study of rhetoric, 
but also for the many associated contributions they can make to a rounded education for 
Scottish young people. To recap, I acknowledge that they do not represent the most 
efficient approach to the learning and teaching of rhetoric, but I maintain that they provide 
the most educationally valuable approach given their concomitant contributions to skill 
development; preparation both for learning across the curriculum and for lifelong learning. 
Laying aside the educational benefits of studying Classical languages for the moment, the 
second challenge concerns their suitability for inclusion in the curricula of Scottish 
mainstream secondary schools owing to research which identifies that Classical 
languages
78
 are more difficult than other subjects in the curriculum. Indeed there exists 
some doubt among education professionals
79
 as to whether the study of Latin, and 
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 Research conducted by Prof. Coe at Durham University in 2006 concluded that GCSE and A Level Latin 
were between one and two grades harder than other subjects (Coe 2006: 9, Weeds 2007). 
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 Classics teachers are keen to identify the accessibility of their subjects to all students. Mercer (1993), Hunt 
(2009) and Downes et al. (2012) identify strategies for differentiation in Classics. Ancona (1982), Chanock 
(2006), Hill (2009), Shahabudin and Turner (2009) and Laurence (2010) identify the value of Latin and 
Greek for students with dyslexia while Dyson (2003), Holmes-Henderson (2008), Paul (2008) and Rankin 
(2008) identify the unique contribution of Classical languages to the education of gifted and talented 
students. However, others (Hoskins 1976, Morwood 2005, Matthews and Matthews 2009, Hunt and Foster 
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particularly Greek, is realistically accessible or achievable for all learners. In the initial 
stages of language learning, I believe that all students can successfully grasp the key 
linguistic patterns which govern the operation of the languages. As the study of accidence 
and syntax progresses, however, the irregularity of Greek verbs and the number of noun 
declensions make it a language which is almost exclusively studied by students of ‘high 
academic ability
80’. Latin is arguably more accessible to students of a wider ability range 
(there is certainly a better selection of published resources
81
 which allows for more 
differentiation than in Greek
82
) yet it too demands much from learners both in terms of 
memorisation of noun declensions and verb conjugations as well as the ability to 
understand the structure of clauses and the complex syntax of a highly inflected language. 
Being academically demanding and requiring a high degree of linguistic skill and 
exactitude, might Latin and Greek actually be considered exclusionary, then, to students of 
lower ability? And if so, surely this suggests that Latin and Greek are not the ideal 
curricular vehicles for the study of rhetoric, appearing, as they do, to be positively 
undemocratic and divisive rather than providing relevant and accessible content within a 
coherent and unified approach to promoting linguistic equality?  
Classical languages certainly have a reputation for being divisive; there exists a gap in 
curricular provision between well-resourced independent schools where the Classical 
tradition has remained in place for centuries and State schools (Lister 2007: 89) in which 
either there is no Classics teacher or the teaching of Classical languages is limited to the 
most able students for example, the top set for French. For decades, the perception that 
only academically gifted students were suited to the study of Latin and Greek has 
prevented generations of interested students from accessing a Classical education. I see 
CfE as an opportunity to reverse this trend and to make the curriculum more democratic, 
narrowing the gap between provision in the private and public sectors. Latin and Greek 
                                                                                                                                                    
2011) express concern that the style and content of assessment in Latin and Greek are exclusionary to pupils 
of weaker academic ability. 
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 This category is problematic for some and relies on measurement of attainment which does not, I know, 
necessarily truly reflect achievement or intellectual potential. I use it here because it is commonly associated 
with learners of Greek in my professional context and in the critical literature (Sharwood Smith 1977, Lister 
2007). 
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 Current textbooks used in the teaching of Latin include: ‘Ecce Romani’ (Scottish Classics Group 1982), 
‘Oxford Latin Course’ (Balme and Morwood 1996), ‘Cambridge Latin Course’ (CSCP 1998) and ‘So You 
Really Want To Learn Latin?’ (Oulton and Douglass 1999). Of these, the Cambridge Latin Course is the 
most accessible to learners of all abilities and is supported by a website and e-learning resource which 
provide differentiated activities. 
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 Greek textbooks are notoriously pedestrian and include very little visual or cultural stimuli. In general, they 
assume familiarity with Latin and explain the formation of grammar features through reference to Latin 
counterparts (Balme and Lawall 1995, Wilding 1997, Taylor 2003). 
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provide, in my view, the most authentic curricular context for the study of rhetoric and 
expose students to a greater intensity of linguistic strategies to persuade and should, 
therefore, be considered a valuable option for all students. Given the correct support, I 
think Classical languages need not be the preserve of the academically gifted if students of 
‘weaker’ ability and less enthusiastic inclination towards the Classics are guided 
appropriately when translating, analysing and evaluating unadapted Latin literature. Yes, a 
high degree of linguistic skill is required but it is the responsibility of the teacher to ensure 
that students acquire sufficient support to enable them to engage with the literary merit of 
the texts. In my professional practice I have witnessed a number of students who struggled 
with the complexity of the language yet engaged purposefully with the texts under study, 
and benefited both intellectually and culturally from the endeavour. The study of rhetoric 
through English-language based teaching and learning activities is an easier option for both 
the teacher and learner under these circumstances and may well be a more realistic goal but 
leads to an inferior learning experience, in my view.  
The third and perhaps most threatening challenge to the study of rhetoric through Classical 
languages is the fact that only the deconstruction of rhetorical language can be studied in 
Latin and Greek; the construction and performance of rhetorical communication is not 
possible at secondary school level owing to the difficulty of composing in Latin and Greek. 
Translating into Classical languages is not expected at any level for SQA qualifications
83
 
and is only required in a small number
84
 of university Classics degrees. The fact that the 
study of rhetoric through Latin and Greek provides exposure to only deconstruction and 
does not offer preparation or tuition for the construction of rhetorical text in Classical 
languages might suggest that these subjects can only provide half the required learning for 
students of rhetoric. Yet I contend that this is not so. As has already been stated, Classical 
rhetoric provides a rich preparation for the analysis of modern communication and the 
richness of Classical rhetorical literature is far greater than its English-language 
counterparts. It therefore makes good sense to use the authentic context provided by Latin 
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 Although, interestingly, there has been a recent move to reintroduce prose composition as a compulsory 
element (10 per cent) of assessment in Classical languages at GCSE level in England (Department for 
Education 2013b, 2013c). The proposals, currently under consultation, suggest that very basic linguistic 
manipulation will be required so there is no expectation that school pupils will be able to compose according 
to the rhetorical framework. 
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 Oxford, Cambridge, Durham, Edinburgh, Bristol, Warwick and St Andrews universities require that 
students do prose composition (discussion with Coderch at conference 2008) although, from my experience 
at Oxford and Cambridge, this is in the form of sentences to be translated from English into Latin and Greek. 
The composition of extended passages is done only for competitions (for example, Cambridge and Oxford 
Classics Faculties’ Latin and Greek Composition prizes) and in these cases, the English passage is provided. 
It is not necessarily rhetorical in content. 
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and Greek for the delivery of deconstructive rhetorical skills. These skills supply a 
necessary foundation for the development of constructive skills and it is vital that students 
have a firm command of the language in which they will be constructing rhetorical 
communication. As far as I can see, the application of skills learned through the analysis of 
Classical literature can only enrich and enhance the construction of contemporary speech 
and text in English through vocabulary acquisition, linguistic agility and a critical 
understanding of the way in which language can be used to persuade. These skills become 
more straightforward, I claim, after the close analysis of Greek and Latin literature. While 
construction in Latin and Greek would certainly offer more scope for the use of certain 
linguistic devices which are difficult to replicate in English, this ability does little to build 
the rhetorical capacity which will contribute to linguistic equality and effective self-
representation within a modern deliberative democracy, for obvious reasons
85
.  As was 
highlighted above, to deserve a place on the mainstream school curriculum, the study of 
Classical languages needs to be about more than the enhancement of rhetorical awareness. 
In this regard I would suggest that the valuable transferable skills which result from the 
study of Classical languages (including increased cultural and historical sensitivity, better 
attention to detail and improved grammatical understanding
86
) lend further support to the 
argument for their reintroduction to the curriculum. I stop short, however, of decreeing that 
the study of Latin and Greek are vital for the study of rhetoric. While acknowledging that 
they have an important, relevant and helpful role to play, I admit that they are not strictly 
necessary for the study of rhetoric but are rather desirable for their contribution to a richer 
and deeper understanding of rhetorical theory and practice. 
What contributions can be made by other subjects? 
English, then, has an important role to play in providing a vehicle for the composition of 
communication and the practice of rhetorical invention and performance. As was shown in 
Chapter Three, a number of the experiences and outcomes in CfE for English and literacy 
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 Latin and Classical Greek are no longer spoken languages so the ability to declaim in these languages is 
not conducive to the fulfilment of the aims of rhetoric I have highlighted elsewhere: responsible citizenship, 
literacy and critical literacy. 
86
 Unfortunately there is not scope within this study for a detailed analysis of the value of a Classical 
education; this could be the focus of another Doctoral dissertation. Some research into transferable skills 
which result from the study of Classics was conducted by the University of Cambridge Classics Faculty 
[2007b] which identified a range of ‘intellectual skills, communication skills, organisational skills and 
interpersonal skills’. I must limit my discussion here to the role of Classical languages in the cultivation of 
rhetorical skills.  
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include elements which I consider to fall under the remit of rhetorical education; thus a 
partnership approach to the teaching of rhetoric through Classical languages and English 
has the potential to work very effectively. This might be usefully complemented by extra-
curricular opportunities (operated as optional lunch-time or after-school clubs), for 
example student debating or Model United Nations competitions. 
Aside from English, I consider that important contributions can also be made by Religious 
and Moral Education (RME), Modern Studies and Media Studies. RME offers 
opportunities to critically analyse the beliefs, scriptures and sermons of diverse faith 
groups which may be written to persuade others to become followers. In this connection, 
students have plenty of opportunity to employ and develop critical thinking and critical 
literacy skills as well as becoming increasingly aware of their role as citizens in a multi-
faith world
87
. Modern Studies includes direct study and analysis of political life and can 
include the analysis of modern (and some historical) political speeches. It encourages 
students to probe their own considerations on the rights and responsibilities of citizens 
while expecting them to articulate their position competently. The ability to consider and 
ask difficult questions is a key feature of Modern Studies education (Maitles 2003) and 
here, the subject has a significant role to play in educating for democratic citizenship. 
Modern Studies is located at an intersection of the curriculum – where politics, 
communication studies and citizenship meet; it occupies space between the Humanities 
and the Social Sciences. This makes it a very useful and cross-curricular subject for the 
delivery of rhetorical education
88
. I contend, though, that it does not offer sufficient 
detailed study of language to be able to teach exclusively about rhetoric, hence my 
recommendation for an inter-disciplinary approach which combines the study of politics 
and citizenship with speeches from the Classical world which exemplify the rhetorical 
framework. As has been suggested earlier, the study of political speeches (see Appendix A, 
for example those of Churchill or Obama) provides an alternative to the study of Classical 
rhetorical literature but, for the reasons outlined above, does not replace Classical 
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 Two CfE outcomes are particularly relevant here: ‘Having reflected upon a considered a range of beliefs, 
belief systems and moral viewpoints, I can express reasoned views on how putting these beliefs and values 
into action might lead to changes in society’ RME 4-09a (Scottish Government 2009a: 225) and ‘Through 
researching a range of traditions, practices and customs of world religions, I can consider the place of these in 
contemporary life’ RME 4-06a (Scottish Government 2009a: 224). 
88
 Modern Studies outcomes which include aspects of rhetoric are: ‘I can evaluate conflicting sources of 
evidence to sustain a line of argument’ SOC 4-01a and ‘I can debate the reasons why some people participate 
less than others in the electoral process and can express informed views about the importance of participating 
in a democracy’ SOC 4-18b (Scottish Government 2009a: 293). 
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languages as the most educationally valuable vehicle for the learning and teaching of 
rhetoric. 
Media Studies
89
, too, offers possible input to the teaching and learning of rhetoric in 
Scottish schools. It prepares students to see beyond the way in which events are reported in 
the media or reinterpreted by Hollywood to distinguish fact from fiction, truth from make-
believe. Given how digitally and technologically advanced our society has become, Media 
Studies is perhaps in a stronger curricular position for delivering rhetorical education to 
students as it is not generally criticised, as Latin is, of being out of date and irrelevant for 
young people in Scotland today. Welch (1999: 101) notes that the high number of ‘HUTs, 
households using television, and the machine’s ubiquity has changed rhetoric’. Television 
has become so heavily implicated in people’s acquisition of language that there ought to be 
training in how to be effective decoders of the communication content and style, seen and 
heard, on television. Media Studies can go some way to providing ‘training in the 
grammar, vocabulary, and ideology of digital communication’ (Welch 1999: 134), 
especially important given the tendency for the communication ‘power mongers of post-
Fordism to intellectually colonise our citizenry’ (Welch 1999: 189). Without the capacity 
and ability for critical judgement, the television companies and producers will narcotise us 
into believing unquestioningly and consuming what they so imprecisely call ‘information’ 
and ‘content’. Communication on television is often rhetorical and involves persuasion: 
thus there exists an inherently rhetorical relationship between television and computers and 
the social and literary analysis of communication technologies. Welch (1999: 179) uses a 
pair of powerful metaphors which show the intersection of rhetoric, media and technology 
with captivating imagery,  
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 CfE outcomes which relate to Media Studies but which can usefully deliver aspects of rhetorical learning 
are: ‘I can evaluate the role of the media in a democracy, assess its importance in informing and influencing 
citizens, and explain decisions made by those in power’ SOC 4-17b (Scottish Government 2009a: 294), ‘I 
can understand how advertising and the media are used to influence consumers, HWB 2-37a (Scottish 
Government 2009a:  92), ‘I know that popular culture, the media and peer pressure can influence how I feel 
about myself and the impact this may have on my actions’ HWB 3-46b/ HWB 4-46b (Scottish Government 
2009a: 96) and ‘Through research and discussion, I have contributed to evaluations of media items with 
regard to scientific content and ethical implications’ SCN 3-20b (Scottish Government 2009a: 277). 
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if television offers a Niagara Falls of rhetorical artefacts, both graphic and 
spoken (and both based on writing), then the digital world offers an Atlantic 
Ocean of rhetorical artefacts and performances, also written, graphic and 
spoken.  
Through Media Studies, students can discover that cultures are composed of their rhetorics, 
and online technologies are at the centre of our current culture; therefore to be cyberliterate 
there is the need to go beyond merely being a user. Learners need to become active 
participants in the discussion, critiquing, challenging and anticipating how these 
technologies are designed, implemented and used (Gurak 2004: 191). I agree with Gurak 
(2004: 194) that the future of cyberliteracy needs to be critical, observant and activist and 
share her call for a curriculum that helps students understand and critically evaluate the 
rhetorical features of digital communication (Gurak 2004: xvi). This aim, I defend, 
resonates well with the cultivation of responsible citizens who, as a result of their study of 
rhetoric, exhibit literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking skills. Although a far cry 
from the study of rhetoric in Latin or Greek, the need for input from other subjects on the 
school curriculum is a result of the changing nature of rhetoric in contemporary society. 
This is no blight on Classical languages, rather it is an indication that as certain aspects of 
language and humanity stay the same, others change and, as Ovid sagely advised 
(Metamorphoses 15.662) ‘omnia mutantur nos et mutamur in illis’, ‘as all things change, 
we change with them’. The onus on educators, therefore, is to ensure that learners receive 
the best preparation each curricular area has to offer for the optimal study of rhetoric. 
What, then, is rhetoric’s optimal curricular position? The extent to which rhetoric ought to 
be viewed as a content-rich standalone subject in the curriculum is dependent to some 
degree on the current and future shape of CfE policy. Currently, rhetoric does not appear as 
a discrete subject within any of the curriculum areas, so it is difficult to imagine how such 
a scenario could arise except if the curriculum were subject to a review after the initial 
implementation process and the completion of a school cohort. Supposing that this review 
does not take place for the foreseeable future, I assert that there remain two other possible 
courses of action. Rhetoric could either be seen as a discrete subject but delivered as a 
short-course or it could be viewed as a cross-curricular skill, becoming the responsibility of 
many practitioners to embed it within their subject curriculum. If rhetoric were taught as a 
short course, it could complement citizenship education through a life skills or personal 
development programme (Chaffee [1992] and Knight [1992] showcase how critical 
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thinking can be approached in this way). While there is nothing inherently flawed in this 
approach, it runs the risk of rhetoric not being treated seriously by either staff or pupils; 
viewed from the outset as an add-on, dispensable and of limited direct value to curriculum 
and, by extension, the learner. Under such conditions, I do not think that rhetoric would 
make a successful re-entry to the school curriculum and would, quickly and without fuss, 
be marginalised or axed.  
If conceived as a cross curricular skill rhetoric could remain linked to a deep vein of 
linguistic and literary knowledge but, as Gaonkar (1990: 345) has commented, would no 
longer be ‘overburdened with content’. Emptied of the values and languages of a particular 
community in a particular time and place it could ‘become a portable, content-free process 
that could be used to respond discursively to any situation, anywhere, any time’ (Fleming 
2003: 96). This, I think, is the most fruitful approach to adopt as it allows for flexibility 
within schools concerning which staff (teachers of Classics, RME, Modern Studies, Media 
Studies or others) and students will be involved in the teaching and learning of rhetoric and 
it supports CfE’s focus on skills while contributing directly to the four capacities.  
Rhetoric in CfE: the practicalities of pedagogy 
Aside from the theoretical challenges which threaten the reintroduction of Classical 
rhetoric, there are some practical complications which require consideration too. Firstly, as 
mentioned in Chapter One, there is an acute shortage of qualified Classics teachers not 
only in Scotland, but in the UK (Hunt 2012a, b, c, 2013) with the result that there are now 
more teachers of Classical languages leaving the profession than there are entering, which 
has led to the closure of an increasing number of Classics departments in schools in the last 
decade (including Trinity High School in Renfrew, Our Lady and St. Patrick’s in 
Dumbarton, Cleveden Secondary in Glasgow as well as several others). Some hope is 
offered by the Graduate Teacher Program
90
 (GTP) which allows a small number of trainees 
to complete the teaching degree while employed as a full-time graduate teacher within a 
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 One of these is operated by the Kings Educational Consortium in Birmingham which trains three Classics 
teachers per academic year (Hunt 2012b), in addition to the twenty who are trained within the traditional 
University system. Such an annual increase of more than ten percent could quickly become significant for the 
Classics teaching profession and could begin to reverse the closure of departments and decline of support in 
schools. 
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school and college initial teacher training partnership. Additionally, as part of the Bachelor 
of Education degree in primary education at the University of Glasgow, student teachers 
can choose to pursue an elective in Latin, which is taught by the Classics Faculty in 
conjunction with the School of Education. Students of this very popular
91
 elective course 
have commented that their English grammar has improved as a result of their study of 
Latin and that it has made easier the learning of other languages (Seith 2009). A promising 
development from this elective is that teachers are cascading their enthusiasm for and 
knowledge of Latin to the pupils in the schools in which they teach after graduation and 
there exists a suitable textbook to revitalise Latin in the primary sector
92
.  Admittedly this 
elective is not a standard offering across primary teacher training institutions nationwide so 
the impact on the future of Classical language study is certainly limited. There are, 
however, encouraging signs that the tide may be turning and any renewed interest in 
Classical languages makes their reintroduction into the mainstream school curriculum all 
the more viable. 
Nevertheless it would remain challenging to locate and employ sufficient Classicists to 
deliver the Classical language elements of the sort of rhetorical program of study I have 
suggested in all Scottish schools. Rhetoric also forms just one small pocket of the study of 
Classical languages, therefore it is entirely conceivable that even those who are qualified to 
teach Latin and Greek may not actually know much about Ancient rhetoric or have any 
desire to teach it. As has been outlined in this chapter, teachers of other subjects can play 
an important role in the delivery of rhetorical knowledge and skills but the prospect of 
additional subject knowledge and teaching responsibilities has the potential to intimidate, 
alienate or infuriate some teachers at a time of curricular upheaval. Given the policy 
landscape of CfE (and reaction to the policy summarised in Chapter One), an attempt to 
integrate the teaching of rhetoric might be met with ill-favour by staff who see it as the 
imposition of yet another, unrequested change making further demands on their 
knowledge, energy and time. More positive reactions may be forthcoming from staff well-
disposed to curriculum change: those who are keen to embrace the flexibility offered by 
CfE may be enthusiastic to participate in the teaching of a cross-curricular program of 
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 So successful was the course that students asked for a more advanced version to be offered in subsequent 
years so that they could continue their study of Latin. 
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 ‘Minimus’ (Bell 1999) charts the adventures of Minimus, the small mouse, as he travels along Hadrian’s 
Wall and observes daily life in Vindolanda Roman fort. 
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rhetorical study or undertake appropriate training to enable them to do so
93
. It is 
impossible, at this early stage of conceptualisation, to second-guess the reaction of 
teaching staff; until such an initiative is actually introduced and the staff consulted on their 
views at varying stages of the process, reactions can be only hypothetical or conjectural.  
Secondly, it will be a matter of trial and error, I think, to determine at which age it is most 
beneficial to introduce learning about rhetoric. From my own professional experience, I 
have found that students respond positively when they reach a fairly advanced level of 
literacy and linguistic agility, aged approximately 15. However, my experience is limited 
to the teaching of rhetoric through Classical languages and it may be that rhetoric could be 
more usefully studied earlier, through RME, Modern Studies, English or Media Studies. 
What I am certain of, though, is that the model operated in the USA of having composition 
courses delivered by English language specialists at undergraduate level is inadequate. 
Undoubtedly, this encounter with rhetoric occurs too late; as I described in Chapter Three, 
criticality is an essential skill prior to higher education, a justification for the situation of 
my defence of the learning and teaching of rhetoric in the school curriculum. The argument 
I propound that learning rhetoric contributes positively to responsible citizenship resonates 
with the Scottish concern for young people to ‘fully understand and be able to play their 
part as citizens of a democratic society’ (Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] in Frazer 
2003: 67) and supports the belief once held about the aim of education being the enabling 
of students to become citizens of the community. In this regard, I consider the earlier the 
exposure to rhetoric, the better. This ideal appears influenced by the Aristotelian view of 
the role of rhetoric: to educate citizens for an active and productive life of participation in 
the polis. I agree with Turner that this conception of rhetorical studies is of very great 
importance and should ‘appear at the centre of a liberal arts education that prepares those 
who partake of it not merely for an occupation but rather for a lifetime of learning’ (Turner 
1998: 334). 
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 Lee, Bers and Storinger (1992) note that collective training seminars and teaching a new cross-curricular 
skill (critical thinking) made for a more cohesive faculty within a US community college and Litecky (1992: 
87) suggests that the teaching of an additional cross-curricular skill has the capacity to generate innovative 
teaching. Hence the introduction of rhetoric may herald welcome professional development opportunities for 
staff. 
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Rhetoric and responsible citizenship: why we need both Aristotle and 
Cicero 
Turner (1998: 332) is right, I think, that we need ‘to equip our students to be better critics 
and consumers of the mediated forms that permeate their lives’, and I propose that 
rhetorical studies offer a wealth of frameworks within which such analysis can fruitfully 
proceed. In Chapters Three and Four, I showed how the construction of communication 
and the capacity for self representation are becoming increasingly important in a society 
dominated by party politics and media spin
94
. A renewed focus on rhetoric aims to endow 
students with appropriate skills to make informed, ethical decisions. In Chapter Five I 
highlighted the benefits of rhetoric for citizenship, making a link between the study of 
rhetoric and deliberative democracy and arguing that the rhetorical framework provides a 
suitable and helpful structure around which citizens in Scotland might usefully construct 
their communications for improved communicative equality. The learning and teaching of 
rhetoric has the potential to make Scotland a better and more democratic place for all 
citizens if students are given appropriate preparation in school to be fully participating 
citizens, made aware of their capacity for critical thinking and critical literacy. The 
knowledge of how to apply these skills is directly related to the two-fold demands of 
rhetorical expertise: constructing and deconstructing communication. Yet when 
constructing communication, there is a fine line between using rhetorical techniques to 
improve the oratorical quality and manipulating the emotions of fellow citizens through 
linguistic ‘cleverness’. This age-old challenge to rhetoric, explored in Chapters One, Two 
and Five continues to be of concern; will the reintroduction of rhetoric in schools produce 
a society of linguistic tricksters? I sympathise to some extent with the anxiety displayed by 
this view since CfE is designed to improve Scottish education, not to encourage the 
reintroduction of unsavoury curricular elements. In response to this concern, I have two 
remarks to make. Firstly, students are certain to encounter attempts to engage their 
emotions which aim to persuade and may even experience the manipulation of their 
emotions and obfuscation of facts, simply by participating in civic life. The pedagogical 
approach I propose highlights that it is both helpful and right to learn about this skewed use 
of language in an authentic and educational context as part of a wider and balanced 
programme of communication studies rather than encountering it for the first time in a 
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 As Scotland prepares for an independence referendum next year there is already an increase in the quantity 
and pointedness of political communication in both print and digital media (Deans 2013). 
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more nefarious setting. Secondly, a focus on Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric rather than 
Cicero’s would mollify any potential disquietude in this regard since Aristotle views 
rhetoric as the discovery of any possible means of persuasion in communication whereas 
Cicero suggests that it should be used to help orators achieve their aims, regardless of the 
desires of the audience. While I consider that knowledge of both approaches to 
communication is vital for contemporary rhetorical education, I acknowledge that 
Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric is more morally defensible. It does, however, offer 
limited scope for learning about self-expression and performance hence why I think the 
syllabus content for modern rhetorical education should be informed and influenced both 
by the Aristotelian and Ciceronian conceptions of rhetoric. 
Revisiting the aims of the study and identification of areas for further 
development  
Chapter One identified that the aim of this dissertation was to defend the learning and 
teaching of Classical rhetoric in Scotland’s CfE. There, I claimed that this research study 
was innovative in a number of ways, three of which warrant restatement here. Firstly, the 
defence of Classical languages in Scottish education has not attracted much research 
(except for Williams 2003) and this is the first study to have been conducted on the role of 
Classical languages in CfE. Secondly, since its inception, there has been little critical 
analysis of the CfE suite of policy documents (Priestley 2010: 27) so in examining the 
conceptions of responsible citizenship, literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking, this 
study augments a small corpus of critical literature on CfE policy. Thirdly, although 
research has been (and is being conducted) on the learning and teaching of rhetoric in 
tertiary and higher education (particularly in the USA), there is a gap in the examination of 
rhetoric in the secondary school curriculum (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 10). In this way, 
this dissertation attempts to enrich this impoverished field of Classics education research 
and seeks to contribute to the field of Scottish curriculum studies scholarship.  
In considering the question, ‘what is education for?’, this dissertation has argued that in 
Scotland, the answers to this question are subject to social, political and economic 
influence at national, international and supranational levels. The question and its answers 
require to be continually reappraised and with a referendum for independence on the 
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political horizon in 2014, there will be an increasingly urgent need for research to keep 
pace with political changes, particularly in the analysis of the aims of education and the 
conception of citizenship promoted by Scotland’s politicians, policy-makers and educators. 
Future empirical
95
 research could usefully augment the findings of this conceptual study 
and could, for example, investigate the capacity of the rhetorical framework as a practical 
pedagogical strategy for the improvement of literacy in school pupils. Future conceptual 
research studies into curriculum theory and education policy, though, are also vital. They 
will help to maximise understanding of curricular aims while revealing the motivations 
behind policy discourse. This critical analysis is essential to ensure that education in 
Scottish schools is fit for purpose in the 21
st
 century and is adequately underpinned by 
detailed theoretical and philosophical consideration.   
Rhetoric does, however, appear to be making something of a comeback in the philosophy 
of education. A recent edition (44, 6) of the Journal of Curriculum Studies focussed on 
‘Revisiting the rhetorical curriculum’ and included articles on rhetoric’s relationship with 
paideia and Bildung (Biesta 2012), the rhetorical nature of the curriculum (Rutten and 
Soetaert 2012a, 2012b), rhetoric and illiteracy (Mortensen 2012) and the nature of 
rhetorical education (Brummett 2012). Based on the ‘new rhetoric’96 movement these 
articles were not concerned with the contemporary value of Classical rhetoric, nor did they 
situate their discussions in the secondary phase of education. Encouraging though this 
special strand of curriculum studies research is, this dissertation advises the extension of 
such research into the secondary school curriculum as it is in this context that I consider 
the revitalisation of rhetoric can have most immediate and valuable impact, as was outlined 
in Chapters Three and Four. While a consideration of the value of ‘new rhetoric’ in CfE 
could provide a useful parallel to the defence made here for Classical rhetoric, my primary 
concern from the outset of this study has been the retrieval of Classical languages for 
Scotland’s current and future learners. It is possible, however, that the examination of ideas 
from ‘new rhetoric’ could prove fruitful in supporting the claim I have made that rhetoric 
can make a dual contribution to the development of critical faculties and responsible 
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Hyslop-Margison and Ayaz Naseem (2007: vii) suggest that empirical research is concerned with ‘the 
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unequivocal respect’. Some pragmatic educators (especially those in the quagmire of CfE implementation) 
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 A movement which sought to reinterpret Classical rhetoric ‘as a means of understanding and living 
successfully in a world of symbols’ (Herrick 2004: 223), pioneered by scholars such as Kenneth Burke, I.A. 
Richards, Richard Weaver, Richard McKeon, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (Rutten and 
Soetaert 2012b). 
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citizenship, concepts which I suggest ought to be read together but which are not 
connected in CfE. 
In Chapter Five, I proposed that aspects of Ancient and modern democratic theory, 
previously considered irreconcilable, could be compatible if a partially revised conception 
of rhetoric is advanced which operates dialogically rather than monologically and paves 
the way for improved private and public communication and deliberation. By 
accommodating this revision, I made the claim that rhetoric can act as a unifying method 
of communication, acting as a bridge between people from differing social backgrounds by 
cultivating in learners a more profound sense of empathy, realised through the practice of 
narrative imagination in the common composition of arguments. Contrary to the notoriety 
rhetoric has attracted over centuries, which was explained in Chapters Two and Five, at the 
crux of this dissertation is the exhortation to move beyond such an uncritical and 
superficial analysis of rhetoric and to reconsider its value as a civic virtue. While there 
have been some basic studies (Copson 2006, Watson 2011) on the contribution of Classical 
languages to citizenship education, these have been based on ‘knowledge and 
understanding’ elements of citizenship and did not engage with participatory, active and 
‘difficult’ conceptions of citizenship. Based exclusively on pedagogical practice in English 
schools teaching the Cambridge Latin Course (CLC), the value and impact of these studies 
could be increased, I suggest, if their findings were reconsidered and informed by an 
enhanced understanding of the richly complex relationship between Classical languages, 
citizenship and the critical faculties. It is elements of the complexity, interdependence and 
importance of this relationship which this dissertation has sought to articulate. 
Certain aspects of CfE, it has been argued, are insufficiently articulated with the result that 
terms like ‘critical literacy’ and ‘active citizenship’, as Chapters Three and Four 
highlighted, are not clearly understood by teachers. More needs to be done in the future, I 
propose, to help teachers understand the implications of contested terms in CfE if they are 
to feel confident in the delivery of the new curriculum. Critical literature shows that these 
concepts are more complex than the way in which they are conceived in CfE and this lack 
of clarity also has the potential to threaten the quality of students’ learning in these areas. 
A possible solution to this problem might be the production of guidance documentation 
which distils the critical literature into a selection of practical strategies which teachers 
could choose to integrate into their teaching.  
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Implications of the study for professional practice  
The value of the Ed.D. dissertation is not simply the contribution it makes to the field of 
knowledge but is also the training and skills which are developed as a result of the research 
exercise and which can be redeployed in professional educational contexts (Andersen 
1983, Nelson and Coorough 1994, Townsend 2002). There are two main areas of my 
professional practice which I consider to have been transformed as a result of this research 
study: my professional commitment to citizenship education and my competency as an 
educational professional beyond my role as Classics teacher. There are two citizenship-
related developments of note. Firstly, by conducting a detailed interrogation of what is 
meant by responsible citizenship, my own understanding of citizenship education 
improved dramatically and I became more conscious in my daily teaching activities of the 
contribution I could make not just to a student’s ability to, for example, recognise and 
translate accurately a particular grammar feature in Latin but rather I have become 
increasingly aware of how I can help guide their growth and development as citizens. This 
has prompted me to afford more importance and time in my lessons to the student voice 
and the modelling of democracy; decisions regarding lesson content and assessment are 
sometimes made collectively by the students, often with representatives for conflicting 
views making their case. This provides an opportunity for students to participate in 
deliberative communication and gives them practice in experiencing a form of civic society 
which provides preparation for ‘the real thing’. I have found this transformation of my 
practice incredibly rewarding and it has renewed my commitment to the value of talking 
and listening within rhetorical education. 
Secondly, this research required the analysis of the LTS (2011a) document, ‘Developing 
Global Citizenships within CfE’ and the policy evaluation I completed in that regard has 
prompted me to pursue additional professional initiatives. Inspired by the value of 
international education and the maximal interpretation of global citizenship, I have become 
involved in Comenius school partnerships, sponsored by the British Council, which 
facilitate the exchange of knowledge and understanding between staff and pupils in schools 
across Europe. Through e-twinning and school visits, I now actively seek to generate links 
between cultures and peoples for the mutual benefit of education and citizenship. This is an 
area of professional development of which I knew nothing prior to the commencement of 
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this research study and which I attribute to a particular focus in current Scottish 
educational policy. 
Because this study has involved detailed analysis of CfE policy and the assessment of its 
impact on my own professional practice as a Classics teacher, I consider that my wider 
professional competency has been transformed in four ways. Firstly, I have delivered in-
school staff development training on ‘literacy across learning’ based on the research I 
conducted in the dissertation phase. I previously lacked confidence in my ability to engage 
in professional dialogue with colleagues, since my claims were based simply on a ‘hunch’ 
but with the benefit of rigorous academic investigation and extensive critical analysis of 
the policy, I relished the opportunity to share and develop new ideas. Secondly, and a 
result of this free-flowing professional dialogue, I have engaged more actively in 
collaboration with colleagues. This dissertation has suggested that the most efficient way 
to deliver rhetoric in CfE is through a cross-curricular approach and this has been 
influenced in no small measure by the discovery of ways in which Classics can enrich 
activities in other subjects and be enriched by them, prompted by the intention of CfE as a 
‘joined up curriculum for the 21st century’ (Carr et al. 2006: 13). For example, I 
collaborated with colleagues in Chemistry, Art and Mathematics on a ‘silver’ theme, with 
colleagues in Design and Technology, Geography and Physics on a ‘cosmology’ theme 
and with colleagues in English, Modern Languages and Music on an ‘Environmental 
issues’ theme. Having the professional courage to approach teaching colleagues in other 
departments and to suggest new ideas has certainly been influenced positively by the 
conduct of this study and the success of these activities has improved my perception of the 
aims and intentions of CfE. Thirdly, my reaction to CfE has been transformed by the 
conduct of this study. As a member of staff, my initial reaction was one of despair since so 
much was left unsaid: where was the syllabus and which resources were being 
recommended? However, analysis of the policy confirms that, although not perfect, CfE 
embodies an ambitious program of improvement for Scottish schools with aims for both 
learning and teaching which are worth pursuing. Finally, the fact that CfE places greater 
onus on teachers to be creative and innovative has dovetailed very neatly with the research 
imperative of this study. In defending Classical rhetoric, I have had to think critically and 
creatively about its optimal position in the curriculum and the process of doing so has 
made me not only a better researcher but also a better teacher. The stimulation I have 
gained from the conduct of this study has made me determined to continue my role as a 
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researcher within education
97
; something I hope to fulfil no matter which branch of 
education my career follows.  
Concluding remarks 
This dissertation has highlighted a possible new role for Classical rhetoric which correlates 
with the purposes and principles of CfE and which has the potential to be of academic, 
social and civic benefit to learners in Scottish schools. I have shown the impact such a 
curricular innovation might have on the cultivation of responsible citizenship and have 
made direct connections between the study of rhetoric and the development of three cross-
curricular skills, literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking. The capacity for critical 
awareness and judgement has become more of a priority in education, I contend, since the 
expansion in use of technology, media and electronic methods of communication. More 
than ever, learners are confronted by mixed messages which compete for their support and 
promotion; they must be equipped with suitable knowledge and skills to critically evaluate 
these messages to determine their veracity.  I agree with Glaser that being critical is more 
than a desirable educational objective; it also ‘helps the individual cooperate with others’ 
(1985:26). The capacity to exercise critical judgement, then, can be viewed as ‘an 
intellectual ability, a strategy for dealing with the world’ (Cromwell 1992: 38) and, in my 
view, a factor contributing to good citizenship. Rhetoric acts as the foundation for the 
acquisition of critical skills and, as I showed in Chapter Five, has the potential to 
contribute to deliberative democracy, a political system in which the art of thinking 
together is combined with effectively engaging in discourse that does not just try to win 
but that moves all ‘sides’ into new territory. At its best, rhetoric can become a curricular 
imperative 
whose end is the development of a certain kind of person: engaged, articulate, 
resourceful, sympathetic, civil – a person trained in, conditioned by, and 
devoted to what was once called eloquence (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 24). 
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 In fact, I have already identified a project on which I hope to commence work in the near future, which has 
critical literacy as its focus. 
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In order to become rhetorical, I contend that students need exposure to the considered 
construction and deconstruction of communication in concert with the rhetorical 
framework and a theoretical vocabulary for reflecting on and making sense of their 
rhetorical experience. The critical ability which grows out of the skills associated with 
creation and interpretation of communication may help them to observe that ‘every 
communication situation is unique’ (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 24) but crucially that they 
are suitably equipped to respond in an appropriate, responsible and articulate way. It is 
hoped that the reintegration of rhetoric into the mainstream curriculum might help 
ameliorate what Eagleton (2013) has called a ‘crisis of criticism’; he suggests that there are 
elements of contemporary Western culture which conspire against literary sensitivity and 
that there is an important job to be done in making society more attentive to the word and 
encouraging people to ‘read closely’ (Batholomew 2013: 23). It is my hope that the 
learning and teaching of rhetoric can do exactly this. 
This dissertation, though, aims to raise the possibility of reviving in our time an art of 
rhetoric whose subject is bigger than a basic verbal skill and whose impact is greater than a 
critical theory. Terril (2011: 296) contradicts the view of Plato by suggesting that an 
education in rhetoric ought to be seen as ‘something more than merely the training of 
tongues’. As I highlighted in Chapter Five, following Young (1997), I shun the common 
identification of rhetoric with a focus on building a science of argumentation as a method 
for participating in deliberative democracy. Rather, I consider such a ‘science of 
argumentation’ to be a dreadful slight on the complexity and richness of Classical 
rhetoric’s legacy. Following Aristotle, I would prefer rhetoric to be viewed as a training in 
civic discourse, an integral element in the formation of citizens, that has intellectual 
integrity, moral attraction and practical application to a variety of communicative 
situations. I propose that the role of Classical rhetoric in the curriculum should be even 
broader and more ambitious; it ought to involve the development of an art that, once 
learned, ‘confers on students a genuine practical and ethical ability’ (Petraglia and Bahri 
2003: 105). In this regard Booth (2004: xii) suggests, and I agree, that ‘the quality of our 
lives, especially the ethical and communal quality depends to an astonishing degree on the 
quality of our rhetoric’. If this is so, it follows that ‘the teaching of rhetoric – of how to 
think together and talk together and read and write together – is the most important of all 
vocations’ (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: ix) hence my call for its role in Scotland’s CfE to be 
urgently reviewed. 
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Appendix A Rhetorical passages 
Cicero, In Catilinam I, 1-2 
Cicero accuses Catiline, a dissenting noble youth, of hatching a plot to overthrow the 
government of the Roman Republic. 
How long will you (continue to) abuse our patience, Catiline? For how much longer will 
that rage of yours make a mockery of us? To what point will your unbridled audacity show 
itself? Did the nocturnal garrison on the Palatine, the watch patrols of the city, the fear of 
the people, the assemblies of all the good men, this most fortified place of holding the 
Senate, the faces and expressions of all these people [the senators] not move you at all? Do 
you not realise that your plans lie revealed? Do you not see that your plot is already held in 
check by the knowledge of all these people? Do you think that any of us do not know what 
you did last night, what you did the night before, where you were, who you summoned, 
and what plans you made? 
O what times (we live in)! O what customs (we pursue)! The Senate understands these 
things; the consul sees these things; this man, however, lives. He lives? No indeed, he even 
comes to the Senate. He even takes part in public affairs. He points out and designates with 
his eyes, individuals amongst us for slaughter. But we, brave men, seem to do enough for 
the state, if we avoid the rage and the weapons of that man. You, Catiline, should have 
been led to death already long ago by order of the consul, that ruin, which you are devising 
against us, should have been conferred upon you. 
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Barack Obama, US Presidential election victory speech, 5th November 
2008 
Opening 
If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are 
possible; who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time; who still 
questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer.  
It's the answer told by lines that stretched around schools and churches in numbers this 
nation has never seen; by people who waited three hours and four hours, many for the very 
first time in their lives, because they believed that this time must be different; that their 
voices could be that difference.  
It's the answer spoken by young and old, rich and poor, Democrat and Republican, black, 
white, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, gay, straight, disabled and not disabled - 
Americans who sent a message to the world that we have never been just a collection of 
individuals or a collection of Red States and Blue States: we are, and always will be, the 
United States of America.  
It's the answer that led those who have been told for so long by so many to be cynical, and 
fearful, and doubtful of what we can achieve to put their hands on the arc of history and 
bend it once more toward the hope of a better day.  
It's been a long time coming, but tonight, because of what we did on this day, in this 
election, at this defining moment, change has come to America.  
146 
 
End 
America, we have come so far. We have seen so much. But there is so much more to do. 
So tonight, let us ask ourselves - if our children should live to see the next century; if my 
daughters should be so lucky to live as long as Ann Nixon Cooper, what change will they 
see? What progress will we have made?  
This is our chance to answer that call. This is our moment.  
This is our time - to put our people back to work and open doors of opportunity for our 
kids; to restore prosperity and promote the cause of peace; to reclaim the American dream 
and reaffirm that fundamental truth - that out of many, we are one; that while we breathe, 
we hope, and where we are met with cynicism and doubt, and those who tell us that we 
can't, we will respond with that timeless creed that sums up the spirit of a people: yes, we 
can.  
Thank you, God bless you, and may God bless the United States of America.  
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Winston Churchill, Speech to House of Commons, 4th June 1940 
I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the 
best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again 
able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of 
tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone. 
At any rate, that is what we are going to try to do. That is the resolve of His Majesty’s 
Government-every man of them. That is the will of Parliament and the nation. 
The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their 
need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades to the 
utmost of their strength. 
Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall 
into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or 
fail. 
We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, 
we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our 
Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the 
landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we 
shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a 
large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and 
guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, the 
New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the 
old. 
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Appendix B The four capacities of CfE 
 
Scottish Government (2008: 22) 
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